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Abstract 
 
As Philip L. Simpson notes, humankind has an ‘ongoing...fascination with tales of 
gruesome murders and evil villains’ (15). Popular culture abounds with depictions of the 
mad and the bad; and perhaps no single disorder holds as much morbid appeal as 
psychopathy, the baffling condition which combines what Hervey M. Cleckley terms a 
‘mask of sanity’, with a seeming lack of the qualities usually deemed to constitute 
humanity.  
My thesis focuses on how authors have sought to explain, interpret and understand 
the psychopathic individual, and explores how literary techniques have manipulated 
readers’ responses to the moral questions posed by psychopathic characters. Between the 
mid-nineteenth century and the present day, authors have increasingly used empathetic 
narrative techniques to encourage readers to identify with and accept the villains whose 
stories they so voraciously consume. I track the transitions in narrative style, structure and 
form which take us from depictions of the psychopath as fiendish ‘other’, for example 
Rigaud in Charles Dickens’s Little Dorrit, to modern portrayals of the psychopathic 
murderer as hero, as seen in Jeff Lindsay’s series of Dexter novels. 
I consider what the reader gains from reading such material and how we as readers 
negotiate the paradox of empathising with characters who are themselves incapable of 
empathy. I also explore whether cultural fascination with the psychopath is based on a 
desire to understand the workings of the psychopathic mind, a perverse delight in our fear 
of the aberrant ‘other’, or whether it reveals something altogether darker and more 
disturbing about ourselves.   
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Introduction 
 
Psychopaths: callous, unemotional predators devoid of the usual markers of humanity. 
Monstrous others, stalking the mean streets of our teeming cities; ready to pounce on the 
unsuspecting or socially marginal. So goes the popular cultural conception of psychopathy, 
but how does the reality of the condition compare to the myth? Conservative estimates 
suggest that approximately 1% of the population is psychopathic, which in a city of around 
8 million inhabitants, such as London or New York, equates to around 80,000 
psychopaths.
1
 Of this 1%, some will be criminals;
2
 some will be killers. But the majority 
will not offend and many of these will hold respectable, high ranking professional 
positions as surgeons, CEOs, lawyers, politicians and police officers.
3
 Despite the 
relatively low levels of violent offending amongst psychopaths, they appear in a 
disproportionately high number of popular cultural treatments including literature, film, 
television and music, and the term psychopath has become a part of the popular lexicon. 
Indeed, characters bearing the signs of psychopathy have had narrative presence for as 
long as narratives have existed and can arguably be found in works from Ancient Greece, 
the Bible, Chaucer, Shakespeare and Marlowe.
4
 There is no specific, recognised canon of 
psychopath fiction and it does not exist as a formal, established genre. However, the 
                                                          
1
 Robert Hare suggests that the figure in New York could be as high as 100,000 (Without Conscience 2). We 
can surmise that this may be due to the city’s concentration of the high-powered, high-risk roles, in sectors 
such as finance, to which the psychopath is attracted. 
2
 It is estimated that 15%-20% of the prison population is psychopathic. See Robert D. Hare, ‘Psychopaths 
and Their Nature: Implications for the Mental Health and Criminal Justice Systems,’ in Millon, 188-212. 
3
 See Paul Babiak, ‘When Psychopaths Go to Work,’ Applied Psychology: An International Review 44.2 
(1995):171-188; and Paul Babiak and Robert D. Hare, Snakes in Suits: When Psychopaths Go to Work (New 
York: Harper/Collins, 2006). 
4
 Greek military statesman Alcibades is generally considered to have been a ‘real life’ psychopath, whilst the 
vignette by Theophrastus on ‘The Unscrupulous Man’ offers a fictional account; in the New Testament, St. 
Paul warns of people with psychopathic tendencies, see 1 Timothy 4:2, NIV, and Titus 1:15-16, NIV; The 
Pardoner in The Canterbury Tales, Iago in Othello and Richard III (although only in his Shakespearean 
incarnation, as historians now agree that he did not show psychopathic characteristics in life), and Barabas in 
The Jew of Malta can all be construed as psychopathic. 
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psychopathic figure is so ubiquitous in narrative that it seems appropriate to use the term 
‘psychopath fiction’ to loosely and economically refer to the myriad representations of 
psychopathy in literature. 
Interest in psychopathic characters has not diminished with the passage of time; 
rather, as psychopathy has gained popular currency it has become increasingly central to 
the cultural imaginary. Significantly, literary representations of the psychopath have not 
only proliferated, they have also become more sympathetic; and this thesis will chart the 
development of the psychopathic figure across the last 150 years or so. My interest lies in 
the transition from depictions of the psychopath as fiendish ‘other’, for example Dickens’s 
Rigaud, to modern portrayals of the psychopathic murderer as hero, as portrayed in Jeff 
Lindsay’s series of Dexter novels. Such a startling transformation demands critical 
scrutiny; this thesis will investigate how reader engagement with the psychopathic figure is 
manipulated by authors bent on provoking an empathetic response to characters who were 
traditionally portrayed as monstrous. Narrative poetics, which we can define as the 
linguistic techniques of prose and poetry, can push the reader into positions of 
identification with literary figures who both attract and repulse, and my study will consider 
the modes of reception inherent to such texts. These ‘poetics of identification’ will be 
explored in detail as I demonstrate how literary technique shapes aesthetic response and 
enables readers to negotiate moral ambiguity in their acceptance of the psychopathic 
character.  
Although, as noted above, representations of psychopathy can be found in texts 
some 2000 years old, the condition itself was not formalised in medical science until well 
into the twentieth century. Etymologically the word ‘psychopath’ derives from Greek, 
where ‘psykhe’ means ‘mind’ and ‘pathos’ refers to suffering; in its earliest uses the term 
‘psychopath’ was used to refer to any kind of psychological disorder. Chapter One of this 
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study will chart the scientific evolution of the term from its first recorded use to its current 
tightly defined clinical status. Today, psychopathy is recognised as a specific personality 
disorder, distinct from the antisocial personality disorder with which it is often confused. 
Diagnosis of the disorder is typically made via the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, 
or PCL-R, a clinical rating scale which measures socially deviant behaviours and specific 
personality traits to produce a detailed picture of the psychopathic individual. One of the 
key measurements made by the PCL-R relates to the subject’s ability to feel empathy for 
others, and the psychopath can be typified as callous-unemotional and lacking in affect. 
Given the increasingly sympathetic treatment of the figure in literature and the empathetic 
narrative techniques employed by writers in the modernist period and beyond, the focus on 
empathy is very interesting. Chapter One therefore explores the appeal of representations 
of the psychopath in fiction and offers an exposition of the modes of literary reception. I 
also consider the implications of fictional representations of the psychopath, and examine 
their impact on the reader, literary technique and narrative. I rely on the PCL-R definition 
of psychopathy as it offers a tighter and more nuanced delineation of psychopathic traits 
than other clinical rating methods, particularly with regards to its emphasis on empathy. 
This thesis is concerned with literary constructions rather than clinical case studies, 
however, as Liam Clarke notes, 
whilst fiction is (in itself) not real, it informs us about reality, especially its 
‘incomplete status’ and it can do this since it doesn’t carry the promised 
expectations of psychology research with its hypotheses and anticipated 
outcomes. Neither does fiction seek to inform didactically…Instead it 
constantly demands a collusion from readers in respect of its meanings, 
construing itself in ways that complicate this requirement endlessly. (186) 
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This sense of collusion can be troubling to the reader of psychopath fiction, as it often 
carries with it a sense of moral ambivalence. However, examples studied in this thesis 
offer the reader a number of means of repudiating the more troubling aspects of her or his 
engagement with transgressive material, such as cognitive dissonance or Thomas Leitch’s 
techniques of disavowal.  
Cognitive dissonance was the subject of a 1957 study by social psychologist Leon 
Festinger. It describes the state of tension which arises when a person holds clashing 
cognitions or ‘knowledges’; what Festinger describes as ‘things a person knows about 
himself, about his behaviour, and about his surroundings’ (9). Cognitions are dissonant if 
‘for one reason or another, they do not fit together…[or are] inconsistent or contradictory’ 
(12-13). The reader of psychopath fiction, for example, may find it difficult to reconcile 
their support for a fictional killer with their understanding that multiple murder can never 
be justified in real life. The disharmony of dissonance is uncomfortable and the subject 
feels under pressure to reduce it via psychic manoeuvring. Festinger notes that ‘in order to 
eliminate a dissonance completely, some cognitive element must be changed…But even if 
it is impossible to eliminate a dissonance, it is possible to reduce the total magnitude of 
dissonance by adding new cognitive elements’ (21). The reader of psychopath fiction may 
therefore seek to reduce dissonance by emphasizing certain elements, or adding new ones, 
which are consonant with the idea being explored. This study will focus on the ways in 
which narrative poetics aim to reduce dissonance and facilitate the acceptance of troubling 
material and characters. 
Similar manoeuvres take place during audience identification with challenging 
characters on screen and some of these techniques of disavowal are also applicable to 
literature. In his 2001 article, ‘Nobody Here But Us Killers: The Disavowal of Violence in 
Recent American Films’, Leitch discusses the ways in which American films provide 
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audiences with an array of tools they can use to reduce the ambivalence created by the 
passive acceptance and enjoyment of screen violence.
5
 The stylisation of violence, such as 
that seen in the films of Sam Peckinpah or Quentin Tarantino, for instance, can highlight 
the dissonance created by violent spectacle and our consumption of it as entertainment; 
however for Leitch this is not a single process. He draws a distinction between those 
instances which make ‘the audience more acutely and uncomfortably aware of their own 
ambivalence toward the violence they are watching’ (ibid. 5), and those that ‘anaesthetize 
the audience’s awareness of their own disavowal rather than sharpening it’ (ibid.). I will 
address such techniques in my discussion of the representations of psychopathy dealt with 
in this thesis, highlighting instances where readers are forced to address their moral 
complicity, such as in Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho (1991), and those where the 
reader is encouraged to gloss over the more disturbing aspects of the narrative, as with 
Lindsay’s Dexter series (2004-2013). Leitch draws attention to the way that intertextuality 
can reattribute the sociopathology being explored from the character expressing it to the 
sources which are being referenced. Comedy, Leitch explains, is another important tool of 
disavowal and my study will show how this has become a vital element of psychopath 
fiction, both in terms of disavowing moral connivance and for engendering empathy for 
psychopathic characters. 
It should be noted that, in addition to psychopathy being a relatively newly-defined 
condition, empathy itself is also a modern term. As Breda Gray points out, it was 
‘translated in the early twentieth century from the term Einfühlung which dates from 
1897….So the term empathy did not exist until the nineteenth century and it is seen as 
signalling aspects of the modern self’ (209-210). In fact, the earliest recorded use of the 
                                                          
5
 For a discussion of how Leitch’s techniques are utilised in the award-winning Showtime television series, 
Dexter, please see David Schmid’s article ‘The Devil You Know: Dexter and the “Goodness” of American 
Serial Killing’, in Howard, 132-142. 
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clinical category of psychopathy (see section 1.2) and the designation of empathy are 
relatively coterminous.
6
 In recognition of the significance of these late-nineteenth century 
developments, I plot the beginning of the psychopathic character’s literary trajectory in the 
same approximate period. Texts are selected both for their use of the psychopathic 
character and for the quality of their psychological rendering and empathetic techniques; 
however, my selection is necessarily selective rather than exhaustive, and constraints of 
space and time have forced me to include only the most singular texts. Filmic and 
televisual texts are sadly beyond the scope of this project. 
The narrative modes for representing consciousness in fiction are detailed in 
Chapter Two, where I consider the impact of narrative situation and focalization on what 
Dorrit Cohn has termed psycho-narration (see pages 59-60 for exposition of this term 
which, it should be noted, describes narrative techniques for rendering consciousness and 
is not specifically related to psychopathy). Textual analysis of three key novels then 
follows. My starting point, in section 2.1, is Charles Dickens’s Little Dorrit (1857), which 
contains an extraordinarily detailed and lifelike psychopathic character named Rigaud. The 
novel is notable as much for its polyphonic techniques as for its author’s obvious 
fascination with his psychopathic character, and we see the attraction of repulsion which 
so colours psychopath fiction played out in his handling of Rigaud. Yet despite Dickens’s 
flirtations with his psychopath, this realist novel follows a standard pattern of crime and 
retribution. Rigaud is depicted as a monstrous other who must ultimately pay for his 
crimes. This theme is modified slightly in the second text I consider in this section, Fyodor 
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment (1866). Despite the narrative trajectory promised by 
                                                          
6
 Emil Kraepelin referred to ‘psychopathic states’ for the first time in the fifth edition of his seminal work, 
Psychiatrie: Ein Lehrbuch which was published in 1896, although it was not until 1904 that he identified 
what is today referred to as the antisocial personality (see Millon 9-10). One could argue that the emergence 
of the term ‘empathy’ was a prerequisite for the acknowledgment of the absence of empathy in the 
psychopathic subject, in a similar way to how the emergence of the term ‘homosexual’ in the late-nineteenth 
century predated the notion of heterosexuality (see Sedgwick 2) and led to the creation of ‘a binarized 
identity that was full of implications’ (ibid.). 
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the novel’s title, Dostoevsky shows an almost perverse interest in human wickedness and 
suffering. His novel of consciousness is significant both for its extraordinary rendering of 
aberrant psychology and for its manipulation of the reader; and, although its protagonist is 
not, in fact, a psychopath, Crime and Punishment’s narrative style would have a lasting 
influence on subsequent psychopath fiction.
7
 The final analysis in Chapter Two covers 
William Faulkner’s literary experiments in The Sound and the Fury (1929), in which he 
attempts to approximate human perception from a number of different perspectives. His 
poetics offer new ways of accessing consciousness, and his introduction of black humour 
and a veneer of normality to his psychopath was to impact heavily on those novelists who 
came after him. 
In fact, after Faulkner there followed a veritable explosion of psychopath narratives 
and in Chapter Three of the thesis I examine the social and cultural drivers for the sudden 
proliferation of fictional psychopaths in the twentieth century. This chapter tracks the 
psychopath through hardboiled, pulp and noir fiction, and considers the significance of the 
serial killer subgenre. The international relocation from Europe to America in this period is 
also significant, as it follows the academic and psychoanalytic developments in the field. 
The period saw a concentration of psychopathic figures in the crime fiction genre, and I 
discuss how innovations in publishing impacted on the development and expansion of this 
kind of fiction. I map the development of the psychopathic figure onto the key events of 
this tumultuous century, and show how the psychopath was progressively depicted as an 
empathetic and likeable character whose transgressive behaviour could be seen as a 
rational response to an increasingly hostile modernity. The chapter offers detailed analysis 
                                                          
7
 Unlike the other texts studied in this thesis, Crime and Punishment does not contain a psychopathic 
character. It is included here due to its early rendering of psychological disturbance and the way that 
Dostoevsky’s poetics push the reader into a position of empathy and collusion with the killer; the interest 
therefore resides in the narratological technique, rather than psychological accuracy. A true depiction of 
psychopathy can be found in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (1880), where the senior Karamazov 
appears to be a prototypical psychopath. For Cleckley’s discussion of this character, see The Mask of Sanity, 
page 194. 
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of a number of key texts from the period, with a particular focus on the works of Jim 
Thompson and Patricia Highsmith whose witty, personable psychopaths created a new 
template for psychopath fiction. Conversely, this period also produced texts which sought 
to demystify and understand the psychopath; particularly those ‘real life’ psychopaths 
whose hideous crimes had captured and appalled the public imagination. The sensational 
Leopold and Loeb trial of 1924 is depicted in Meyer Levin’s Compulsion (1956) and I 
assess its impact on Truman Capote’s genre-changing ‘non-fiction novel’ In Cold Blood 
(1966), which deals with the 1959 Clutter murders. Capote’s unflinching portrayal of the 
killers Perry Smith and Dick Hickock paved the way for the serial killer subgenre which 
would follow. 
Chapter Four of the thesis examines the genesis of the serial killer subgenre and its 
impact on fictional representations of psychopathy. I focus on the impact of Thomas Harris 
and his paradigm-changing creation of Hannibal Lecter, who came to define psychopathy 
in popular consciousness. Lecter achieved a mainstreaming of psychopathic deviancy 
which led to a massive shift towards the normalisation of psychopathy in pop culture. 
However, the key thrust of Chapter Four is the extraordinary impact of Bret Easton Ellis’s 
American Psycho (1991). His highly controversial postmodern novel challenged 
conceptions of decency via its explicit scenes of extreme violence and pornography, yet 
still managed to create an amusing and engaging psychopathic character that became a 
cultural icon. The acceptable public face of his psychopath contrasts with the banality of 
random violence in a narrative which critiques the market-driven, neoliberal late-1980s 
culture which valorises psychopathic traits and devalues the human. American Psycho is 
the single most impactful novel in the history of psychopath fiction to date and perhaps the 
only one to force the reader to truly confront his or her engagement with violence as 
entertainment. The binary oppositions of good and evil, sanity and madness are 
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relentlessly attacked until subject positions become meaningless. Ellis wrests the 
psychopath away from pulp fiction and back into high literature. 
Ellis’s depiction of modernity and his ‘boy-next-door’-cum-‘fucking evil 
psychopath’ (19) leads us to the end point of the literary trajectory of the fictional 
psychopath: the heroic serial killer, Dexter Morgan. I examine Jeff Lindsay’s series of 
Dexter novels and ask whether it represents a dramatic negotiation of the rhetoric of evil or 
a rational response to bewildering modernity. Lindsay’s postmodern gathering of 
psychopath fiction influences enables him to create one of popular culture’s most 
innovative and accessible anti-heroes; a serial killer who only kills other killers. However, 
my research has revealed that as the series progresses, the focus on Dexter’s psychopathy 
retreats and the novels move towards a police procedural format where the emphasis is on 
detection rather than the vigilantism of the earliest novels. In this way Lindsay’s books tap 
into the zeitgeist and answer a cultural need to push back against the pressures of modern 
life via a transgressive figure that both challenges and supports the status quo. The moral 
ambivalence which has followed the psychopath’s literary trajectory from monster to hero 
is slowly replaced with a flaccid conformity. The Conclusion of this thesis addresses what 
this conformity represents, then considers the likely future developments of the 
psychopathic figure in literature, its continued cultural prominence and its potential 
relocation to other media. 
 
The Question of Gender 
In the interests of brevity, throughout the thesis I use the male pronoun when referring to 
the psychopath. Psychopathy affects more males than females and the disorder is more 
pronounced in men, particularly with regards to physical violence. With the exception of 
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characters such as Rhoda, the girl psychopath in William March’s The Bad Seed (1954) 
and the mysterious, letter-writing killer in Edward Lee and Elizabeth Steffen’s Portrait of 
the Psychopath as a Young Woman (1998), the literary psychopath is almost exclusively 
male. This mirrors the profile of the typical serial killer (the most common figuration of 
the psychopath in fiction), who Peter Vronsky argues ‘usually turn out to be white males’ 
(8) and also points to the gender issues which necessarily attend this kind of literature. 
Kevin D. Haggerty suggests that ‘[f]rom a feminist perspective it could be argued that 
serial killing is not so much a radical departure from normal codes of civilized behaviour 
as it is an intensification of hegemonic masculine ideals’ (332) and this is certainly in 
evidence throughout the corpus of psychopath fiction. 
It is impossible to study texts such as Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho or Jim 
Thompson’s pulp classics without confronting the issue of gender. The works of both 
authors contain multiple instances of disturbing and graphic violence against women: a 
stratified response to the texts therefore seems inevitable. Surely no woman could enjoy 
reading American Psycho’s extended scenes of phallocentric pornography, torture and 
murder, or engage with Thompson’s assorted shrews, gold-diggers, and double-crossing 
bed-hoppers? Yet both authors, each now enjoying cult status, have cross-gender appeal – 
so how can we account for this? As befits these authors, there is no one clear answer to this 
question, but rather an assortment of responses which mingle and interlink to create a 
dialogic view of gender, literature and the act of reading that communicates much about 
readers and the relationship of literature to society. 
 Although Ellis and Thompson will bear the weight of my scrutiny in this section, 
the issue of gender, representation and reception is applicable to most of the authors 
analysed in this study, and particularly to those writing in the twentieth century. With the 
exception of Patricia Highsmith, all of the authors are male and the majority of them, 
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Highsmith included, write masculinist fantasies from a male perspective, for an implied 
male readership. The treatment of women in the texts is broadly analogous with the 
condition of women at the time of the novels’ writing, with the pulp fiction and noir texts 
of the early- to mid-twentieth century having a particularly narrow and unsympathetic 
approach to the portrayal of women. Although pulp fiction, with its sexy, salacious covers 
and textual focus on violence, hard drinking men and femme fatales was aimed mainly at 
male readers, contemporary statistics reveal the broader genre of crime fiction to be 
female-oriented. 80% of all fiction is reportedly bought by women (Groskop) with some 
commentators claiming that ‘[w]omen account for almost 60% of the [crime fiction] 
genre’s market, with females aged over 55 the most avid readers’ (Hill). I suspect that the 
women Hill references are reading about Jane Tennison (in the novels of Lynda La Plante) 
or Kay Scarpetta (a Patricia Cornwell heroine) rather than Patrick Bateman, but the fact 
remains that the crime genre, for all its gore and sensationalism, does appeal to women. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the allure that contemporary crime fiction holds for some 
female readers may lie in a fascination with extreme psychology and a desire to understand 
the drivers to abhorrent acts, or the culture of fear into which females are inculcated from a 
young age (Cooke). It is difficult to align American Psycho with the more formulaic novels 
of Cornwell and her ilk, as Ellis’s novel not only confounds generic classification but also 
refuses to adhere to literary conventions with regards to plot, identification and resistance, 
narrative closure, and so on. The issue of generic classification is an important one; 
although most of the novels dealt with by this study can sit under the very broad umbrella 
of crime fiction, very few of them are defined by it. The texts analysed in this thesis were 
selected for their treatment of psychopathic or psychologically disordered characters rather 
than crime, hence the inclusion of non-crime texts such as Little Dorrit and The Sound and 
the Fury, and texts in which crime takes a backseat to the development of the psychopathic 
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protagonist. Statistical data detailing readership demographics is not readily available for 
the various and distinct genres that the psychopath appears in, but work done on the 
readership of crime fiction (which often relies on psychopathic characters for its thrills) 
offers a view of contemporary tastes, particularly in relation to gender, which can be 
instructive. Nevertheless we must not forget that, in a thesis interrogating poetics, we are 
concerned with the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’ of fiction’s appeal.  
This ‘how’ rests in part in what cultural historian Robin Bernstein, in her essay on 
‘Material Culture and the Performance of Race’, has referred to as a ‘processual 
interaction’ (86) between a ‘scriptive thing’ and the response it provokes in the person 
interacting with it. A scriptive thing is something which invites a particular action, 
reaction, or range of physical response. Bernstein explains: ‘That which I call a “scriptive 
thing,” like a play script, broadly structures a performance whilst simultaneously allowing 
for resistance and unleashing original, live variations that may not be individually 
predictable’ (69). Further, ‘[t]hings script meaningful bodily movements, and these 
citational movements think the otherwise unthinkable’ (70). According to Bernstein’s 
schema, the very act of turning the pages of a novel like American Psycho – itself a 
scriptive thing – interpellates the reader into Bateman’s disturbed and disturbing version of 
the world. The grasping and turning of the page transforms the reader from a passive 
consumer of entertainment into a person who actively solicits scenes of hard core 
pornography, extreme violence, cannibalism and murder. According to Bernstein, ‘by 
entering the scripted scenario, the individual is interpellated into ideology and thus into 
subjecthood’ (73). From this we can extrapolate that, for the period of entrancement (see 
section 1.5), the reader of American Psycho temporarily merges with Bateman and his 
psychology, however disgusting, boring, or difficult that may be. This interpellation seems 
to account for the curious phenomenon of cross-gender identification in a novel which has 
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such a troubling relationship to women. That is not to say that women are uniformly 
enamoured of the text, if at all – and of course men, too, can experience resistance to the 
novel’s more challenging content. The novel’s early critical reception almost uniformly 
opposed its violence, vacuity and tedium. Yet this too, is part of the novel’s script. 
Bernstein argues that ‘an action which appears transgressive actually follows a script’s 
range of implications’ (75), with resistant response being not only permissible as an 
appropriate response to disturbing material, but also covertly invited by the text. Novels, or 
scriptive things, are read and interacted with within what Bernstein refers to as 
‘historically located traditions of performance’ (76). Familiarity with these traditions 
grants performers of the scripts awareness of ‘normative aggregate behavior’ (ibid.) and 
the subsequent comfort of knowing that their performances fall within the bounds of 
accepted practice. The appropriate tradition of performance in the late twentieth century 
would be a disavowal and rejection of the violence that American Psycho’s script pushes 
the reader towards, with the detailed scenes of sexual and physical violence against women 
producing vehement disapprobation. Yet, significantly, Ellis’s poetics deny the reader the 
comfort of this reaction as they manipulate reader empathy and identification and push him 
or her towards engagement with – and, dare I say, enjoyment of – the novel’s violence. 
American Psycho frustrates the reader’s expectations of the typical scripts of literature, 
denying an Iseran closed gestalt,
8
 and throwing into disarray his or her understanding and 
expectations of appropriate response to the novel’s violence and pornography. For 
Bernstein, ‘[w]hen a thing scripts actions, it manifests the repertoire of its historical 
                                                          
8
 In his 1972 article, ‘The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach’, Wolfgang Iser contends that 
meaning is produced from literature when the artistic (i.e. ‘the text created by the author’ 279) and the 
aesthetic (‘the realization accomplished by the reader’ ibid.) poles of the literary work meet in a 
‘convergence of text and reader’ (ibid.). This convergence ‘must always remain virtual, as it is not to be 
identified either with the reality of the text or with the individual disposition of the reader’ (ibid.) It is this 
virtuality which renders the text dynamic; a state which induces in the reader a desire to impose the ‘gestalt’, 
or fixed meaning, which is essential to understanding. However, due to the contingent nature of the 
intersection between the artistic and aesthetic poles of the work, ‘the “gestalt” is not the true meaning of the 
text; at best it is a configurative meaning’ (289). 
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moment’ (89) and for American Psycho we can take this to include post-feminism, 
Reaganite politics, runaway capitalism, the breakdown of community, the celebrification 
of the serial killer, and the slasher films the novel pays homage to. Each of these things, 
and more, are present in the text but they create such a polyphony of conflicting ideologies 
that Ellis’s novel ultimately elects not to consistently ‘interpellate us into ideology and 
subjecthood’; instead it confounds and confuses us, in a postmodern challenge to 
traditional reader/text ontological boundaries. 
As I noted above, those authors writing in the pulp, noir and hardboiled traditions 
in the mid-twentieth century betray the restrictive and unsympathetic treatment of women 
prevalent at that time. Authors such as Jim Thompson have long been accused of 
misogyny, and the hardboiled ‘dames’ of Hammett and McCoy can be hard to stomach for 
the modern female reader. Despite this, such novels do have cross-gender appeal, with 
men and women alike empathising with and accepting chauvinistic anti-heroes such as 
Lou Ford and Ralph Cotter. Although both Thompson and McCoy are skilled writers who 
have created compelling and convincing characters, their poetics lack Ellis’s virtuosity and 
it seems that cross-gender identification here depends, at least in part, on a process that 
Judith Fetterley has called ‘immasculation’. Fetterley argues that ‘[w]omen are taught to 
think as men, to identify with a male point of view, and to accept as normal and legitimate 
a male system of values, one of whose central principles is misogyny’ (The Resisting 
Reader xx). Having been schooled in a male-dominated literary canon and having lived in 
patriarchal society, the average female reader is well prepared to function in this often 
unconscious fashion and Fetterley’s schema still has resonance some 35 years after it was 
first published. The lack of active, undomesticated female focalizing characters in mid-
twentieth century pulp fiction forces the female reader into close relationships with 
masculine protagonists, as that is the only way to achieve narrative satisfaction. The non-
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feminist reader ‘accepts as normal’ the misogyny of the texts and, by attributing the 
misogyny to the era and genre the text originates from, can escape psychic injury or slight 
(men, of course, are privileged in the texts and so these negotiations do not apply to the 
male reader). 
 Having explored how poetics and immasculation make possible cross-gender 
identification, one could be forgiven for assuming that the gender of the reader loses all 
significance during the reading process. However, gender remains  
a significant determinant of the interaction between text and reader 
…gender-related differences are multifaceted and overdetermined. They are 
a function of the social, cultural, and political structures that form the 
context of reading and writing, and they interact with other differences, in 
particular, those grounded on class, race, and sexual orientation. (Flynn 
xxviii)  
An Iseran aesthetic response (see Section 1.3) is evinced when the reader draws on his or 
her social, cultural and individual background in order to make sense of a text. 
Subjecthood is composed of social and cultural influences and their impact on the 
individual self, and it is inevitable that such influences are themselves contingent and 
gender-determined. These influences are not restricted to essentialisms such as masculine 
aggression, but extend also to our relationship to emotion and its expression. In Western 
society, masculine performances centre on stoicism whilst women are entitled to emotional 
display. So, when this study addresses emotions such as empathy, it is addressing it as 
something gendered and socially constructed. Anthropologist Catherine Lutz has noted 
that ‘any discourse on emotion is also at least implicitly, a discourse on gender’ (qtd. in 
Abigail Locke 192). Even when a reading position is ostensibly neutered, the reader 
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inevitably processes the emotional material in gendered terms. This is not to say that he or 
she is always aware of his or her own gender, but rather that emotion and non-emotion are 
figured as female and male characteristics. 
 For writers like Thompson and McCoy there is a difficulty with emotion in that it 
doesn’t fit with the ‘tough guy’ paradigm of hardboiled and noir fiction. But if emotion 
cannot be expressed, what happens to the cathected energy? And if feminine-coded 
sentiment is expressed by men, what is the consequence of this cultural transgression? In 
much of the psychopath fiction from the middle of the twentieth century, the expression of 
emotion is emasculating and it is this rather than his aberrant psychology which sees the 
transgressing male lose his foothold in the dominant social order. This was a particularly 
strong concern of Thompson’s, whose novels teem with male characters who are unable to 
articulate their emotions or even to properly feel. Denied an outlet, signification breaks 
down for these characters and they descend into madness, a kind of psychic gelding. Those 
characters who do vent their emotions are similarly emasculated: Brownie in The Nothing 
Man (1954) spends a great deal of time talking about his feelings, but he was castrated in 
the war and is therefore not fully masculine according to Thompson’s schema. In Savage 
Night (1953) Little Bigger’s punishment is both a psychic and physical castration, his 
mental collapse accompanied by his dismemberment by a crazed female he has wronged. 
A Hell of a Woman’s (1954) male protagonist Dolly Dillon also suffers a breakdown and is 
castrated by a lover, a similar fate to that which befalls McCoy’s Ralph Cotter. Cotter is 
symbolically neutered by two separate women after a repressed oedipal memory and acute 
castration fear resurfaces. He loses his mind and is shot to death by a spurned and furious 
‘dame’. 
 Highsmith’s Ripley thwarts the masculine paradigm in that he openly expresses 
emotion. In his bouts of self-pity and frustration he often weeps, but rather than Highsmith 
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figuring this as a masculine failing, Ripley’s emotionality is actually one of the things 
which helps to secure an empathetic response from the reader. This ‘feminine’ trait is not 
Ripley’s downfall, as it is for his literary contemporaries. One reason for this may be that 
Ripley is written by a woman, who was subject to the social, cultural and political forces 
that are specific to female experience and which denote emotionality as an acceptable, 
even desirable, trait. However, Highsmith did not conform to the dominant gender 
ideologies of her time. Her sexual orientation placed her outside of hegemony and she has 
been described as ‘markedly masculine in appearance, and something of a man-hater, a 
kind of female chauvinist’ (James 181). Her stark prose and dark subject matter have also 
been described as masculine. Furthermore, Highsmith is now widely believed to have been 
on the autistic spectrum with a high-functioning form of Asperger’s Syndrome (ibid. 182). 
According to the National Autistic Society, a common characteristic of Asperger’s is 
difficulty with ‘social imagination’, which means that sufferers find it difficult to 
empathise with others. Asperger’s Syndrome affects more men than women and is on a 
similar spectrum to psychopathy, which complicates this line of enquiry even further with 
regards to issues such as empathy, emotion and socialisation. Highsmith’s mysteriousness 
and refusal (or inability) to conform are part of her appeal and it is neither possible nor 
desirable to unravel her psychology here. Broadly speaking, the issues that arise with the 
gendering of characters and readers fall into certain roles because of the cultural 
constructions of things like emotions. Highsmith does not correspond to these essentialist 
notions of what is right and/or acceptable; rather she acts as an interesting counterpoint 
that highlights the arbitrary nature of the issues at play. 
 The arbitrariness of gender roles and a sense of constructedness are also present in 
American Psycho. The novel has been roundly criticised by feminists the world over for its 
extreme and prolonged scenes of violence against women, yet rather than being a manual 
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for the torture of women, as has been suggested by one feminist group (see page 205), the 
novel is actually a response to the culture that the author sees around him. The narrative is 
not misogynistic; it is about ideas of victimhood and victimhood’s opposite – the person 
who can’t be got at or feel emotion, and who is invulnerable in some way – in other words, 
the psychopath. Like Thompson and McCoy’s characters, when Bateman becomes 
emotional and despairing he becomes delusional. As his mania heightens he hallucinates 
about ambulant rubbish bins and pieces of breakfast cereal being interviewed on television. 
Yet whilst characters in the works of Thompson and his contemporaries are locked into 
gender-based essentialisms, in American Psycho the situation is much more fluid. Ellis 
suggests that gender doesn’t or shouldn’t matter, but it does. In fact, it affects our very 
means of engaging with literature and the levels of immersion we are able to reach. When 
David Bleitch conducted his empirical research into the ‘comparative literary response 
patterns of men and women’, he found that ‘women…automatically blended in with [the 
narrator]…and/or they automatically blended in with the author […] The men, however, 
draw boundaries much more decisively’ (264-265). Bleitch found the women to have 
greater empathetic capabilities than the men, and a greater willingness to capitulate to the 
diegesis. Men in the study were far more reticent, and less prepared to surrender 
themselves to the narrative world. To me, this suggests that a reader’s potential level of 
immersion in the text is gender-determined and I suggest that this ultimately impacts on 
the extent to which the two sexes can, or will, empathise with literary characters and 
situations. As with the acceptability of masculine emotional response, this could be 
attributed to social factors. One can surmise that a woman who has been socially 
conditioned to think of others and put other people first may find it easier to surrender her 
self and merge with the other of the text during the period of entrancement, than a male 
whom society has dictated should be self-possessed and single-minded. More empirical 
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research would be needed before such a claim could be definitively stated (and there is 
sadly no space for that here), but it certainly offers food for thought. 
 What is clear is that gender is neither a barrier nor a driver to reader identification 
with literary psychopaths and in light of this the issue of gender will not be a primary focus 
in this study. Although a text’s violence may be skewed more towards one gender or social 
group than others, the reader’s reception of this violence is shaped by a number of 
competing factors including, as we have seen, socialisation, immasculation and narrative 
poetics. Furthermore, readerly acceptance (or rejection) of literary violence is not 
necessarily determined by the imposition of morality on the text; this thesis will 
demonstrate how it is possible to engage with and enjoy material to which one is 
diametrically opposed. As Bleitch’s study has shown, empathetic response to texts can be 
tempered by gender but this difference relates only to the depth of the reader’s immersion 
in the diegesis. The feminist impulse which says ‘No!’ to violence against women is an 
ideological response that makes political decisions about content, rather than a readerly 
decision to engage with poetics. Since it is apparent that female readers for such texts 
exist, my study of the poetics of these narratives is both timely and necessary. Emotion, 
gender and empathy are important and interlinked, but they are also contingent and subject 
to manipulation. Ultimately, it is the novel’s poetics which determine the reader’s response 
to a text. One can only be interpellated into a text’s ideology so far, as there is always a 
little of oneself colouring the reading experience.  
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Chapter One 
Depicting the Psychopathic Individual 
 
1.1 Literature and Psychopathy 
In this chapter I shall explore the particular fascination with psychopathy that is manifest 
in so many literary, filmic and televisual texts. By examining the literary techniques that 
allow the reader to access the psychopathic subject, I will also investigate the 
psychological factors that come into play through audience engagement and identification 
with the fictional psychopath. Although, ultimately, the cultural meanings of psychopathy 
put into circulation by literature will be more important to this thesis than strict clinical 
definitions of the disorder, a solid understanding of psychopathy is a necessary basis for 
this study. 
There is a strong tradition of fictional characters being explored in psychoanalytical 
literature, be that Freud discussing Sophocles and Shakespeare, Lacan debating Poe with 
Derrida, or Laing analysing Dostoevsky. The benefits to the clinician seem clear enough – 
accurate literary portraits of medical conditions allow the reader a closer and more detailed 
view than may be gained from individual patients in the ‘real’ world, and such ‘case 
studies’ may be disseminated to a wider audience. But what does the lay reader get out of 
their literary engagement with the darker recesses of the human mind, and why the 
enduring cultural interest in the figure of the psychopath? A glimpse into the unknown 
certainly has a strong appeal, but one can assume that the average reader of such literature 
does not seek out the fine points of psychological realism for their diagnostic efficacy. The 
enigmatic psychopath can present a fascinating stream of salacious material to a literature 
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fascinated with monsters, villains and criminality, yet it can be difficult to imagine how 
readerly access to such a character can be fulfilling or enjoyable. This chapter will 
therefore endeavour to uncover the appeal that the psychopath has for the reader, whilst 
exploring the techniques that writers use to ensure that readers are immersed in and 
engaged with their texts. However, before we can explore how one engages with the 
psychopath in literature, it is first necessary to explore the disorder itself. 
As Philip L. Simpson notes, in his book Psycho Paths: Tracking the Serial Killer 
Through Contemporary American Film and Fiction, humankind has an 
‘ongoing...fascination with tales of gruesome murders and evil villains’ (15). Popular 
culture abounds with depictions of the mad and the bad; and aberrant psychology has 
proved a fertile source of such material to the novelist and the reader alike. Perhaps no 
single disorder holds as much morbid cultural appeal as psychopathy; the baffling 
condition which combines what Hervey M. Cleckley terms a ‘mask of sanity’ with a 
seeming lack of the qualities usually deemed to constitute humanity. Over the course of the 
last century or so, the figure of the psychopath has become increasingly prevalent in 
fictional depictions, and, as medical understanding of the psychopath has developed, so too 
has his portrayal in literature, television and other popular cultural forms. This is not to 
suggest that the literary and medical conceptions are intrinsically linked; rather we see 
literature, fuelled by its own interest in the subject of human psychology, exploring 
psychopathy and other abnormal mental states, fed by the scientific understanding of 
psychopathology. As this deepens and is more widely disseminated, literary and cultural 
representations of aberrant psychology become more detailed, accurate and realistic. As I 
hope to show in this study, late nineteenth century representations by authors such as 
Dostoevsky, who scorned psychology, are not entirely clinically accurate; yet the mid-
twentieth century, when understanding of psychopathy became more defined and 
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widespread, saw its increasingly realistic portrayal in literature, film and television 
multiply.
9
 This suggests a sequential link between scientific understanding of psychopathy, 
the seeping of this awareness into the wider populace, and its portrayal in literature and 
other popular cultural forms. 
However, not all of the authors I will explore in this study comply with this model. 
Dickens wrote knowledgeably about a variety of conditions even as they were being 
discovered and debated by the medical community. B.C. Douglas tells us that the veracity 
of Dickens’s characterisations was such that he ‘was well known in his own lifetime for 
true-to-life descriptions of characters with illnesses that were even cited in medical 
journals as case reports’ (64). Furthermore, ‘[s]ome clinical entities were anticipated 
before they were identified as such by physicians’ (ibid.). One of Dickens’s most 
memorable creations, the psychopathic Rigaud of Little Dorrit (who I will examine in 
section 2.1), appeared almost thirty years before the first recorded use of the term 
‘psychopath’, yet is clinically accurate and complete. However, Dickens was unique in that 
he entertained a keen interest in mental health issues and had access to asylums and 
contemporary medical literature via his work on asylum reform. Furthermore, it is known 
that he based Rigaud on the notorious Pierre François Lacenaire, a nineteenth century 
murderer whom today we can recognise as a ‘real life’ psychopath.  
 
 
                                                          
9
 The more widespread understanding of psychopathology in the twentieth century generally improved the 
accuracy of representations of psychopathy. In some respects such representations could be deemed more 
realistic than earlier portrayals, which may be less complete or clinically suspect. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that the most accurate portrayals offer the greatest satisfaction to the reader. Rather, 
satisfaction is derived from the quality of the writing and the level of engagement it invites in the narrative 
world. It is interesting to note that, today, the term ‘psychopath’ has become such an integral part of the 
popular lexicon that it functions as a kind of shorthand for all the social and cultural implications of 
psychopathy. A less nuanced depiction of psychopathy may pass as accurate and complete due to the 
subconscious work done by the reader of the text. 
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1.2 The Historical Background of Psychopathy and its Nomenclature 
Popular culture’s interest in psychopathy is mirrored by that of the international medical 
community: despite being the ‘first personality disorder to be recognized in psychiatry’ 
(Millon vii), the condition continues to be widely debated and regularly reclassified. The 
earliest recorded use of the term ‘psychopath’ was in an 1884 Russian murder trial, when 
psychiatrist I. M. Balinsky used it in his defence of accused child-killer, Mlle. Semenova. 
Balinsky typified the psychopath as a person ‘whose every moral faculty appears to be of 
the normal equilibrium...But of all moral notions he is entirely devoid...Besides his own 
person and his own interests nothing is sacred to the psychopath’ (New York Times, 
February 14
th
 1885 np; original story taken from the Pall Mall Gazette). The term came to 
be used as a somewhat obtuse label for any type of psychopathology that did not fit the 
existing categories of mental disorder, although it was later narrowed as the understanding 
of psychopathic typologies grew. In 1930, the psychologist G.E. Partridge proposed that 
the term ‘psychopath’ be dropped in favour of ‘sociopathic personality’, which he felt 
better reflected the social ramifications of the disorder. However, Partridge’s contribution 
had the effect of muddying an already problematic nomenclature, and, as David T. Lykken 
has pointed out, ‘[f]or the next 50 years or so, dangerous or persistent lawbreakers were 
labelled variously as psychopaths or sociopaths with negligible diagnostic consistency or 
clarity’ (3). 
Perhaps the most influential figure in the development of the clinical understanding 
of psychopathy was Hervey M. Cleckley, whose 1941 The Mask of Sanity (revised and 
reissued multiple times over the subsequent four decades, until Cleckley’s death in 1984) 
became ‘the foundation for modern research on the topic’ (Patrick xv). Cleckley offered, 
for the first time, a clear and nuanced picture of the disorder, including a detailed 
understanding of the psychopathic personality and the challenges it poses to society. 
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Cleckley viewed psychopathy as a combination of personality traits and socially deviant 
behaviours, whilst also considering the impact of psychological, biological and genetic 
factors on the inner workings of the psychopathic mind. Significantly, Cleckley noted that 
‘[d]espite the plain etymological inference of a sick mind or of mental sickness, this term is 
ordinarily used to indicate those who are considered free from psychosis and even from 
psychoneurosis’ (7, original emphasis). The debate as to whether the psychopath is ‘mad 
or bad’ continues to rage, and the argument is largely related to the legal conception of 
‘insanity’. Insanity denotes whether a person can be held responsible in law for their 
actions and experts are split as to the culpability of the psychopath. The aberrant acts of the 
psychopath do not derive from unconquerable urges or a break with reality, but rather 
‘from a cold, calculating rationality combined with a chilling inability to treat others as 
thinking, feeling human beings’ (Hare, Without Conscience 5). Such control and 
rationality suggests culpability, yet how culpable can a person be when their behaviour is 
dictated by a biological disorder? What is clear is that psychopathy is largely untreatable; 
there is no cure or therapy that has been shown to be effective and, whilst patients present 
as ‘sane’, clinical tests reveal their brains to work very differently to those of the broader 
population. 
Despite the inroads made by Cleckley, the term psychopath continued to be used 
interchangeably with ‘sociopath’ until the publication of the third edition of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
III) in 1980. In an attempt to end the subjective and inconsistent diagnostic practices 
previously in use, psychopathy was renamed ‘antisocial personality disorder’ and 
‘diagnostic criteria that were relatively objective and noninferential’ (Lykken 3) were 
introduced. Focus shifted away from personality traits and onto social deviance, as this 
was easier to categorise and therefore helped to remove the reliance that earlier diagnostic 
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criteria had on the subjective impressions of clinicians and the self-reporting of patients. 
However, the system is not universally popular and Robert Hare has described it as ‘a 
diagnostic category with good reliability but dubious validity, a category that [lacks] 
congruence with other, well-established conceptions of psychopathy’ (‘Psychopathy and 
Antisocial’ 39). In 1991, Hare published his own clinical rating scale for psychopathy, the 
Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R). The system was adopted worldwide 
(although it is typically used in conjunction with DSM in America and a combination of 
DSM and the World Health Organisation’s ICD Classification of Mental and Behavioural 
Disorders in Europe) and, as Patrick has noted, its publication ‘has led to a surge of 
interest and activity’ (xiv) in the field. The PCL-R combines a rating scale with an in-
depth interview and case-history information to provide a nuanced view of the patient and 
their actual and potential offending behaviour. Significantly, the PCL-R appears to reveal 
the shortcomings of the DSM’s tendency to view psychopathy and antisocial personality 
disorder (ASPD) as one and the same, with Hare claiming that it proves that ‘[m]ost 
psychopaths...meet the criteria for ASPD, but most individuals with ASPD are not 
psychopaths’ (‘Psychopathy and Antisocial’ 40, original emphasis). In the interests of 
clarity, then, this study will exclusively use the term psychopathy when referring to the 
disorder, rather than following current naming trends.  
My key area of interest in this study relates to empathetic response, particularly the 
dissonance created by reader engagement with characters who are themselves incapable of 
empathy. As lack of empathy is a defining feature of psychopathy, I shall therefore largely 
limit my analysis to characters who exhibit psychopathic traits. In order to distinguish 
psychopathy from other personality disorders, I will refer to the PCL-R clinical rating 
system rather than DSM-IV. In clinical practice, the PCL-R is administered in two parts, a 
semi-structured interview and a review of the subject’s case files and personal history. The 
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clinician rates the subject against a list of twenty psychopathic characteristics (summarised 
below) which cover emotional and interpersonal traits and socially deviant behaviours; a 
score between 0 (non-psychopathic) and 40 (prototypical psychopath) is then produced. I 
should of course point out that I am neither a trained psychologist nor an expert in psycho-
diagnosis in forensic settings, and I have received no formal training in administering this 
test. However, as I noted in the Introduction, I am examining literary constructions rather 
than writing clinical case studies and my ‘diagnosis’ of characters is necessarily limited. 
When assessing a fictional character’s propensity towards psychopathy it is not possible to 
conduct an interview and there are no clinical case notes to consult. However, this does not 
devalue the exercise; full clinical diagnosis of fictional constructs is neither necessary nor 
instructive. It is enough that the basic character traits are identified and that one can 
distinguish the psychopaths, who are incapable of the empathy this study is concerned 
with, from the non-psychopaths who may be displaying other signs of mental aberrance. 
My evaluation of the characters analysed in this study is based on the summarised PCL-R 
checklist provided by Hare in his book, Without Conscience (1993), which I have 
reproduced below.  
According to Hare, prototypical psychopaths exhibit the following traits: 
Emotional/Interpersonal  Social Deviance 
- glib and superficial   - impulsive 
- egocentric and grandiose  - poor behaviour controls 
- lack of remorse or guilt  - need for excitement 
- lack of empathy   - lack of responsibility 
- deceitful and manipulative  - early behaviour problems 
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- shallow emotions   - adult antisocial behaviour 
     (Hare, Without Conscience 34) 
On the emotional and interpersonal side of the scale, psychopaths could be described as 
lacking humanity in that they appear to be devoid of empathy, self-awareness and guilt. 
Indeed, forensic psychiatrist J. Reid Meloy has suggested that the psychopath is in fact a 
predator; a human functioning from the ‘reptilian brain’. According to Paul MacLean’s 
theory of the triune brain, the reptilian brain, which is composed of the upper brain stem 
and cerebellum, is primarily concerned with physical survival. Significantly, it also plays a 
crucial role in establishing social dominance. Some clinicians believe that, in the 
psychopathic subject, this primitive brain takes precedence over the higher functioning 
neocortex, which gives us reason, and the limbic system, which is responsible for emotion. 
Reptiles lack a limbic system and, like the psychopath, have no capacity for emotion or 
empathy. In their essay, ‘The Internal World of Psychopaths’, Meloy and Carl B. Gacono 
explain how their study revealed 
psychopaths...[to have] little interest in others as whole objects...People 
were part-objects...defined by the psychopaths’ present desires...Our 
psychopaths were pathologically narcissistic, grandiose, and self-focused 
individuals...who unconsciously identified with predatory objects...Their 
relationships were defined by dominance, not affection. (104) 
When considered in relation to literary studies, this lack of empathy becomes extremely 
interesting. As Suzanne Keen points out, ‘[t]here is no question...that readers feel empathy 
with (and sympathy for) fictional characters and other aspects of fictional worlds’ (vii), yet 
it is difficult to see how one can empathise and identify with a character who is himself 
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incapable of empathy. If empathy and identification are both a goal and reward of reading 
literature, then we are left with a striking ambivalence which needs to be explored.  
 
1.3 Reading, Immersion and Identification 
The cultural fascination with aberrant figures is perhaps easier to understand than the 
personal one; whether it is based in a desire to understand the workings of the 
psychopathic mind, a perverse delight in our fear of the aberrant other, or, as Simpson 
suggests, the provision of a figure of darkness that we can unite against (7), it seems clear 
that the collective cultural imaginary revels in depictions of humanity that are recognisable 
yet distorted. In his article, ‘Cozying Up to the Psychopath that Lurks Deep Within’, Bruce 
Weber quotes the forensic psychiatrist Ronald Markman, who has suggested that our 
identification with filmic psychopaths is based on our awareness that they are lacking a 
superego, or conscience. Markman explains that the conscience typically develops 
between the ages of two and seven, so identification with the psychopath is based on our 
recognition that ‘We were born that way, without any superego...We’re all psychopaths 
under the skin’ (np, my emphasis). With literature, as opposed to film, however, the 
process of engagement is perhaps a little more complicated. Film is by nature spectatorial 
but, as readers, we may be called upon to think someone else’s thoughts and feel their 
emotions; this sees us engaging with, and trying to understand, others – an act the 
psychopath is incapable of. In order to explore this phenomenon fully, we must first 
examine how literary identification, immersion and engagement are achieved. This is 
complicated by the relative neglect of these issues in twentieth century literary study, as 
although these matters are addressed to some degree by reader response theories and 
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psychoanalysis (which I will discuss shortly), the mechanics of empathetic engagement 
with fictional constructs are less well-defined.  
 The scholarly pursuit of a pseudo-scientific objectivity in criticism saw many 
schools of thought attempt to eradicate discussion of emotional responses to literature, as 
Marie-Laure Ryan notes:  
[e]motional participation in the fate of imaginary characters was accepted 
as a natural response to literature until textualist approaches overtook realist 
paradigms and dissolved the human essence of characters into actantial 
roles or aggregates of textually specified features...In the heyday of 
structuralism and deconstruction, it became heretical even to mention the 
phenomenon of emotional response. (148) 
Despite such efforts to the contrary, the reality of literature’s powerful effect on the reader 
endured; one of the key pleasures of literature remains its ability to move us, immerse us in 
an alternative reality, or cause us to empathise or identify with another. This is no cheap 
trick; the Oxford English Dictionary defines empathy as ‘[t]he power of projecting one's 
personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation’. In creating an 
empathetic connection between the reader and the characters, the novelist is able to imbue 
the text with a rich and complex heteroglossia.  
Some of the pleasures of literature depend on the fact that ‘in reading we think the 
thoughts of another person’ (Iser, Act of Reading 126) and it follows that our proximity to 
the consciousness of another should also bring us into close emotional contact with them. 
Interestingly, identification does not depend on us reading about characters that are exactly 
like us; scant details of disposition, location and narrative situation are often sufficient to 
forge a connection or initiate engagement. Ryan explains this phenomenon via the 
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psychological concept of ‘mental simulation’, which she describes as ‘a form of 
counterfactual reasoning by which the subject places himself in another person’s mind’ 
(111). One of the key benefits of this process for the novelist is that it encourages the 
reader to understand and engage with characters they might normally find abhorrent. 
Creating this experience is a challenge no less for the writer than for the reader, whom 
Virginia Woolf defied to ‘welcome representation of unfamiliar, disconcerting, and even 
frightening thoughts and feelings’ (qtd. in Keen 59).  
For Keen, the risk-free opportunity to engage with transgressive figures is one of 
the key advantages of fiction. She explains:  
Novels can provide safe spaces within which to see through the eyes of the 
psychopath, to occupy the subject position of the oppressive racist, to share 
the brutalizing past of the condemned outcast...Such serious literary 
experimentation with inhabiting the perspective of stigmatized or repulsive 
others may play on readers’ appetites for vicious imagery or play with 
taboos, but it has not been generally understood as a corrupting aspect of 
narrative. (131) 
However, as Keen points out, ‘character identification is not a narrative technique (it 
occurs in the reader, not in the text), but a consequence of reading that may be precipitated 
by the use of particular techniques of characterization’ (93). This standpoint invokes the 
reader-response criticism of Wolfgang Iser, who held that meaning existed not in the text 
itself, but in a dialectic relationship between the reader, the text and their cultural context. 
In his theory of aesthetic response, he argues that the reader is not the passive consumer of 
meaning, but its active producer. Guided by the author, the reader is free to construct his or 
her own, historically contingent interpretation of the text, drawing on his or her cultural, 
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social and personal background and beliefs. Iser explains: ‘It is called aesthetic response 
because, although it is brought about by the text, it brings into play the imaginative and 
perceptive faculties of the reader, in order to make him adjust and even differentiate his 
own focus’ (Act of Reading x). Significantly, Iser saw the reader engaged not just in 
making meaning from what was present in the text, but also from what was absent. By 
necessity, no story can ever be told in its entirety so it is littered with blanks and negations 
which the reader must negotiate as s/he works through the text. As connections are made 
between the elements, subject positions are revealed and subtle meanings made clear; 
‘[n]egation and blanks as basic constituents of communication are thus enabling structures 
that demand a process of determining which only the reader can implement. This gives rise 
to the subjective hue of the text’s meaning’ (Iser, How to do Theory 68). For Iser, this 
reveals the duality of ‘the literary work with its two poles: the artistic and the aesthetic. 
The artistic refers to the text created by an author, and the aesthetic to the realization 
accomplished by the reader, the interaction of which unfolds the work’s potential’ (ibid.). 
The novelistic techniques employed by the author manipulate and guide the reader 
through the lacunae and towards the relevant positions of identification and empathy. 
Narrative situation, which the Dictionary of Narratology describes as the ‘mediating 
process through which the narrated is presented’ (Prince 64), is a key tool in engendering 
empathy, as it determines narrative perspective and focalization. Of the many techniques 
for representing consciousness in fiction, it is widely accepted that the internal 
perspectives (such as the direct discourse of first person narration, free indirect discourse, 
and shifting authorial narration that omnisciently reveals the inner lives of a number of 
characters) are the most successful at achieving character identification and reader 
empathy. Despite this, ‘[f]or immersion to retain its intensity, it needs a contrast of 
narrative modes, a constantly renegotiated distance from the narrative scene’ (Ryan 137). 
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A varied mode of representation, such as a third person narration detailing a character’s 
thoughts, feelings and experiences, therefore tends to be most successful at maintaining 
immediacy and interest. David Lodge explains: ‘[t]he discourse is...both objective and 
subjective, simultaneously...One might say that the diction is mostly subjective, belonging 
to [the character’s] consciousness, and the syntax is objective’ (33). 
However, narrative situation and its perspectival subtypes don’t always engender 
identification and empathy in the reader, even when internal perspectives are given. Joyce 
Carol Oates’s Zombie (1995), for instance, is a richly nuanced text which offers the scholar 
of poetics an excellent case study for the discussion of narrative situation, reading position, 
and their impact on the reader. It will form an integral part of the discussion that follows in 
sections 1.3 to 1.8. Zombie is a first person account of a serial killer’s ‘projects’, yet we 
remain at a remove from the text – and especially from the aberrant psychopath, Quentin 
P.
10
 Such narrative distance, despite the use of what are usually identificatory techniques, 
suggests that there is more at play and that a complex hierarchy of reading positions, 
differentiated by the psychological distance between the reader and the text, exists. These 
range from an outside viewing position to oneness with the character(s), and can broadly 
be categorised as spectatorship, imaginative involvement and entrancement. These reading 
positions and their effects are explored in detail in sections 1.4 to 1.7 which follow. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Quentin’s name nods to the other famous Quentin in American literature, Quentin Compson, whose mental 
collapse is detailed in Section 2.3 of this thesis. The name carries with it heteroglot meanings, creating in the 
dialogic, which colour our reception of the text. See pages 80 and 67 respectively for discussion of these 
phenomena. 
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1.4 Spectatorship 
Spectatorship can be construed as the basic mode of reception for literary, theatrical or 
televisual/filmic texts. It situates the reader or viewer outside of the narrative, as an 
observer who does not interact with the diegesis. Spectatorship is therefore a distanced 
mode of reception which does not demand a response or engagement from the reader, 
although s/he may like or dislike particular characters, or feel excited, moved or repulsed 
by the text. The main motivation in engaging with texts that place us in a spectatorial 
position seems to be the satisfaction of curiosity; we want to know what happens, so we 
keep on reading or watching or viewing. Novels which place the reader in the position of 
observer or spectator are generally written in the third person, and the technique can be 
found in works ranging from Charles Dickens’s Oliver Twist (1838) to J. K. Rowling’s 
Harry Potter series (comprising seven novels, published between 1997 and 2007).  
Mary Astor’s The Incredible Charlie Carewe (1960), which was hailed by 
Cleckley as ‘the most realistic and successful of all portrayals of the psychopath’ (195), is 
a good example of standard spectatorship in psychopath fiction. It uses a heterodiegetic 
narrator which keeps the reader at a distance from the text and, although the reader does 
respond to the various characters, s/he does not engage with them on an empathetic level. 
The text’s poetics quickly reveal the dual poles of attraction and repulsion at work in the 
psychopathic figure. Charlie is highly intelligent, handsome, rich and charismatic. He is 
also glib and superficial, callous, impulsive, unemotional and lacking in affect. The novel 
opens with a hungover Charlie waking up in a car he has stolen and crashed when drunk; 
his insouciance and good humour, even when blaming the incident on the innocent owner 
of the car, brings the reader on-side as s/he anticipates a text rich in excitement and 
amusement. When the focus shifts to the young Charlie, we are struck by his innocence; 
the incidents which worry his father and older sister, such as trying to place play money on 
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the collection plate at church instead of a real five dollar bill, appear to be childish pranks 
more indicative of immaturity than malevolence or criminal intent. The reader’s 
complacency is shattered, however, when the text confronts him or her with a shocking 
glimpse of Charlie’s fledgling psychopathy. At a lavish Carewe family party, Charlie slips 
away down the beach with another boy and his sister, sensing trouble, follows shortly 
afterwards: 
They rounded the sentinel rocks, plashing through a strip of wave 
that seemed to slide ahead of them, reaching to point to the scene on the 
edge of Berry Pie. Fifteen feet away, Virginia and Jeff froze, unable to 
move or make a sound. Charlie was on top of Roger, holding his ears in his 
hands, rhythmically banging the now unconscious boy’s head on the side of 
a rock. There was absolutely no savagery in the action, no passion or 
hatred, no viciousness. He looked up briefly as he saw Virginia and Jeff and 
called out a smiling ‘Hi!’ and then went back to his task. Firmly, 
purposefully, as though he were occupied in cracking a coconut. In the 
seconds before movement came back to the paralyzed observers another 
wave whispered up to the two boys and receded with pink in its foam. (27-
28) 
Here, the text’s poetics demonstrate the gulf which exists between ‘normal’ subjectivity 
and the aberrant psychopath, with the ‘strip of wave’ marking the distance and ‘point[ing] 
to the scene’. The reader, like Virginia and Jeff, looks on in horror at the unexpected and 
horrifying tableau. The psychopath’s terrifying lack of passion or aggression suggests that 
the attack is motiveless; a crime motivated by a blinding rage and momentary loss of 
control would be easier for the reader to understand, but Charlie’s lack of affect reveals his 
lack of humanity as it is commonly understood. The spectatorship mode places the reader 
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in a peripheral position; to some extent this lessens the impact of the violent spectacle – a 
narrative technique which facilitates the reader’s ongoing engagement with the text and 
allows the temporary suspension of moral judgement on the character (he is, after all, just 
twelve years old in this scene11). Yet the technique also heightens the horror, by setting 
Charlie literally and figuratively apart from both the reader and Virginia and Jeff, who 
function as examples of normal subjectivity in the narrative. For all its seeming simplicity, 
then, spectatorship can assist in the creation of a nuanced understanding of scene and 
character which shapes the reader’s response to the text as completely as the more 
involving modes of reception. Spectatorship’s distancing effect, created by heterodiegetic 
narration, typically precludes the reader from empathetic engagement with characters and 
can sometimes be seen as a ‘safe’ means of engaging with the fictional psychopath. The 
first person form which came to dominate psychopath fiction from the middle of the 
twentieth century onwards places the reader in direct proximity of the psychopathic 
consciousness and, whilst this has great dramatic potential, it suggests a state of ‘oneness’ 
with the psychopath which can be troubling to the reader. Aligning the reader with the 
psychopath, via the text’s poetics, inculcates him or her into the character’s ideology and 
this invokes feelings of complicity which can be distinctly uncomfortable.  
However, first person narration does not guarantee an empathetic response and 
spectatorship does not always emanate from third person heterodiegetic narration, as Joyce 
                                                          
11
 Later, when Jeff and Virginia discuss the incident, Jeff remarks that upon witnessing the scene he had not 
instantly considered Charlie a monster, but rather: ‘I felt pretty much the same as if I’d seen a four-year-old 
child with a knife in his hand, poking somebody’s eye out…what I mean is that Charlie didn’t even seem to 
be guilty – it was like maybe we were the guilty ones, but of just what, I don’t know’ (32). His unwillingness 
to categorise Charlie as evil at this point mirrors the reader’s own reticence and ambivalence. It also suggests 
the ‘mad or bad’ debate surrounding psychopathy, which I discuss on page 30 of this thesis. 
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Carol Oates’s Zombie shows. The poetics of Zombie subvert the usual rules in that, despite 
using a typically identificatory first person technique and an intimate narrative form, the 
reader remains in a spectatorial position. The novella combines these involving techniques 
with a raft of other literary devices to create a distancing effect that denies an empathetic 
or identificatory response to the focalizing character. The text constantly challenges and 
frustrates readers’ expectations. The version of first person narration introduced by the 
journal form feels and functions like third person narration, as it is a slightly more 
distanced narrative mode than the ‘I’ verbal form, where the ‘I’ relays the story personally 
to the reader. With the journal form, the reader is naturally placed on the outside of the 
narrative, surreptitiously looking in and although s/he has access to privileged information, 
it is not as a confidante of the focalizing character. So, despite the privileged access to the 
psychopathic figure that Zombie’s poetics grant to the reader, his or her understanding of 
the character remains shallow and limited. This reinforces the perception that when dealing 
with the psychology of a psychopath, the normal rules do not apply. Zombie demonstrates 
that it is not the mere presence of the psychopath which makes the text so compelling and 
unusual, but the way in which that presence is mediated. The homodiegetic first person 
narratorial form puts the psychopath in control, both of the material and of the reader.  
As noted above, Oates uses a confessional journal form to tell her story from the 
perspective of the psychopathic Quentin P, a sex-obsessed serial killer (loosely based on 
Jeffrey Dahmer) intent on lobotomising his victims to create a ‘zombie’ who will satisfy 
his every need. Despite the access that the reader gets to Quentin’s thoughts, his condition 
is such that he is unable to confront his own feelings, even in his private diary. The result 
is that the reader remains at an emotional and mental distance from him; there is no 
recognition of human traits and frailties shared by all. We react to Quentin’s plans and 
actions with horror, and the passages detailing the torture, rape and eventual murder of his 
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victims are uncomfortable to read. What is interesting about Oates’s technique is the fact 
that, having been granted unprecedented access to Quentin’s thoughts and emotions via his 
diary, the reader expects to gain some insight into the psychopathic mind but finds instead 
that there is nothing that the average person can associate or identify with. Despite the 
unpleasure the reader experiences as s/he is faced with the shocking details of Quentin’s 
crimes, s/he reads on in the hope of uncovering some kind of motive for his actions or 
some sense of his humanity, however warped. Yet what we get is nothing: Quentin does 
not seem to be motivated by hatred, rage or psychotic delusions; we cannot label him as 
evil or explain away his actions biologically. There’s simply nothing there and this 
absence is demonstrated in the text by the unfinished sentences and thoughts that are 
alluded to but not revealed. The result of this technique is a compelling text which 
simultaneously draws readers in and pushes them away; cleverly playing with the 
conventions of narrative situation and our expectations as readers. Such stylistic devices 
allow Oates to constantly reinforce and increase the distance between Quentin and the 
reader, emphasizing the gulf between the psychopathic subject and the ‘normal’ individual. 
Our spectatorship is made all the more apparent as Oates ensures that readers are 
constantly aware that they are regarding an ‘other’, rather than a character in whom they 
can catch glimpses of themselves and of humanity at large. 
 
1.5 Immersion  
Immersion describes the process by which a reader gets absorbed in a book; it relies on the 
text offering a believable and engaging textual world ‘to which the reader, spectator, or 
user can relate, and it must populate this space with individuated objects’ (Ryan 15). The 
fictional reality that the author presents must be detailed enough to captivate the reader 
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both imaginatively and emotionally; a degree of mimetic skill is therefore required. Ryan 
distinguishes four degrees of immersion (98-99);
12
 however, just two of these – 
imaginative involvement and entrancement – seem relevant to this discussion of the 
techniques relating to empathy and identification.  
 
Imaginative Involvement 
Imaginative involvement describes the immersive state the reader reaches when s/he 
engages with the text but is also aware of stylistic and aesthetic qualities of the narrative 
techniques at play. Zombie creates just such an effect on the reader, as the confessional 
journal form draws one’s attention to the actual writing of the narrative, an effect 
compounded by Quentin’s curious illustrations, syntax and punctuation. The juxtaposition 
of the visual elements and the semantic content of the text combine to make the reader 
more aware of the literary medium, the diary form and the unconventional outlook of the 
fictional author. Similarly, the reader of Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, remains 
cognitively split between immersion in the narrative world and aesthetic awareness of the 
author’s poetics, in an attitude of what Ryan has termed ‘epistemological awareness’ (98). 
This bifurcated reading position does not detract from enjoyment of the text, but rather 
adds a complexity and richness which can enhance satisfaction. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 The two modes I have omitted are ‘concentration’ and ‘addiction’. Ryan defines concentration as the ‘type 
of attention devoted to difficult, non-immersive works…[where] the textual world – if the text projects any – 
offers so much resistance that the reader remains highly vulnerable to the distracting stimuli of external 
reality’ (98). Addiction ‘covers two cases: (a) The attitude of the reader who seeks escape from reality but 
cannot find a home in the textual world because she traverses it too fast and too compulsively to enjoy the 
landscape. (b) The loss of the capacity to distinguish textual worlds, especially those of fiction, from the 
actual world’ (98-99). 
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Entrancement 
Entrancement describes an even deeper level of immersion, whereby the reader is so 
deeply immersed in the diegesis that s/he loses all sense of the literary experience and 
begins to feel that s/he is actually living the action as it unfolds. Iser has argued that, in 
order to reach this level of entrancement, the reader must surrender him- or herself to the 
text and allow his or her own reality to temporarily retreat in favour of identification with 
the fictional reality, so that both ‘selves’ co-exist:  
To imagine what has been stimulated by aesthetic semblance entails placing 
our thoughts and feelings at the disposal of an unreality, bestowing on it a 
semblance of reality in proportion to a reducing of our own reality. For the 
duration of the performance we are both ourselves and someone else. 
(Prospecting 244)  
Despite the depth of the reader’s immersive encounter with the fictional world, however, 
s/he remains aware that the experience is not rooted in reality. Readers of works as 
disparate as Charles Dickens’s Little Dorrit and Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho often 
experience a level of entrancement which can effect physical symptoms of engagement, 
such as tears at moments of high emotional drama or a pounding heart and shortness of 
breath as narrative tension mounts. The depth of the immersive experience is fixed, 
however, by the reader’s awareness that they are participating in a fiction, as Victor Nell 
points out:  
...totally committed attention may heighten the reality of the cathected 
object so as to transfigure both the object and the observer...the reader feels 
that he or she has been transported to another place, which, though real, is 
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known to be false, since there is still an observing ego, distinct from the 
participating ego. (215) 
The ‘split subject’ of the reader does not lose sight of his or her own self during the period 
of entrancement, but at some level remains aware of the process of reading itself. In 
identifying that the ego is at the centre of this process, Nell invokes Freud’s influential 
essay on the psychology of literary creation, ‘The Relation of the Poet to Daydreaming’ 
(1908), in which Freud argues that ‘His Majesty, the Ego, [is] the hero of all daydreams 
and novels’ (qtd. in Nell 207). The role of ego identification is central to reader enjoyment 
of, and emotional and psychic participation in, literary and visual texts and therefore to the 
process of identification itself. This phenomenon will be explored more thoroughly in 
section 1.8; first, however, I must address the issue of emotional participation which is so 
central to this study. 
 
1.6 Empathy 
Immersive texts lead to an empathetic engagement between the reader and the characters 
of a text. This kind of emotional immersion occurs when readers become so engrossed in a 
narrative that they feel as though they understand fictional characters on an intimate, 
emotive level. In such circumstances, the depth of understanding readers gain of the 
feelings, thoughts and motives of the characters leads them to unconsciously project 
themselves into the narrative where they find themselves feeling the emotions of the 
characters as they occur in the fictive world (although these emotions are of course 
supplied or projected by the reader, rather than the text).  
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Empathy should be distinguished from sympathy, which is where readers feel for 
characters, rather than with them. In Oates’s Zombie, for instance, we feel sympathy for 
Quentin’s unsuspecting victim, Squirrel, as the killer prepares to abduct him, but we do not 
empathise with him as we have not reached the necessary immersive depth. By contrast, 
when reading Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, we experience Raskolnikov’s terror 
and suffering as he tries to come to terms with his actions and evade capture for his crimes. 
The reason for this, I suggest in section 2.2, is the fact that Dostoevsky takes the reader 
deep into Raskolnikov’s mind and explores the interplay between his conscious and 
unconscious drives. We therefore experience not just his aberrance but also his humanity, 
via projected emotions of anguish, rage, guilt, jealousy and fear which we feel vicariously. 
 
1.7 Identification 
Identification is an effect of imaginative involvement or entrancement which can perhaps 
best be described as the process by which immersion and empathy combine to such an 
extent that the reader mentally begins to merge temporarily with a fictional character. 
Jonathan Cohen, in his study of viewer engagement with screen media characters, 
describes identification as 
an imaginative experience in which a person surrenders consciousness of 
his or her own identity and experiences the world through someone else’s 
point of view. Identification leads to the (temporary) adoption of an 
external point of view and to viewing the world though an alternative social 
reality. The varying intensity of identification reflects the extent to which 
one exchanges his or her own perspective for that of another and is able to 
forget him- or herself. (248) 
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A similar process also occurs during engagement with literary characters. However, what 
Cohen does not mention is that identification – this swapping of our own beliefs for those 
of a fictional other – is not a willed conscious act, but seems to occur independently. 
Furthermore, this shift in point of view tends not just to be confined to those moments 
when we are actively engaged in the reading process but lingers, affecting our thought 
processes in between reading sessions and remaining, however briefly, once we have 
finished the book. This effect may be as innocuous as being more aware of etiquette after 
reading a comedy of manners such as Fanny Burney’s Evelina (1778) or, in the case of 
psychopath fiction, it can be altogether more disturbing. 
When reading American Psycho, for instance, we can find ourselves involuntarily 
thinking Bateman’s thoughts about vagrants as we go about our daily life, even though 
they may be diametrically opposed to our own, more humanitarian beliefs. We become 
inured to the violence of the novel, even experiencing a ‘blood-lust’13 during reading as we 
race through long and tedious expositions of the musical achievements of Huey Lewis and 
the News to reach the next brutal slaying. The effect seems to be caused, at least in part, by 
the level of contact we have with Bateman’s psyche. We are exposed to the minutiae of his 
inner and outer life, everything from his taste in music to the shower gel he prefers and his 
exact routine in the gym. The triggers for his outbursts are everyday occurrences, such as 
his jealousy over the superior business cards of his peers or his rage at being unable to get 
on the Stairmaster when the gym is busy. These glimpses of normality allow us to 
recognise Bateman as a human being we can identify with; we empathise with his disgust 
at the selfishness and gross materialism of late twentieth century American society, whilst 
at the same time participating in that society via the text. Despite this, the reader is not 
moved to express this disgust via the kinds of murderous and sadistic acts that Bateman 
                                                          
13
 For more on this phenomenon see pages 50-51 of this thesis. 
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engages in; there remains an awareness of the separation between the character and 
ourselves. As William Flesch explains, in his discussion of the ‘biological components of 
fiction’, our identification is rooted in vicarious enjoyment of the text rather than a belief 
that we are the character:  
When we try to see through their [characters’] eyes it becomes vivid that 
their eyes are not ours, and we are brought to an intense awareness of the 
difference between us – the very opposite of identification...If I can identify 
with what I see, then my vicarious experience comes first, and identification 
is based on it. Such identification has nothing to do with some illusion that I 
am the character I care about. (15-16) 
Although Flesch is correct to distinguish between the character and the reader in this way, 
he falls short of explaining what does occur during the identificatory process; that is, the 
fact that his ‘vicarious experience’ is based on a complex psychical process concerned 
with the fulfilment of his forbidden wishes. This is clearly an important distinction and one 
I will be examining in greater detail as this study progresses. Psychical energy spent 
repressing these wishes is given respite when they are explored in this way; although the 
wishes are not literally fulfilled, experiencing them vicariously via the text leads to a 
satisfying release of tension without any of the risk typically associated with the taboo. 
 
1.8 Conscious Motivations vs. Repressed Desires 
As noted previously (section 1.3), identification is not a narrative technique but a 
phenomenon that occurs in the reader, having been triggered by textual effects. It arises at 
the juncture between the conscious act of reading and the imagining of the narrative in the 
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reader’s head. The tension this creates seems to be particularly acute when we are dealing 
with texts which explore aberrant psychology, as the engagement with the reader’s sense 
of right and wrong raises awareness of the interplay between the ego, the id and the 
superego. Freud explores this notion in his essay ‘Psychopathic Characters on the Stage’ 
(1905-1906), in which he theorises the appeal of drama. He identifies the pleasure of 
drama as essentially narcissistic, in that the hero (or anti-hero, as is usually the case with 
psychopath fiction) gives the viewer or reader someone to identify with. Via this figure, 
the viewer can imagine her- or himself centre stage and at the heart of the action, in a safe, 
risk-free environment. S/he can experience the suffering that the drama is concerned with, 
whilst at the same time being spared the anguish such suffering would entail in real life. So 
far, so in tune with Flesch’s argument of vicarious enjoyment. However, I would argue 
that the situation is slightly different with fiction (and particularly with texts exploring 
aberrant figures such as the psychopath), in that the experience can entail suffering.
14
 
Reading novels like Zombie and American Psycho can be an acutely uncomfortable and 
disturbing experience, due to the extreme subject matter the texts are concerned with. Yet 
at the same time these texts are compelling; the reader, driven by the desire to satisfy his or 
her curiosity about what will happen next in the narrative, reads on despite the discomfort. 
The gratification the reader derives from the experience may originate from his or her 
appreciation of the narrative technique, or the author’s satiric swipe at contemporary 
society, and it could equally arise from the satisfaction of the ‘blood-lust’ that often 
develops during engagement with this kind of material. The question of ‘blood-lust’ is 
interesting in that it’s based on the pursuit of a particular kind of vicarious sadistic 
pleasure, specifically the enjoyment of outrageous and unsavoury events that most readers 
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 Suffering is, of course, possible with drama, even with the potential for catharsis. However, I contend that 
it is more pronounced during engagement with fiction due to the nature of the act of reading. As I noted in 
my discussion of Bernstein’s theory of material culture (see page 18), the very act of turning the page 
interpellates the reader into the text’s ideology. Reading position and narrative technique can also heighten 
the effect, as they create a closer mode of reception. 
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would rightly baulk from engagement with in real life. The process sees the reader 
identifying with key passages and aspects of plot and participating in them without risk, 
culpability or even acknowledgement of the process at play. As Elizabeth Dalton explains, 
in her discussion of the unconscious in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot: 
The paradox of these books is that they present forbidden fantasies rather 
openly, and yet because the material is contained within ritualized literary-
cultural conventions, and manipulated in a superficial and mechanical way, 
without much relation to reality or any sense of the ambiguity of lived 
experience, the nature of the fantasy is concealed from the naive 
reader...One is permitted to enjoy in fantasy the gratification of forbidden 
wishes while paying little or nothing in conflict and guilt. (30) 
Dalton’s theory certainly seems applicable to psychopath fiction, where the reader engages 
with characters and events which s/he would find reprehensible in real life. The ‘conflict 
and guilt’ felt by the reader of psychopath fiction may increase commensurate with the 
salaciousness and extremity of the material, but dissonance is mediated by a combination 
of the text’s poetics and the prevalence and relative acceptability of psychopath narratives 
in society – Dalton’s ‘ritualized literary-cultural conventions’ – which highlight the 
fictionality of the challenging material. 
Freud suggests that dramas depart from the psychological and become 
psychopathological when ‘the suffering in which we are to share and from which we are to 
derive pleasure is no longer a conflict between two almost equally conscious motivations, 
but one between conscious and repressed ones’ (‘Psychopathic Characters’ 147). The 
viewer or reader’s satisfaction in watching such a struggle, Freud argues, derives from the 
fact that, like the character, the spectator is neurotic. The release or recognition of the 
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repressed desire creates pleasure in the neurotic which is not felt by the non-neurotic 
subject. Freud gives as his example Shakespeare’s Hamlet and bases the repressed desire 
in the Oedipus complex which he argues is common to all people and therefore 
recognisable as a point of identification, allowing the audience to muse that ‘we are 
victims of the same conflict as he’ (ibid.). I believe we can extrapolate from this to include 
(with regards to the literary psychopath narratives this thesis explores) the fleeting and 
repressed ‘psychopathic’ desires that each person has, such as the wish to kill those who 
harm or annoy them, or the desire to please oneself regardless of the impact those actions 
may have on others. For Freud, the pleasure of psychopathological (by which he means 
any kind of mental disturbance, rather than the tightly defined psychopathy that this study 
is concerned with) texts lies in this struggle with the repressed; if there is no struggle then 
an empathetic reaction to the text is impossible.  
 This sense of struggle also goes some way towards explaining why readers push 
through the unpleasure of reading graphic scenes of anal rape in Zombie, or misogynistic 
brutality in American Psycho. Reader resistance to such scenes strains the empathetic 
response the texts have previously engendered, yet the reader carries on. This partial or 
limited suspension of moral sanction is disturbing, so what is the meaning of it? Is this a 
twentieth century phenomenon born of an age which saw the certainties of the past give 
way to the unimaginable horrors of two World Wars and a desensitized, brutalized 
modernity? Or is there something more instinctive and primal at play? The attraction of 
reading such material is based on the reader’s contact with matters which are usually taboo 
or prohibited. Freud touches on this, although he does not elaborate, when he notes that 
‘there are many things that could afford no enjoyment in reality, but can do so in the play 
of fantasy, and many excitations that are in themselves painful, but can give pleasure to the 
writer’s audience’ (‘Creative Writer and Daydreaming’ 26). The pleasure derived from 
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unsavoury material seems to spring from the reader’s latent sadism and masochism, which 
Freud refers to as ‘two excellent examples of a mixture of the two classes of instinct, of 
Eros and aggressiveness’ (‘Anxiety’ 138). In his lecture, ‘Anxiety and Instinctual Life’, 
Freud argues that every impulse consists of a combination of these instincts and that any 
imbalance in the interplay between the two can lead to psychic tension and discomfort. 
The readers of Zombie or American Psycho indulge their masochistic urges by reading 
through the unpleasure of the most brutal scenes, sating their appetite for tragedy whilst at 
the same time vicariously inflicting suffering on the victims of the texts by their complicity 
in the acts committed. For Freud, sadism – and its aggressive outlets – functions primarily 
as a defence against self-injury by directing pain outwards. However, ‘aggressiveness may 
not be able to find satisfaction in the external world because it comes up against real 
obstacles. If this happens it will perhaps retreat and increase the amount of self-
destructiveness holding sway in the interior’ (‘Anxiety’ 138). Such obstacles may be real 
or imagined and, for the average law-abiding, morally upstanding citizen, will relate to a 
wider culture of self- and societal censorship. Literature, therefore, offers a socially and 
morally acceptable outlet for the sadistic, aggressive drives which the subject cannot 
otherwise exercise or even acknowledge. Literary technique can help the reader to 
overcome their natural repulsion towards other people’s fantasies whilst indulging their 
own forbidden pleasure in acts that they consciously find abhorrent. These drives can 
remain repressed, whilst being exercised in a controlled fashion that offers no danger to the 
reader or to others. The release or recognition of the repressed desire creates pleasure in 
the neurotic reader (and, of course, we are all neurotic to some degree or another), as Freud 
explains: ‘the real enjoyment of a literary work derives from the relaxation of tensions in 
our minds. Maybe this effect is due in no small measure to the fact that the writer enables 
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us, from now on, to enjoy our own fantasies without shame or self-reproach’ (‘Creative 
Writer and Daydreaming’ 33). 
 However, it is hard to imagine the average reader fantasising about such abhorrent 
acts as we find in novels like American Psycho or Zombie; the levels of twisted, sadistic 
violence and depravity seem too pronounced for a ‘normal’, non-psychopathic subject to 
engage in, even at the level of fantasy. Something more is at play. When confronted with 
such texts, the spectrum of narrative identification runs from the aggressor to the victim 
and the reader must find his or her own position on that spectrum as he or she negotiates 
the material. Literary technique may push us towards identification with the psychopath, 
even whilst we feel sympathy for the victim of their crimes. Yet, as the narratives typically 
deny us as much access to the psyches of the victims as to the psychopaths, our feelings of 
sympathy cannot develop as fully as our empathy for, or identification with, the 
psychopathic figure who is perpetrating the crimes. The reader therefore feels helpless 
unpleasure when reading of the victim’s suffering. Projective identification, where the 
reader subconsciously projects his or her own unpleasant, repressed drives or desires onto 
another, can help us to cope with these feelings and may add further explanation for reader 
engagement with the fictional psychopath. This ego defence mechanism, posited by 
Melanie Klein in 1946, involves a complex process of projection and introjection, where 
the projected ‘bad’ elements of the self are then reincorporated when the subject identifies 
with the object s/he has imaginatively modified. Klein argued that projection ‘originates 
from the deflection of the death instinct outwards…[helping] the ego to overcome anxiety 
by ridding it of danger and badness’ (181) and it is the active element of the process which 
is important. As Charles Rycroft explains, projective identification ‘creates the illusion of 
control over the object and enables the subject to deny his powerlessness over it and to 
gain vicarious satisfaction from its activities’ (68-69). This process allows the reader of 
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psychopath fiction to simultaneously disavow his or her unacknowledged instinctual 
aggression and exercise it by proxy; and this seems to go some way towards explaining the 
complex psychic manoeuvres taking place during engagement with the literary 
psychopath. 
When considered in this light, reader fascination with, and vicarious enjoyment of, 
psychopath narratives become easier to understand. Through them, the reader is able to 
explore his or her repressed desires and obtain the release that the (subconscious) 
recognition of these desires brings. As Glyn White notes, such texts present the reader with 
an escape from the restrictions of society ‘through which the reader may avoid 
responsibility for the wish fulfilment obtained’ (7); crucially ‘the literary work, like a 
dream, represents the fulfilment of...forbidden wishes, but in a way that disguises their true 
nature so that both the repressing tendency and the wish are satisfied’ (Dalton 10). The 
reader of texts such as American Psycho, then, is able to satisfy his or her basest, most 
unspeakable desires in a safe and guilt-free manner (the possibility of counter or resistant 
reading is also scripted in) that affords release without the risk of harm to self or others 
and, perhaps most importantly, without the reader having to confront or acknowledge the 
desires themselves. The novel’s interest, then, goes beyond what Femi Oyebode describes 
as ‘the intrinsic fascination that we all have for how the mind works, either in health or 
illness’ (142) and is engaged instead with the satisfaction of deep-seated, forbidden desires 
and the pleasure which accompanies the release or recognition of the repressed – evidence, 
perhaps, of Markman’s suggestion that there’s a little bit of the psychopath in each of us.  
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Chapter Two 
Narrative Modes for Representing Consciousness in Fiction 
 
In the introduction to her seminal work, Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for 
Presenting Consciousness in Fiction, Dorrit Cohn talks of ‘the paradox that narrative 
fiction attains its greatest “air of reality” in the representation of a lone figure thinking 
thoughts she will never communicate to anyone’ (7). She cites Käte Hamburger’s theory 
that the successful representation of a character’s interiority is what differentiates fiction 
from reality and facilitates the construction of a fictional reality. For Hamburger, the 
‘semblance of life is produced only by the person as a living, thinking, feeling, and 
speaking subject...it is language alone which is capable of producing the semblance of life’ 
(The Logic of Literature 59). She explores how it is the verbs of ‘inner action, such as to 
think, to reflect, to believe, to intend, to feel, to hope, and so forth’ (82) which create these 
effects (often via the narrated monologue), but that the ‘real life’ individual can never use 
these verbs authoritatively about another; we can only truly ‘know’ our own 
consciousness. Ultimately, she concludes, ‘Epic fiction is the sole epistemological instance 
where the I-originarity (or subjectivity) of a third-person qua third-person can be 
portrayed’ (83, Hamburger’s emphasis). This preoccupation with mimesis of human 
experience has been present in the novel since its rise in the eighteenth century, when a 
mood of social and psychological questioning, coupled with the growth of the reading 
public, precipitated demand for an ever-widening choice of narratives. Readers 
voraciously consumed fledgling depictions of consciousness and world views other than 
their own, and revelled in the opportunity to relate to an ever-widening selection of literary 
characters. 
57 
 
The modern novel first appeared during the Age of Sensibility (c.1701-1789), 
which straddled the Augustan ‘Age of Reason’ (c.1660-1740) and the Romantic period 
(c.1785-1832). The emphasis of the Sensibility novel was typically on the particular, rather 
than universals and generalities, and a preoccupation with the experience of the individual 
was manifested in a proliferation of eponymous heroes and heroines (e.g. Robinson 
Crusoe, Pamela, Clarissa, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, etc). The focus on 
the individual led to an increasing concern with representing consciousness in fiction. This 
can be seen in novels such as Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), often credited with being 
the first English novel, which provided ‘for the first time in the history of fiction...a hero 
whose day-to-day mental and moral life is fully shared by the reader’ (Watt 76). Building 
on Defoe’s successes, Richardson’s Pamela (1740) added greater psychological depth to 
its characters, by creating fuller, more complex and more realistic characterisations than 
had previously been seen.  
These early works often relied on first person techniques such as the memoir or 
journal (Crusoe) or the epistolary form (Pamela) which offered readers an insight into the 
minds of the characters without the need for authorial intervention. Readers receive the 
material ‘first-hand’ without the involvement of an authorial, or third person, narrator, 
making things more immediate. However, these techniques are not without their 
difficulties. As Anna Barbauld notes in her essay ‘Three Ways of Telling a Story’15 
(1804), since ‘what the hero cannot say, the author cannot tell’ (259), the memoir is 
limited to what the protagonist chooses to share with the reader; furthermore, the vibrancy 
and accuracy of recollections may be hampered by the time that has elapsed between their 
occurrence and retelling. Barbauld conceded that third person narration has advantages 
over first person narratives in that:  
                                                          
15
 The ‘Three Ways’ that Barbauld identifies are the memoir, omniscient narration and the epistolary form. 
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The author relates himself the whole of the adventure…he can reveal the 
secret springs of actions, and let us into events in his own time and manner. 
He can be concise, or diffuse, according as the different parts of his story 
require it. He can indulge…in digressions, and thus deliver sentiments and 
display knowledge which would not properly belong to any of the 
characters. (258) 
The omniscience of the third-person narrator, as Barbauld shows, allows him or her to 
shape and control the flow of information according to his own narrative agenda, thereby 
heightening tension for dramatic effect. The narrator’s access to the thoughts and 
motivations of diverse characters is also an advantage, although Barbauld warns that, as 
‘his narration will not be lively, except he frequently drops himself and runs into dialogue’ 
(ibid.), narrative interest is best maintained by the use of differentiated modes of discourse.  
Indeed Barbauld saw that the realist writer faced problems with each of the existing 
narrative techniques and that new methods, combining the best elements of both first- and 
third person narration, were needed. This was achieved in the nineteenth century via 
combinations of what Wallace Martin has termed Barbauld’s ‘conceptual distinctions’ 
between ‘grammatical person or voice’, ‘kinds of discourse’ and ‘access to consciousness’ 
(131, original emphasis). The new methods of narration which developed led to increased 
interest in the question of point of view, and a number of competing terms came into 
usage. However, for Gérard Genette, writing in the early 1980s, terms such as ‘narrative 
perspective’, ‘point of view’, ‘vision’ and ‘field’ lacked precision. He felt that:  
most of the theoretical works on this subject...suffer from a regrettable 
confusion between...mood and voice, a confusion between the question who 
is the character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective? and 
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the very different question who is the narrator? – or, more simply, the 
question who sees? And the question who speaks? (186) 
Genette’s solution to the problem was to introduce his own, more specific term: 
focalization. Focalization determines the way that a story gets told, with the focalizer the 
person perceiving the events being relayed. This simple semantic shift marked a dramatic 
departure from earlier narratological theories and, as Jonathan Culler has noted in his 
introduction to Narrative Discourse, Genette’s ‘[i]nsistence on the difference between 
narration and focalization is a major revision of the theory of point of view’ (10). In 
Genette’s schema, the focalizer, who is often the narrator (although this is not always the 
case), can be a character from within the diegesis (homodiegetic narration) or be external 
to it (heterodiegetic narration). This was an important development and, as H. Porter 
Abbott observes,  
Genette argued with much justice that the distinction between homodiegetic 
and heterodiegetic narrators is more adequate than that between first- and 
third-person narrators for specifying whether a narrator is inside or outside 
of the world of the story. (68) 
Such distinctions are of great use to the literary critic, particularly one who is engaged in 
an historical survey of narratological techniques for mimesis of inner life. Narrative trends 
have changed over time as writers continue to experiment. Generally speaking, however, 
nineteenth century realism tended to favour heterodiegetic narration, whilst the modernist 
preoccupation with representing consciousness in fiction saw a proliferation of 
homodiegetic stream-of-consciousness techniques. 
Central to all these techniques for the literary representation of consciousness is 
Cohn’s formulation of the three modes of psycho-narration. Psycho-narration, says Cohn, 
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‘identifies both the subject-matter and the activity it denotes (Transparent Minds 11). She 
defines the three techniques for presenting consciousness in third person narratives as: ‘1. 
psycho-narration: the narrator’s discourse about a character’s consciousness [e.g. ‘Little 
Dorrit had sometimes thought, and now thought again as she retraced her steps up the 
staircase, that he had made his way too easily into her father’s house’ Dickens, Little 
Dorrit 427]; 2. quoted monologue: a character’s mental discourse [e.g. ‘Yesterday was one 
day, she thought, but I didn’t eat then. I haven’t eaten since.......and that night was the 
dance, and I didn’t eat any supper’ Faulkner, Sanctuary 88; original ellipsis]; 3. narrated 
monologue: a character’s mental discourse in the guise of the narrator’s discourse’ [‘He 
thought of fastening his door, but he could not raise his arm...and besides it would be no 
use! Fear crept like ice round his heart, tortured his nerves, numbed his spirit...’ 
Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment 110; my emphasis, original ellipses]’ (ibid. 14). 
Cohn’s third person techniques can be equally applied to the study of narrative techniques 
for presenting consciousness in first person narratives, although the terms are slightly 
modified: ‘psycho-narration becomes self-narration...and monologues can now be either 
self-quoted, or self-narrated’ (ibid.).  
Of course, not all novels seek to represent the consciousness of their characters; the 
nineteenth century third person novel typically shunned psycho-narration. But, in the 
absence of an exposition of inner life, how is the reader to engage with or understand 
figures in the text? The answer lies within the texts themselves, where ‘character portrayal 
is far more “contextual” than “intrinsic” (Transparent Minds 22). We can reach these 
‘contextual’ truths by examining the broader narrative techniques employed in a novel. As 
Martin notes, American critics such as Cohn, Paul Hernadi and Roy Pascal placed great 
emphasis on the language of narrative and on how representations of speech and thought 
impact on narrative action and interaction between characters. Although the work of these 
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theorists is very different, collectively it led ultimately to an understanding that narration 
consists of three types of discourse: (1) ‘mimetic and diegetic, showing and telling’ and (2) 
‘the relationships between characters, as well as [3] their relationship to the narrator. Each 
one can provide a perspective on the action just as the narrator does’ (Martin 143). 
Narration can therefore be achieved either directly, via a character’s mind, or indirectly, by 
their reactions to the people around them and events as they unfold. None of the characters 
in a text exists in isolation. Mieke Bal argues that, in order to gain full understanding the 
careful reader must analyse both the subject and the object of focalization, as well as the 
relationship between them. For Bal, ‘a character-bound focalizor [sic]...brings about bias 
and limitation’ (105, original emphasis), and shifts from one focalizer to another can reveal 
a variety of different versions of the same event. These levels of interaction add deeper 
shades of meaning to the narrative, and are particularly important to the work of the 
Russian theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin. 
In his influential work The Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin explores the 
idea of ‘contextual character portrayal’ when he separates novelistic prose into three 
distinct groupings: 
I. The direct word, aimed directly at its object; the expression of the 
speaker’s ultimate semantic authority 
II. The objectivised word (the word of a represented character) 
III. The word oriented toward another person’s word (the double-voiced 
word)  
(Unpaginated schematic, appears on the reverse of a photograph of 
Dostoevsky in between pages 164 and 165) 
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The original schematic contains detailed subcategories for groups II and III, but, following 
Simon Dentith’s lead and in the interests of brevity, I have reproduced a simplified version 
here. Bakhtin’s schema begins to introduce his notion of consciousness as subjective and 
multiple. As Dentith notes, Bakhtin insisted that ‘consciousness can only realize itself, 
however provisionally, in dialogue with the other...truth only emerges in contact with, or 
anticipation of, another’s truth’ (44). In many ways this interaction mirrors the inter-
relations between characters and truth that Cohn explores, although with an important 
distinction. For Bakhtin, truths are revealed when the different voices in the novel (each of 
which carries its own world view, temporally and socially created) collide to create new 
meanings. As Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan explains: 
the act of narration does not represent the world directly. Rather, it 
represents modes of representation, possibilities of doubt and credence, in 
the worlds the characters inhabit. These may be filtered through a variety of 
narrators and points of view or through other forms of what Bakhtin calls 
“polyphony” and “heteroglossia”. (A Glance Beyond Doubt 20) 
In essence then, Cohn’s psycho-narration deals with the internal dialogue of characters, 
whilst Bakhtin’s polyphony and heteroglossia focus more on external dialogues and the 
way that they interact with and affect one another. Polyphony and heteroglossia can also 
have internal implications; as I shall show during my analysis of Crime and Punishment 
and Raskolnikov’s fevered machinations (see page 102), external dialogues can affect 
interior dialogues, which in turn are manifested externally. Broadly speaking, though, 
Cohn is indispensible when dealing with modernist and postmodernist literature, whilst 
Bakhtin is particularly useful for dealing with nineteenth century texts where interiority is 
rare. His theories highlight the subtleties and richness of narrative discourse and help us to 
understand its myriad effects. Although he is probably best known for his work on 
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Dostoevsky, Bakhtin also wrote on Dickens’s Little Dorrit. His essay ‘Discourse in the 
novel’, which appeared in his collection of essays The Dialogic Imagination, gives a 
detailed account of Dickens’s use of heteroglossia. The methods that Bakhtin discusses in 
his essay have proved to be excellent tools for exploring how narrative techniques help us 
to accept and identify with aberrant figures. The next section of this study will therefore 
examine how Bakhtin’s methods grant us a greater insight into the psychopathic villain at 
the heart of Dickens’s eleventh novel, Little Dorrit. 
 
2.1 Realist Representations: Charles Dickens and Little Dorrit 
Little Dorrit’s villain is a psychopathic murderer and master-manipulator named Rigaud. 
Despite being a key figure in the narrative, he occupies a relatively marginal position in 
the text and the reader has little access to his psyche. Indeed, his isolation in the text 
mirrors his isolation from humanity and society. Much of the reader’s knowledge of 
Rigaud is gleaned from the opinions of others; even his crimes occur beyond the diegesis 
as what J.C. Reid calls the ‘picaresque elements of violence and exciting action’ (25). 
Despite this, Rigaud’s influence weighs heavily on the narrative: his acquittal for the brutal 
murder of his wife is a hot topic of conversation; he travels around Europe (without any 
obvious means of support) and provides a ‘bridge’ between many of the key characters and 
events; Cavalletto lives in constant fear of him, etc. The implication is that, even though 
Rigaud exists on the fringes of society, he can re-emerge at any time to wreak havoc. 
Yet Rigaud is, in a way, one of the most enviable characters in the novel. He is 
mostly to be found singing and whistling, happy in his undertakings; quite at odds with the 
misery that attends the other characters. As Clennam trudges with heavier and heavier 
steps towards the Marshalsea, Rigaud seemingly floats through the narrative. He is not 
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bound by the figural prisons that entrap the other characters. Class, money and national 
boundaries do not hold him; he is of ‘no country’ and therefore not subject to any one set 
of societal rules. Whilst Amy Dorrit humbly submits to the status quo and Clennam fights 
against society, Rigaud, self-serving and vile though he is, is free. Interestingly for the 
narratologist, this freedom also exists on a metalevel whereby Rigaud is less subject to the 
constraints of plot than the other characters. He has far greater autonomy than everyone 
else and seems merely to please himself, regardless of narrative feasibility. His freedom 
from authorial powers reveal him to be a menacing and Gothic figure, whom even Dickens 
himself cannot contain. Like the monster in Shelley’s Frankenstein, Maturin’s Melmoth 
and Stoker’s Dracula, Rigaud cannot be second-guessed; his illimitability adds to the 
horror. 
The narrative freedoms that Rigaud enjoys are interesting when considered in 
comparison to Clennam’s constrained, somewhat uptight, existence. As we shall see later 
on in this chapter, much has been made of the ‘doubling’ in Little Dorrit, with critics such 
as Elaine Showalter and Brian Rosenberg suggesting that Rigaud functions as Clennam’s 
‘dark twin’. J. Hillis Miller talks of the ‘relationship between the imagining mind and its 
objects’ (ix), and how characters are projections of the author himself: ‘each imaginary 
man or woman is...a figure in the writer’s own private world of perception or memory, 
longing or fear...a novel is indeed the world refashioned into conformity with the inner 
structure of the writer’s spirit’ (ibid. x). It is possible to extrapolate from this that both 
characters are projections of Dickens himself. Clennam, perhaps the most sympathetic and 
rounded character in the text, is, as Reid notes, ‘a more complex character than Dickens 
usually drew, in that he is seen from the inside, if to a limited extent’ (39). Clennam has a 
strong moral code and a kind heart; he adheres to the rules of society, however limiting 
and uncomfortable that may be for him, and he is similarly constrained by the plot. 
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Conversely Rigaud, as Clennam’s opposite, exists on the outside of decent society and 
narrative plot alike. If Clennam is a version of Dickens, Rigaud is Dickens ‘othered’.16  
Reid calls Rigaud ‘the stock foreign villain of melodrama’ (17) and, as M.H. 
Abrams notes, melodramatic characters are typically ‘flat types...the villain a monster of 
malignity...[whose credibility] is sacrificed for violent effect’ (110, Abrams’s emphasis). 
Despite this, the characterisation of Rigaud is actually based on fact. In his introduction to 
the Oxford World Classics edition of Little Dorrit, Harvey Sucksmith tells us that Dickens 
modelled Rigaud on Pierre-François Lacenaire, a double murderer who was guillotined in 
1836. Lacenaire, who began his criminal career at a very young age and claimed to have 
always known he was destined for the guillotine, courted the attention of the press and the 
public who were thrilled by his ghastly exploits. Like Rigaud, he was ‘work-shy with 
genteel pretensions and took to a life of theft, extortion, forgery and murder for gain. He 
dressed well, affecting an elegant air and scrupulous politeness, and admired the Romantic 
theatre whose over-acting he imitated’ (Sucksmith, ‘Introduction’ viii). Lacenaire was also 
an aspiring writer. His self-reflexive writings were devoured by a public eager to know 
more about a man who believed that ‘murder ought to be defended and judged wholly on 
the basis of aesthetic, rather than legal or moral, criteria’ (Black 113).17 Indeed, 
commentators such as David Evans and Kate Griffiths have noted how his ‘poems, 
memoirs and letters...written during his incarceration, depict a fascinating monster who 
                                                          
16
 One is reminded here of the focus on ‘man’s dual nature’ (48) in Robert Louis Stevenson’s short story The 
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886). The radical splitting of the selves in Little Dorrit 
retrospectively bears much resemblance to Stevenson’s later tale and this highlights both the potency and the 
universality of the theme. Like Dickens, Stevenson (via his character, Jekyll) demonstrates a marked 
attraction to the dark side of human nature: ‘…when I looked upon that ugly idol in the glass, I was 
conscious of no repugnance, rather of a leap of welcome’ (51). 
17
 This focus on the aesthetics of murder would later be found in the works of Thomas Harris and Jeff 
Lindsay. Harris’s Lecter delights in matching the aesthetic of his victims’ murders to their ‘crimes’ as he 
perceives them. Lindsay’s Dexter takes an almost painterly interest in crime scene aesthetics, particularly 
those of his brother, Brian, in the first novel. 
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takes a perverse pleasure in his criminal activity, imprisonment and impending execution’ 
(22).  
Lacenaire appears to have exhibited many of the key traits of psychopathy, 
including egocentrism and grandiosity, lack of remorse or guilt, lack of empathy, deceitful 
and manipulative behaviour, early behavioural problems and criminal versatility. His 
detached attitude towards his crimes, coupled with his charm and flamboyant appearances 
in court, captivated his contemporaries. A lengthy article on Lacenaire, published in 
Dickens’s journal All the Year Round in 1861, describes how he ‘made some people 
shudder, attracted others, and found enthusiastic admirers...For more than two months, 
Paris would listen to and talk of nothing else than the adventures of Lacenaire’ 
(‘Lacenaire’ 417). That journals were still writing about his ‘adventures’, rather than brutal 
murders, some twenty-five years after his death shows not just Lacenaire’s lasting impact 
on popular culture, but also how he was romanticised and rendered attractive to 
generations of readers. 
In his article ‘The Melodramatic Villain in Little Dorrit’, Sucksmith describes how 
both Lacenaire and Dickens’s depiction of Rigaud were heavily influenced by French 
Romantic theatre. Suckmith considers Rigaud to be ‘powerfully realistic and, at the same 
time paradoxically enough, artificial...his falseness is dramatically presented’ 
(‘Melodramatic’ 82). As we saw in section 1.2, the true psychopath is eccentric and 
grandiose, lacks empathy and has shallow emotions. Personality often becomes 
performative, with psychopaths adopting the traits that will appeal to those they are 
attempting to manipulate. For Sucksmith, Dickens’s recognition of ‘the phenomenon of 
life attempting to imitate drama makes Rigaud a triumphant assertion of the true and vital 
hollowness that lies at the core of the psychopathic criminal’s theatrical yet authentic 
performance’ (ibid.). As noted above, Lacenaire similarly drew freely from Romantic 
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theatre in terms of his personal affectations. At his trial, he insisted on portraying himself 
as an artist – both as a poet and as a killer. In this he may have been influenced by Thomas 
de Quincey’s ‘On Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts’ (1827) which was 
published shortly before Lacenaire’s trial. However, the phenomenon of life-imitating-art-
imitating-life was nothing new. As Black has noted: 
Where authors like De Quincey, Stendhal, and Balzac based their criminal 
literature on actual murders, real-life murderers like Pierre-François 
Lacenaire and Jean-Baptiste Toppman were inspired by their readings of 
popular romantic fiction, and they in turn provided fresh models for more of 
the same. (11) 
The similarities between the real life exploits of Lacenaire and the fictional Rigaud would 
not have been lost on the reading public of the 1860s. The intertextuality of 
Lacenaire/Rigaud and life/art invokes the Bakhtinian concept of the dialogic, where 
references of this kind cause the author and the reader to engage in a dialogue with the 
context in which they first encountered the thing being referred to (in this case, the story of 
Lacenaire). The dialogic represents a convergence of ‘voices’ and perspectives which 
engage and interact with each other to create new meanings. For Sue Vice, dialogism 
‘refers to the ceaselessly shifting power relations between words, their sensitivity to each 
other, and the relativizing force of their historically motivated clashes and temporary 
resolutions’ (5). By drawing on popular culture and invoking Lacenaire, then, the 
characterisation of Rigaud inscribes upon the villain certain value judgements and shades 
of meaning. This enables the reader to connect with him on a deeper level, as they bring to 
the text their own understanding of his personality and the acts he may be capable of. 
68 
 
Cultural fascination with the grotesque and barbaric was quite common in the 
nineteenth century (and indeed today), as evidenced by the continuing popularity of ‘real 
crime’ narratives such as the Newgate Calendars. These were originally monthly bulletins 
detailing executions at the Newgate Prison in London, although by 1773 they had been 
gathered together and published in a bound edition entitled The Newgate Calendar: The 
Malefactor’s Bloody Register. Positioned as a chronicle of crime and retribution, it gave 
detailed accounts of London’s most shocking crimes and the subsequent capture and 
punishment of the perpetrators. Public hangings continued in England until the Capital 
Punishment Amendment Act of 1868 recommended that executions only be carried out 
within the confines of prison. Prior to that executions had provided a popular day out, 
attracting vast audiences of men, women and children. As Keith Hollingsworth shows, 
cultural fascination with crime, criminals and public executions was pervasive and drew 
admirers from all social strata: 
The spectators were people of all conditions. Besides the simple curiosity-
seekers and the roisterers, there were a few men of leisure...vulgarians of 
the middle class and large numbers of commonplace city dwellers whose 
bleak lives demanded excitement. The street children were there of 
themselves, and others were brought by their elders for a fright or a treat. 
(4) 
Dickens, who attended a number of executions in a journalistic capacity, was a vocal 
opponent of capital punishment. He viewed it as a vehicle of social injustice, with grave 
effects on what Hollingsworth has called ‘the psychology of crime’ (223). 
However, we know from John Forster, Dickens’s friend and biographer that, even 
as a boy, Dickens had ‘a profound attraction of repulsion’ (18) to the ‘prodigies of 
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wickedness’ (ibid.) that abounded in St Giles, his favourite place in London. Indeed, 
Albert Borowitz claims that Dickens ‘felt a strange empathy for criminals whose impulses 
seemed to raise an echo from some of the darker recesses of his own personality’ (11), 
whilst Edmund Wilson asserts that Dickens ‘identified himself readily with the thief and 
even more readily with the murderer’ (15). This is interesting when we consider the 
incredible popularity of the cheap, crime-obsessed penny broadsides in the mid-nineteenth 
century and also of Dickens’s own narratives of villainy; clearly he wasn’t the only person 
to feel this attraction to the darker side of human nature. Juliet John tells us that ‘[i]n the 
1830s and 1840s, the most notorious breed of romantic criminal was to be found in so-
called ‘Newgate’ fiction and melodrama’ (122). The ‘Newgate novels’, typified by their 
salacious content and fascination with odd personalities, valorised the criminals at the 
centre of their narratives and rendered them attractive to readers. This caused great 
concern to the establishment, particularly when a number of criminals claimed to have 
been inspired by the books. Perhaps most notable of these was François Benjamin 
Courvoisier, valet and murderer of Lord William Russell, who claimed to have based his 
crime on that depicted in Ainsworth’s Jack Sheppard. Courvoisier’s trial in 1840 caused 
great excitement and his execution was watched by some 40,000 people, including 
Dickens and Thackeray. Ainsworth received a great deal of criticism for the alleged 
pernicious effect of his book and, although he continued to write Newgate novels after the 
trial, his reputation never really recovered. When Oliver Twist first appeared, in 1837-
1839, Dickens himself was also categorised as a Newgate novelist – a label he hotly 
resisted. As John has noted, critics, including Thackeray, were so vociferous about 
Dickens’s portrayal of the charismatic Artful Dodger that the 1841 edition of Oliver Twist 
carried a new preface in which Dickens ‘vigorously defend[ed] the novel against charges 
of immorality’ (ibid. 124). 
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Whether we accept Dickens’s protestations or not, his extensive body of work does 
show a marked interest in crime and punishment. Borowitz has claimed that Dickens was a 
‘firm believer in the principle of the existence of Evil...[with a] hatred of the criminal soul’ 
(11). Yet for Hollingsworth, rather than hating the ‘criminal soul’, Dickens identified with 
it on a personal level and it is this which explains his interest in crime and criminality:  
Dickens [was] interested in the criminal as representative of black evil 
erupting from the depths of a human nature which is shared by all...[he] 
worked from springs of intuition which made [him] sometimes aware of the 
shocking affinity with enemy. (224-225)  
Certainly this sense of innate evil is present in Little Dorrit. Murderous villains such as 
Rigaud have no hope of reformation; as Kreutz notes, ‘they prove in their erring to be 
merely inhuman’ (331). Reid expands on this notion when he cites Lionel Trilling’s 
evaluation of Rigaud as ‘the embodiment of evil...[a character whose very] presence is to 
deprive us of the comfortable, philanthropic thought that people are nothing but 
instruments of injustice’ (Dickens 37). Our lack of access to Rigaud’s psyche means that 
we never understand the motivation for his recidivism or whether he has been shaped by 
circumstance.  
The modern reader can recognise in Rigaud the symptoms of psychopathy (he 
scores highly on the PCL-R) and therefore place a medical and psychological gloss on his 
actions; we know it’s just the way he’s built. For the nineteenth century reader, however, 
Rigaud’s behaviour was difficult to comprehend. In her study of American murder 
narratives, Karen Halttunen has noted that nineteenth century Enlightenment faith in the 
supremacy of rational thought did away with earlier Christian beliefs in the innate 
sinfulness and depravity of human nature, and recast the murderer as a ‘moral alien’ whose 
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actions were beyond human understanding. Attempts to understand such (fictional) 
individuals via ‘comfortable philanthropic thought’ were angrily rejected in some quarters, 
as shown by this contemporary review of Little Dorrit in the Manchester Times: 
In the career of this slimy fiend there is no maudlin compromise, no sickly 
sympathy with vice. It is too much the custom to endow the modern villain 
of romance with a halo of compassion; sentimental tears are shed over his 
failings, and the general reader can hardly repress a feeling of indignation 
that the laws of society should interfere with the pleasure and aspirations of 
such a pathetic hero; but in the picture of Blandois all such dangerous cant 
is happily avoided. (20
th
 June 1857, issue 796) 
This anonymous reviewer sees Little Dorrit as a morality tale which will encourage 
readers to emulate the actions of the saintly Amy and develop ‘a more earnest loathing of 
sin when they see it personified in the naked deformity’ (ibid.) of Blandois/Rigaud. 
However, despite the strength of the reviewer’s antipathy for Rigaud, it is interesting to 
note that s/he also identifies him as one of ‘Mr. Dickens’s most finished and successful 
portraitures’ (ibid.). Clearly, for this reviewer at least, the much-vaunted cultural 
fascination with narratives of villainy is not necessarily diminished by a lack of empathy 
for the malefactor.  
What is also significant about the review from the Manchester Times is the 
journalist’s use of the name ‘Blandois’ when referring to Rigaud. It shows that this 
particular reader has been duped by, or has accepted, Rigaud’s alter-ego to the extent that 
s/he no longer refers to him by his real name. In the course of the narrative Rigaud adopts 
no fewer than three aliases: Rigaud, Lagnier and Blandois. All three names are his own 
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and his separate use of them is not accompanied by a splintering of identity, rather, as 
Rosenberg suggests: 
Rigaud’s incarnations as Lagnier and Blandois act as disguises rather than 
as alternate selves and suggest no split in his character. He remains always 
in control of his various identities and aware of their essential singularity, 
referring to himself openly, in the end, as “Rigaud Lagnier Blandois”. (90) 
Throughout the novel, everybody who comes into contact with Rigaud attempts to 
understand him. They sense that something is wrong; that his outward appearance does not 
accord with their intuitive grasp of his character, yet these feelings are so fleeting that no-
one is able to definitively decide whether to trust his appearance or their instincts. 
Interestingly, Dickens plays along with Rigaud’s deceptions, referring to him as Rigaud, 
Lagnier or Blandois at various points in the narrative. Clearly, he does not need to do so. 
Yet this technique creates a powerful effect, placing the reader in the position of the 
characters and forcing him or her to repeatedly go through the process of trying to 
understand who, and what, Rigaud is. 
 Rigaud’s multiple identities, and the simultaneous feelings of repulsion and 
attraction that he inspires in writer and reader alike, echo the multiplicity of dualities, 
confusions and contradictions that run throughout the novel. Characters are literally 
doubled (such as Flintwich and his twin) or have figurative doubles within the text (such as 
Clennam/Rigaud). Furthermore the novel abounds with a polyphony of different voices. 
The idea of polyphony is most closely associated with Bakhtin’s work on Dostoevsky, 
whom he credits with creating the polyphonic novel; however the term can equally be 
applied to the works of Dickens. Bakhtin describes the polyphonic novel as a ‘plurality of 
independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses’ (Poetics 4). The polyphonic novel 
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gives its narrator and characters equal narratorial authority; as Vice points out, ‘[t]he 
narrator does not speak over the characters’ heads, giving the reader privileged moral or 
physical information; the characters narrate themselves, and the narrator never knows 
more than they do’ (6). This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated via Dickens’s decision 
to collude with Rigaud over the use of his various aliases. He places the narrator and the 
reader on equal footing with the characters; we must wait for events to unfold before we 
can grasp the truth.  
For Bakhtin, ‘what matters [about polyphony] is the dialogical angle at which 
these styles and dialects are juxtaposed or counterposed in the work’ (Poetics 150, 
Dostoevsky’s emphasis); it is the meanings that are created when the voices intersect that 
are important. Such fluidity also relates to Bakhtin’s understanding of the self as 
unfinalizable. He believed that individuals could never be truly understood, known and 
revealed to the world and that they existed not in isolation but were affected and 
influenced by others. As Jeremy Hawthorn notes, the voice of each of these individuals is 
deemed by Bakhtin to relate not just to language but to ‘matters relating to ideology and 
power in society...[referring] the listener not just to an originating person, but to a network 
of beliefs and power relationships’ (153). 
This idea of a multiplicity of characters, only partially known, whose lives are 
intertwined is particularly useful for a reading of Little Dorrit. As readers, we never truly 
‘know’ any of the characters; we are only shown elements of personality and given hints of 
motivation. The lack of access we have to the characters’ psyches underscores Bakhtin’s 
conception of the unfinalizable self and what Rosenberg has called the novel’s ‘fascination 
with the elusiveness of character’ (45). Elaine Showalter suggests that Dickens attempts to 
‘penetrate the secrecy of personality’ (31) through his technique of doubling. She sees 
Rigaud as Clennam’s Jungian shadow, ‘an archetypal aspect of the psyche...which 
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represents spontaneity, creativity, and strong emotions, but also lust, criminality and 
violence’ (ibid.). What we see of Clennam is the Persona, or mask, he presents to the 
world. The Persona is the result of ‘a compromise between himself and society’ (Fordham 
47) and a device for shielding the Ego. Rigaud, then, is the dark and uncivilised aspect of 
Clennam’s personality which he wishes to keep from others (and, perhaps, himself). Frieda 
Fordham describes the shadow as ‘all those uncivilized desires and emotions that are 
incompatible with social standards and our ideal personality, all that we are ashamed of, all 
that we do not want to know about ourselves’ (50). Perhaps most significantly for this 
discussion of the repressed Clennam, cowed by the strictures of society, and the 
overbearing, irrepressible Rigaud, Fordham adds that ‘[i]t follows that the narrower and 
more restrictive the society in which we live the larger will be our shadow’ (ibid.). This 
intertwining of individuals, ideologies and power creates true polyphony in the novel and 
helps the reader to better understand the motivations of Rigaud and the psyche of 
Clennam. Yet despite the richness that this doubling brings to the text, Rigaud, like the 
unconscious, remains essentially unknowable. 
 The reader’s first meeting with Rigaud, in the prison at Marseilles, sets up the 
contrasts and contradictions. He is described in an animalistic and derogatory fashion as 
having ‘the expression of a wild beast...his eyes, too close together, were not so nobly set 
in his head as those of the king of beasts are in his’ (3) – a description at odds with 
Rigaud’s courtly bearing and the deference with which he is treated by his cellmate 
Cavalletto and the jailer. We hear that a ‘prison taint was on everything...the imprisoned 
men, were all deteriorated by confinement’ (2). Rigaud is further described as having ‘eyes 
like pointed weapons with...no depth or change...a hook nose...thin lips...[and a] thick 
moustache’ (3). When he laughs his face does not take on a softer, more kindly aspect, 
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rather ‘[h]is moustache went up under his nose, and his nose came down over his 
moustache, in a very sinister and cruel manner’ (5). 
 The focus on Rigaud’s scratched, dirty hands, ghostly white skin and the emphasis 
placed on his eyes, nose, moustache and mouth are characteristics of carnivalesque and 
grotesque realism. In Rabelais and his World, Bakhtin explains how grotesque realism 
focuses largely on those areas of the body which swallow the world or can be swallowed 
by it, usually the bowels and the genitals: 
They can detach themselves from the body and lead an independent 
life....(the nose can also in a way detach itself from the body). Next...is the 
mouth, through which enters the world to be swallowed up...All these 
convexities and orifices have a common characteristic; it is within them that 
the confines [sic] between bodies and between the body and the world are 
overcome. (317)  
The eyes are also significant, as they are almost unique in the body as a site through which 
the world can both enter and be entered. Rigaud’s cold, dead eyes, cruel mouth and mobile 
moustache reveal a great deal about his character. Bakhtin writes that the ‘essential 
principal of grotesque realism is degradation’ (Rabelais 19) and in Rigaud’s case we can 
perhaps take this to represent the degradation of his morality and soul. However, as 
Dentith notes: 
this degradation is not merely a negative process...The degradation enacted 
in carnival and carnivalized writing – the incessant reminders that we are all 
creatures of flesh and thus of food and faeces also – this degradation is 
simultaneously an affirmation...linked to regeneration and renewal. (67) 
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This seems particularly apt for Rigaud; much of the novel sees him engaged in acts of 
regeneration and renewal. Our first encounter with him in prison finds him on the brink of 
release; following his pardon he is spirited away from Marseilles to start a new life abroad; 
as the narrative unfolds he adopts three different identities (Rigaud, Lagnier and Blandois); 
he metamorphoses from a degraded prisoner to a courtly gentleman who moves freely in 
Society; he shows criminal versatility as he goes from murder to extortion, and so on. 
Rigaud’s transformations exemplify Bakhtin’s description of the grotesque as ‘the inner 
movement of being itself...the passing of one form into another in the ever incompleted 
character of being’ (Rabelais 32). However, Dentith has noted that by the time of the 
publication of Gulliver’s Travels in 1726 (some 129 years before the first part of Little 
Dorrit appeared), the regenerative aspect of carnivalesque had largely disappeared from 
literature, leaving behind only the negative elements of the grotesque.  
The changes to the carnival-grotesque are interesting when considered in relation to 
literary texts, as they reveal how social, cultural and political developments have affected 
representations of selfhood and community. From the Middle Ages until the Renaissance, 
the tradition focused predominantly on a collective cultural experience. As Dentith points 
out, in Renaissance literature the carnivalesque ‘perception of life, and its artistic 
expression in the grotesque, is not private, has not settled upon the individual body of the 
bourgeois subject – that is a development of the seventeenth century and later’ (80). This 
move from the collective to the personal shifted the emphasis of the grotesque to an 
‘expression of subjective, individualistic world outlook very different from the carnival 
folk concept of previous ages’ (Bakhtin, Rabelais 36). In part, this can be attributed to an 
earlier state intervention in carnival which sought to control its potentially subversive 
political qualities by turning it into a licensed calendrical ritual. As Stallybrass and White 
suggest, the ‘licenced release’ of carnival is ‘simply a form of social control of the low by 
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the high [that] therefore serves the interests of that very official culture which it apparently 
opposes’ (13).  
The narrowing of festive life saw festivities shift into the private sphere, where 
they were increasingly celebrated within individual homes. This brought a shift in 
emphasis which Bakhtin felt represented 
a reaction against the elements of classicism which characterized the self-
importance of the Enlightenment. It was a reaction against the cold 
rationalism against official, formalistic, and logical authoritarianism...an 
individual carnival, marked by a vivid sense of isolation. (Rabelais 37) 
Perhaps most significantly, it was also marked by a move from joyous laughter to ‘cold 
humor, irony and sarcasm’ (ibid. 38). This is apparent in Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, a 
satire on the human race accused of being one of the most obscene and misanthropic texts 
ever written. For Bakhtin, Swift’s use of the carnival-grotesque tries to break away from 
convention to offer a new perspective of the world, although, as Dentith notes, without the 
regenerative laughter it is ‘an almost purely negative affair’ (81). This harsh, 
individualistic version of the grotesque continued into the following centuries where 
Bakhtin believes it ‘influenced the entire realistic literature’ (Rabelais 52) and ‘[r]ealism 
of grand style’ (ibid.) of authors such as Dickens. Rigaud stands as the archetypal post-
Renaissance grotesque. From his self-serving scheming and lack of empathy to his 
physical appearance, all that is positive about the grotesque has been suppressed. Via 
Rigaud, the traditional carnivalesque focus on regeneration and renewal remains, albeit in 
a newly cynical, negative way; his transformations are used purely to further his villainous 
agenda.  
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 Without regenerative laughter, the grotesque realism in Little Dorrit is similarly 
restricted to the negative and its use in the Marseilles descriptions of Rigaud allows the 
reader to gain some insight into his character. Yet, just as we feel we have the measure of 
him, Dickens introduces a number of contradictions which prevent us from getting close to 
complete understanding. Prior to Rigaud’s trial, he describes to Cavalletto the state of his 
marriage and the circumstances of his wife’s death. We hear that his wife was a young 
widow who had ‘a reputation for beauty, and (which is often another thing) was beautiful’ 
(8). Rigaud himself is described by the narrator as having ‘a certain air of being a 
handsome man – which he was not; and a certain air of being a well-bred man – which he 
was not’ (9). Rigaud refutes allegations of domestic violence, despite being seen striking 
his wife, saying ‘I have a light hand; and if I have been seen apparently to correct Madame 
Rigaud in that manner, I have done it almost playfully’ (ibid.). Even Rigaud’s denial is not 
clear-cut; to hit someone ‘almost playfully’ is not the same as hitting them playfully. Such 
claims and counterclaims show that reality is not singular and absolute but plural and 
subjective; we cannot believe the evidence of our eyes or our ears and we cannot truly 
‘know’ Rigaud. His version of events is allowed to blur the picture and our lack of access 
to his psyche, coupled with the novel’s polyphony (which means Dickens never privileges 
us with information not available to the other characters), constantly keeps us guessing. 
 The polyphony is underscored by the scene in the Break of Day, where a weary 
Rigaud arrives to find himself described as ‘the devil...let loose’, ‘a bad subject’, and ‘a 
wicked wretch’ (106) as his crime and acquittal are discussed. One man, ‘the tall Swiss 
belonging to the church’ (ibid.), suggests that all humans are good: ‘It may have been his 
unfortunate destiny. He may have been the child of circumstances. It is always possible 
that he had, and has, good in him if one did but know how to find it out’ (ibid.). This is 
hotly refuted by the landlady who asserts that some people ‘have no good in them’. Her 
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description of such people, limited though it is, is well suited to the antisocial psychopath. 
The term itself was not to appear until the 1880s, but it is clear that Dickens understood the 
personality type and the characteristics of the condition. During her diatribe the landlady 
finds that she cannot recall Rigaud’s name, referring to him instead as ‘this man – 
whatever they call him, I forget his name’ (107). This highlights the fact that Rigaud’s 
identity is so amorphous, slippery and mutable that names have no meaning; it is his true 
nature, and how that is revealed through his behaviour, that really matters. 
 Rigaud’s overbearing and patronising behaviour soon empties the bar, until only he 
and the landlady remain. He asks her why she feels such antipathy towards Rigaud. As she 
considers her answer, the landlady becomes aware of the contradictions in Rigaud’s 
appearance: 
The landlady, who had at one moment been thinking within herself that this 
was a handsome man, at another moment that this was an ill-looking man, 
observed the nose coming down and the moustache going up, and strongly 
inclined to the latter decision. Rigaud was a criminal, she said, who had 
killed his wife. (107) 
The use of indirect discourse here is significant. The landlady does not know that the man 
she is speaking to is Rigaud, yet her instincts tell her that there is something strange, dark 
and unkind about the stranger before her. By omitting the speech marks around her answer 
Dickens connects her judgement on Rigaud with her judgement on the stranger, with 
ominous effect. We feel that the depths of Rigaud’s depravity are written on his face, 
revealing the darkness of his soul. It is a Gothic moment that fills us with dread. 
 By contrast Rigaud’s discourse is direct and, perhaps most significantly, spoken 
out loud, even when he is alone. Having been shown to his bedchamber by the landlady’s 
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husband, Rigaud draws outs his money: ‘“One must eat,” he muttered to himself, “but by 
Heaven I must eat at the cost of some other man tomorrow!”’ (109). Even when alone, 
Rigaud jealously guards his inner self from sight and, as the author, Dickens colludes in 
this act by denying the reader access to Rigaud’s psyche. We know what Rigaud is 
thinking because his thoughts are vocalised, yet by voicing them, rather than allowing us 
to ‘hear’ Rigaud’s internal monologue, Dickens ensures that the reader is kept on the 
outside, in an unprivileged and spectatorial position.  
Of course, Rigaud’s is not the only voice in the novel. As Dentith points out, 
‘novelistic prose has built into it more than one consciousness’ (196). Bakhtin explores 
this notion in his discussion of ‘heteroglossia’ which, in Russian, literally means ‘different 
speechness’. It refers to the existence of, and dialogic interaction between, different types 
of speech, including (but not limited to) dialects, genres and registers, socially and 
historically formed. Heteroglossia can occur within the speech of the characters, the 
speech of narrators or even the speech of the author, but ultimately it is ‘another’s speech 
in another’s language, serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way’ 
(‘Discourse in the novel’ 324). 
For Bakhtin, each heteroglot language carries a particular standpoint, characterised 
by its own meaning and values, and world view. He argues that one of the simplest forms 
of heteroglossia is ‘incorporated genres’, which typically ‘preserve within the novel their 
own structural integrity and independence, as well as their linguistic and stylistic 
peculiarities’ (ibid. 215). This is significant when we consider Rigaud’s characterisation as 
a melodramatic villain. Dickens invests greatly in Rigaud’s melodramatic persona, from 
his manner of speaking to his style of dress, even his physical movements. An interesting 
example of this comes in the Break of Day, when Rigaud becomes intrigued as to the 
identity of the person sharing his bedchamber. At this point, Rigaud himself has not been 
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named and is variously referred to as ‘the guest’, ‘the traveller’, and so on. This 
polyphonic play adds not just to the mystery surrounding Rigaud’s identity but also to the 
tension of the scene, as he creeps across the room to catch a glimpse of the sleeper:  
The waking traveller, therefore, stole a little nearer, and yet a little nearer, 
and a little nearer, to the sleeping traveller’s bed, until he stood close beside 
it. Even then he could not see his face, for he had drawn the sheet over it. 
The regular breathing still continuing, he put his smooth white hand (such a 
treacherous hand it looked, as it went creeping from him!) to the sheet, and 
gently lifted it away.  
“Death of my soul!” he whispered, falling back, “here’s Cavaletto!” (109) 
Rigaud’s exaggerated tiptoe across the room would not be out of place in a pantomime (a 
form from which melodrama derived, according to Peter Brooks on page 62 of The 
Melodramatic Imagination). Every part of this passage impresses upon us Rigaud’s 
dastardly nature, from his ‘treacherous’ ghostly hand, to his reaction on discovering the 
sleeper’s identity. The hand seems to work independently of Rigaud, bringing to mind the 
detachable body parts of the grotesque. As it goes ‘creeping from him’ there seems to be 
no limit to the amount of mischief or evil it could commit and this adds to our impression 
of Rigaud as diabolical and ‘othered’. His actions and exclamation on uncovering 
Cavaletto are equally melodramatic, tying him tightly to the genre that defines him by his 
immorality and villainy. 
 John makes the point that, as a genre, melodrama creates simple, ‘flat’ surfaces that 
hint at the depths below. It avoids interiority on the assumption that surfaces have a 
broader meaning, that their outward simplicity signals the complexity beneath. She goes 
on to argue that, in Little Dorrit, Dickens is exploring the possibility that this is not the 
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case, with ‘the Gothic villain Rigaud Blandois and his prose environment [foregrounding] 
Dickens’s exploration of a world devoid of interiority’ (112). This is interesting on a 
number of levels. The first is her reference to Rigaud’s ‘prose environment’, by which she 
presumably means both the way he is spoken of (i.e. narrated), and the way in which he 
speaks, within the context of the novel. Now, whilst I would agree that Rigaud seems to 
lack psychological depth, I do not agree that his prose environment lacks complexity. 
Heteroglossia is, by its very nature, complex, representing as it does the dialogic clashes 
and conflicts between diverse languages within a single utterance or passage. As Bakhtin 
notes,  
[s]uch speech constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse. It 
serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two 
different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, 
and the refracted intention of the author. (‘Discourse in the novel’ 324, 
original emphasis)  
John’s assertion is also interesting when we consider it in relation to Rigaud himself. She 
explains how his lack of interiority is a consequence of his melodramatic posturing and his 
‘constant externalization of passion’ (Dickens’s Villains 113), arguing that ‘if innerness is 
constantly made visible, then arguably there is nothing left inside’ (ibid.). This is a 
compelling argument and one which lays bare Dickens’s vision of identity. Yet it could 
equally be argued that Rigaud’s hollowness relates to his psychopathy – that is, a 
biological disorder over which he has no control – rather than manifesting as a side-effect 
of the conscious performativity of his identity. Hare describes psychopaths as suffering 
from 
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a kind of emotional poverty that limits the range and depth of their feelings. 
While at times they appear cold and unemotional, they are prone to 
dramatic, shallow, and short-lived displays of feeling. Careful observers are 
left with the impression that they are play-acting and that little is going on 
below the surface. (Without Conscience 52, my emphasis) 
We have already accepted that, in Rigaud, Dickens has drawn a very accurate portrait of a 
psychopath who conforms closely to the clinical criteria laid out by Hare. It therefore 
follows that, for Rigaud the psychopathic villain, it is not that the melodramatic 
‘externalization of passion’ has made passion meaningless, as John suggests, but rather 
that this passion never existed in the first place. Rigaud jealously guards his psyche from 
the prying eyes of other characters (an act in which Dickens polyphonically colludes), 
because his inner self is not recognisable as human. Were this to be revealed to his peers, 
his progress through the narrative would be hampered. 
However, Rigaud’s polished veneer does not fool everyone. Some, such as Gowan, 
reveal Rigaud’s true character unwittingly and in jest, without realising what they’ve done; 
whilst others, such as Amy Dorrit, Gowan’s mother and Lion, Gowan’s dog, understand it 
on an instinctual level. This is made clear in a key scene in Chapter Six of Book Two, 
when Rigaud poses for a portrait by Gowan in the presence of the Dorrit sisters. Gowan 
asks Rigaud (or Blandois as he appears in this sequence) to hold his pose: 
“Don’t stir, then,” said Gowan, coolly, as the sisters approached the easel. 
“Let the ladies at least see the original of the daub, that they may know 
what it’s meant for. There he stands, you see. A bravo waiting for his prey, 
a distinguished noble waiting to save his country, the common enemy 
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waiting to do somebody a bad turn, an angelic messenger waiting to do 
somebody a good turn – whatever you think he looks most like!” (412) 
It is significant here that Gowan asks that the ladies see the ‘original...that they may know 
what it’s meant for’ and then lists a number of possibilities. The inference is that a glance 
at Rigaud is insufficient to understand him. His surface appearance is merely that, a 
surface, on which can be written any number of definitions of his character, according to 
the taste and disposition of the observer. Each positive possible persona is superseded by a 
negative one, until eventually Gowan settles on ‘a murderer after the fact’ (ibid.). His 
decision is prompted by Rigaud’s ghostly white hands which seem to show the marks of 
‘some scuffle with another murderer, or with a victim’ (413). 
 Of course, Gowan does not really believe that his friend is a murderer; this is 
merely light-hearted banter. Amy Dorrit, however, senses the darkness at the core of 
Rigaud when their eyes meet as she stands by the easel and she trembles with fear. Lion, 
whose head Amy is caressing, also meets Rigaud’s gaze and growls menacingly. 
Supposing Amy to be afraid of the dog, Gowan reassures her ‘He won’t hurt you, Miss 
Dorrit’ (ibid.), a statement which could as equally refer to Rigaud as to the animal. When 
Gowan realises that Lion is not growling at Amy he is incensed and instantly blames 
Rigaud for provoking him. As Lion tries to leap at Rigaud, Gowan restrains him, shouting 
“Get out of his sight, Blandois! What devil have you conjured into the dog?” (ibid.). 
Again, the language that Gowan uses here is noteworthy. By suggesting in his anger that 
Rigaud has ‘conjured’ a ‘devil’ into the dog he grants him diabolical powers that are far 
closer to Rigaud’s malevolent true nature than Gowan could imagine. When Rigaud has 
left the room and Lion has been subdued, Gowan turns to his frightened wife and asks her 
to remember the dog’s usually placid manner: 
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“Come, come, Minnie! You know he is always good humoured and 
tractable. Blandois must have irritated him – made faces at him. The dog 
has his likings and dislikings, and Blandois is no great favourite of his; but 
I’m sure you’ll give him a character, Minnie, for never having been like this 
before.” (414) 
When the dog first became aggressive as it stood by the easel with Amy Dorrit, Gowan, 
‘putting in the markings of the hand’ (413) was focused on his canvas. With his back to the 
dog and his attention away from Rigaud it is easy for him to imagine that the latter was 
engaged in mischief. Yet we know from Amy Dorrit that Rigaud’s eyes were locked to 
hers and not in contact with the dog: “they had looked at each other all the time” (ibid.). 
The dog then, sensing Rigaud’s malevolence at the same time as Amy, acts instinctively 
when he growls in warning before attempting his attack. Significantly, H.K. Browne’s 
illustration of the scene is captioned ‘Instinct stronger than training’, providing further 
proof that, far from being a dumb animal, the dog understands far more than his master. 
 Unfortunately for Lion, however, a strong instinct is not enough to save him from 
his new-found nemesis. Later that evening, when the Dorrit sisters are leaving the opera, 
they meet Rigaud on the quay. As he hands them into their boat he nonchalantly tells them 
that the dog is dead, a fact which Amy finds hard to accept: ‘“Dead?” echoed Little Dorrit. 
“That noble dog?” “Faith, dear ladies!” said Blandois, smiling and shrugging his 
shoulders, “somebody has poisoned that noble dog. He is as dead as the Doges!”’ (420). 
The use of the word ‘noble’ is ironic here. The last time it was used in the presence of 
these characters was when Rigaud was posing for Gowan who suggested, amongst other 
things, that he may be ‘a distinguished noble waiting to save his country’ (412). The 
reader, having followed Rigaud since his release from the prison in Marseilles, knows that 
he is not of noble birth and that he merely plays at being a gentleman. Furthermore, as the 
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scene in Gowan’s studio developed it became clear to Amy and Lion that Rigaud was not 
of noble character, if we take noble to mean a person of illustrious or distinguished 
character. That this term should be conferred on a dumb animal, then, demonstrates the 
dog to have been of exalted and discerning nature. In turn, the base and brutish qualities 
typically associated with animals transfer onto Rigaud as the man who callously took the 
life of the ‘noble dog’. 
 Rigaud’s killing of the dog is also interesting from a clinical perspective. His 
casual, even triumphant account of the dog’s demise indicates his lack of empathy, lack of 
remorse or guilt, and poor behavioural controls; all key indicators of psychopathy on the 
PCL-R. Profound cruelty to animals is a well-documented childhood precursor to 
psychopathy, which appears on the MacDonald triad. In his 1963 article ‘The Threat to 
Kill’, which appeared in The American Journal of Psychiatry, J.M. MacDonald identified 
a set of three behavioural characteristics which when exhibited in childhood can indicate a 
propensity to severe personality disorder. MacDonald’s study was on a small scale and its 
validity has since been questioned, but his findings have been corroborated by many later 
studies, including the research of Hare who notes that ‘[e]arly cruelty to animals is usually 
a sign of serious emotional or behavioural problems’ (Without Conscience 66). Indeed, 
many of the most notorious killers of recent history, such as serial killers Jeffrey Dahmer 
and Henry Lee Lucas (on whom the 1986 film Henry: Portrait of a Serial Killer was 
based), had well-documented histories of precocious sadism and animal abuse. Perhaps 
most significantly for this discussion of Rigaud’s attitude to killing Lion, Hare also points 
out that ‘[a]dult psychopaths usually describe their childhood cruelty to animals as 
ordinary events, matter-of-fact, even enjoyable’ (ibid.). Rigaud’s smiling, shoulder-
shrugging, insouciant account of the dog’s death stands in sharp contrast to the horror with 
which Amy Dorrit reacts to the news. 
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 In these small ways Rigaud’s true character is continuously revealed, despite his 
efforts to conceal it. Throughout the novel people are puzzled as to whether he is ‘an ill-
looking man or a good-looking man’ as their instincts fight with their eyes in their 
evaluation of his character. Amy and Mrs. General, however, are not so easily fooled. 
They see him as ‘an odious creature of the reptile kind’ (426) and are brought together by 
their shared experience of him. Rigaud is aware of their feelings towards him and dislikes 
them in turn, betraying his antipathy by minute mannerisms, imperceptible to the casual 
observer but noticeable enough to inform Amy and Mrs. General that he retains the upper 
hand: 
A mere trick of his evil eyes, a mere turn of his smooth white hand, a mere 
hair’s-breadth addition to the fall of his nose and the rise of his moustache 
in the most frequent movement of his face, conveyed to both of them 
equally a swagger personal to themselves. It was if he has said, “I have a 
secret power in this quarter. I know what I know.” (ibid.) 
Rigaud’s hostility towards the women is most keenly felt when he arrives at the Dorrit 
home in Venice, to pay his respects to Mr. Dorrit before leaving the city. Mrs. General, 
who is visiting for the same purpose, is sitting with Amy. With the paranoid and bullying 
attitude common to the psychopath, Rigaud intrudes on their conversation and offers to 
escort Mrs. General home. Mrs. General declines his offer but he remains at their table and 
attempts to engage them in conversation. However, Rigaud’s attempts at playing the role 
of the polite and amiable Society gentleman fall flat; the women are not taken in by his 
performance. As Hare tells us, psychopaths are typically very good at presenting 
themselves as charming and charismatic, although to some people ‘they seem too slick and 
smooth, too obviously insincere and superficial. Astute observers often get the impression 
that psychopaths are play-acting, mechanically “reading their lines”’ (Without Conscience 
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35). Mrs. Gowan and Amy are certainly astute observers; they hear the subtext beneath his 
honeyed words and are fully aware that his aim is to prevent them from talking about him: 
‘He sat entertaining them with his finest compliments, and his choicest conversation; but, 
he conveyed to them all the time, “No, no, no, dear ladies. Behold me here expressly to 
prevent it!’ (427). 
This sentence is very interesting in its construction, combining the heteroglot 
utterances of Rigaud, the narrator and, in a refracted way, the author himself. It is a classic 
example of a hybrid construction: 
an utterance that belongs, by its grammatical (syntactic) and compositional 
markers, to a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two 
utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two “languages”, two semantic 
and axiological belief systems. (Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the novel’ 304) 
The main clause of the sentence, which is in the narrator’s speech, tells us what Rigaud 
does, in that he sits and speaks to the women. However, it also tells us what Rigaud thinks 
he is doing, via the descriptions of his ‘fine compliments’ and ‘choice conversation’. These 
descriptions give us Rigaud’s inflated sense of himself as infallibly charming whilst, via 
their irony, also conveying to us the discomfort of the women as they receive Rigaud’s 
unwelcome attention. The subordinate clause of the sentence is Rigaud’s direct internal 
discourse, which reveals that his intentions (which are to control the ladies and prevent 
them from speaking about him) speak louder than his actual words (which aim to flatter 
and entertain them).  
For Bakhtin, this particular type of heteroglossia sees the author demonstrate his 
own presence and point of view via his effect on both the narrator of the story and the 
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story itself. In other words, the author’s point of view is separate from and different to the 
point of view of the narrator, whose narration he controls: 
Behind the narrator’s story we read a second story, the author’s story; he is 
the one who tells us how the narrator tells stories, and also tells us about the 
narrator himself. We acutely sense two levels at each moment in the story; 
one, the level of the narrator, a belief system filled with his objects and 
expressions, and the other, the level of the author, who speaks (albeit in a 
refracted way) by means of this story and through this story. The narrator 
himself, with his own discourse, enters into the authorial belief system 
along with what is being told. (‘Discourse in the novel’ 314, original 
emphasis) 
In Little Dorrit, Dickens presents as an impish, mischievous author who identifies with, 
and in some ways admires, the psychopathic Rigaud. He manipulates his narrator, and thus 
his readers, in the same way that Rigaud manipulates the people around him. The 
narrator’s ironic description of Rigaud’s charming conversation in the hybrid construction 
above betrays the frustration he feels at the psychopath’s manipulative behaviour – 
behaviour in which Dickens appears to revel. While the ‘good’ characters in the novel, 
such as Amy, Clennam and the residents of Bleeding Heart Yard, are imprisoned by 
Society, Rigaud floats in and out of the narrative, causing trouble, unconstrained by 
finance, bureaucracy or reputation. And Dickens is similarly mischievous, entering and 
exiting the narrative as he pleases, here confusing the reader, there confounding the 
narrator. His narrative technique mirrors Rigaud’s character and his ambivalence towards 
his villain colours our own perception of him.  
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It is not until the dramatic denouement of the novel that Rigaud’s full identity is 
revealed. Rigaud, who is blackmailing Mrs. Clennam with the threat of revealing Arthur’s 
true parentage, arrives at the Clennam house to make his final demands. The house is dark 
and ominous, full of portent of impending doom. As he enters Mrs. Clennam’s room, the 
window stands uncharacteristically open, symbolising the fact that the outside world (in 
the shape of Rigaud, Pancks and Cavalletto) has been let in and that the secrets of the 
house will soon be opened up for all to see. The death-laden imagery that describes the 
scene adds to our sense of foreboding, from the ‘deadened fire’ to the ‘pall’ on the bed, the 
‘black bier-like sofa’ and the bolster ‘like the head’sman’s block’ (637). The use of the 
word ‘bier’ is particularly chilling, as it refers to the movable stand on which a corpse is 
placed before burial. A burial, but not of the Christian kind, certainly awaits Rigaud; he is 
shortly to be crushed to death when the house collapses.  
In his parting shot, Pancks addresses the villain, saying ‘to his ill-looking face, that 
in my opinion the world would be no worse for his slipping out of it altogether’ (638). 
Although at this stage in the narrative Rigaud cannot imagine how soon Pancks’s 
observation will be proved to be correct, his fate has been inextricably bound up with the 
house of Clennam since day one. As Dickens himself remarked in an 1857 article in 
Household Words:  
when Rigaud first enters it...he is beset by a mysterious fear and 
shuddering...the rotten and crazy state of the house is laboriously kept 
before the reader, wherever the house is shown...the way to demolition of 
the man and the house together is paved all through the book with a painful 
minuteness and reiterated care of preparation. (qtd. in Collins, Dickens and 
Crime 291) 
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Showalter has called the Clennam home ‘the house of shadows’ (28); how appropriate, 
then, that the man she has identified as Arthur Clennam’s Jungian shadow should be killed 
by its collapse. 
 As noted above, Fordham has written of how a restrictive society leads to the 
formation of a large and powerful shadow. In many ways the Clennam house acts as a 
microcosm of Victorian society. It is where the young Arthur was brought up ‘in fear and 
trembling, and in a life of practical contrition’ (Little Dorrit 649) at Mrs. Clennam’s 
‘restraining and correcting hand’ (ibid. 659), and where Mrs. Clennam herself has lived an 
austere life of self-abnegation and psychosomatic paralysis. It therefore seems apt that it is 
within the house that we see Rigaud at his most fully-fleshed. Fordham warns that: 
the danger of repressing the shadow is that in the unconscious it seems to 
acquire strength and grow in vigour, so that when the moment 
comes...when it must appear, it is more dangerous and more likely to 
overwhelm the rest of the personality (51). 
During his confrontation with Mrs. Clennam, the bullying Rigaud appears at the height of 
his powers, ‘always threatening her...coarse, insolent, rapacious, cruel and powerful’ 
(644). He had not counted on the strength of Mrs. Clennam’s character, however. When 
she rises to her feet for the first time in decades, ‘Rigaud fell back and dropped his voice. 
It was...almost as if a dead woman had risen’ (654). Dickens’s references to the ‘ghostly 
figure’ (ibid.) and resurrection of Mrs. Clennam foreshadow Rigaud’s imminent death and 
the return of righteousness to the house of Clennam. Rigaud settles into the window seat in 
‘the old Marseilles-Jail attitude’ (656); a pose redolent with meaning as we shall shortly 
see. As he awaits Mrs. Clennam’s return he congratulates himself on the success of his 
plan so far. His words, however, are chillingly prophetic: 
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“Rigaud Lagnier Blandois, my amiable subject, you will get your money. 
You will enrich yourself. You have lived a gentleman; you will die a 
gentleman....” 
In the hour of his triumph, his moustache went up and his nose came down, 
as he ogled a great beam over his head with particular satisfaction. (656) 
Rigaud Lagnier Blandois is at last revealed as a unified identity; his pretences have been 
dropped and his dark intentions and malevolent nature finally laid bare. Yet as Mrs. 
Clennam rushes to the Marshalsea to confess to Amy and plead with her to protect Arthur 
from the truth, the balance of power shifts. As the secrets are revealed, darkness is 
banished and with it goes Rigaud’s hold over the Clennams. As J. Hillis Miller has argued,  
[if the Devil] exists embodied in a single person, as in Blandois in this 
novel, that person will be powerless against the good, an impotent posturing 
pasteboard figure who is destroyed in the end by his own selfishness, as 
Blandois is crushed in the collapse of the Clennam house. (240) 
In the moment before the house crashes down, Amy and Mrs. Clennam see Rigaud framed 
in the window, still oblivious to his fate: ‘In one swift instant, the old house was before 
them, with the man lying smoking in the window’ (662). As the old house looms large in 
front of them, the secrets and lies and culture of repression that have sustained the house of 
Clennam are brought into stark relief. Rigaud’s position in the window, in the house of 
shadows, reminds us of our first encounter with him in the dank, dark Marseilles prison. In 
the Marseilles window, Rigaud ‘lolled, half sitting, half lying’ (2), his semi-upright 
position signifying that he had not been beaten by the prison system. Now, though, he is 
prostrate, on his back, framed at the centre of the implosion of the Clennam house. In ‘the 
hour of his triumph’ Rigaud has swapped places with Mrs. Clennam, occupying the self-
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imposed prison which has held her for decades. For Rigaud, however, there can be no 
escape. Significantly, at this point in the narrative Dickens has chosen to strip him of his 
name, referring to him simply as ‘the man’. Impotent at last, he has become Hillis Miller’s 
‘posturing pasteboard figure’. The house breaks into fifty pieces, until only its chimney 
stacks remain standing, ‘like a tower in a whirlwind’ (662). This great phallic symbol 
represents the symbolic restoration of power and virility to Arthur Clennam’s father, as the 
repressive house of shadows is dashed to the ground and he is freed from the emasculating 
revenge of his wronged wife. Arthur’s father is long dead, so the endurance of his phallic 
triumph is short; it remains just long enough to free the house of Clennam from Rigaud’s 
power. To drive home the point, the tower too then falls and ‘hailed itself down upon the 
heap of ruin, as if every tumbling fragment were intent on burying the crushed wretch 
deeper’ (662). Again, Rigaud is not referred to by name. The OED gives a number of 
interesting definitions for the word ‘wretch’, including ‘a banished person; an exile’ and a 
‘vile, sorry, or despicable person; one of opprobrious or reprehensible character; a mean or 
contemptible creature’. With each narrative turn Rigaud becomes less and less important 
and recognisable, until he ceases even to be described as human. Following the collapse of 
the house, parties of diggers work for two days and nights to recover Rigaud’s body:  
it was night for the second time when they found the dirty heap of rubbish 
that had been the foreigner, before his head had been shivered to atoms, like 
so much glass, by the great beam that lay upon him, crushing him. (662) 
Stripped of all his identities and a gentleman no more, Rigaud’s final incarnation is as a 
worthless and unwanted ‘dirty heap of rubbish’. The shadow has been vanquished. The 
repressive house of Clennam that Rigaud had sought to destroy but which ultimately 
destroyed him has gone too, making way for a new order. The extreme ‘othering’ of 
Rigaud’s demise, which sees Dickens not just killing him but reducing him to nameless 
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matter,
18
 shows the author asserting his control over, and contempt for, his representative 
of evil. For all its allure and attractions, evil cannot be seen to triumph. Dickens demands 
vengeance; Rigaud must be crushed.  
 
2.2 Dialogism and Disorder: Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment 
Like Dickens, Dostoevsky shows a profound interest in both crime and criminals; each of 
his four great novels contains scenes of murder. However, whereas Dickens is seen as a 
‘didactic [and] moralizing’ (Eagleton English Novel 155) force, Dostoevsky’s depictions 
of crime seem to have gained him a far darker reputation. As Victor Terras observes, as 
early as 1864 Dostoevsky’s interest in the macabre was felt by contemporary critics to 
reveal ‘an unhealthy...curiosity about the darker recesses of the human psyche...a perverse 
attraction to the diseased states of the human mind...[and] sadistic pleasure in observing 
human suffering’ (ix). It seems that this fascination was fed, at least in part, by 
Dostoevsky’s own experiences of mental and physical torment. In 1849 his involvement 
with the Petrashevsky Circle, a radical group of liberal intellectuals, led to him being 
condemned to death for conspiring to set up a printing press. Although his sentence was 
commuted to exile and hard labour, the pardon arrived literally at the last moment as 
Dostoevsky and his comrades faced the firing squad; the trauma of the experience caused 
one of the men to go mad. Dostoevsky’s subsequent imprisonment in Siberia, served in 
squalid, cramped conditions alongside murderers and other hardened criminals who 
                                                          
18
 The reduction of the diabolic to inorganic matter also appears in Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde which, as noted previously, is of great relevance to a number of the texts and themes 
explored in this study. Towards the end of the narrative, Dr. Jekyll ‘thought of Hyde, for all his energy of 
life, as of something not only hellish but inorganic. This was the shocking thing; that the slime of the pit 
seemed to utter cries and voices; that the amorphous dust gesticulated and sinned; that what was dead, and 
had no shape, should usurp the offices of life’ (61). The exaggerated, pathological destruction of the dark self 
speaks to the intensity of the dissonance created by the author’s (and by extension the reader’s) interest in, 
and acceptance of, this figure. 
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resented his links to the gentility they despised, was a period of severe hardship and 
degradation. This was a formative time for Dostoevsky, as Janko Lavrin notes: 
It is beyond doubt that the criminals he became familiar with must have 
revolutionised Dostoevsky’s former ideas of good and evil. The germs of a 
brooding ‘transvaluer’ are to be sought in some of his experiences in the 
katorga (penal settlement) where he could watch human nature divested of 
all its masks and disguises. The enigma of man and of the irrational human 
self appeared, under those conditions, in so many new aspects that on 
leaving this ‘house of the dead’, Dostoevsky was a different human being 
from the one who had entered it four years earlier. (10-11) 
The experience sparked Dostoevsky’s interest in the instability of the self and brought a 
conversion to the Orthodox Christianity that was to inform his later literary works. His 
stoic acceptance of his punishment as a means of atoning for his crime reveals his belief in 
the doctrine of salvation through suffering so central to Russian Orthodoxy, a theme which 
would be explored in Crime and Punishment (1866). Dostoevsky’s ‘curiosity about the 
darker recesses of the human psyche’ led him to intellectualise aberrant psychology; he 
confronts the reader with the appeal of certain psychopathic traits, and also with the 
complexities of portraying mental disarray in literature.  
Dostoevsky’s novel demonstrates a marked interest in aberrant psychology and the 
extremes of human consciousness, yet he grappled with the difficulty of creating an 
engaging and appealing character who is divorced from society and does not care about 
anyone else. In so doing he gave us Raskolnikov and Svidrigaylov. Unlike Dickens, 
however, Dostoevsky does not present the reader with a straightforward portrayal of a 
psychopath. He did not understand psychopathology in the way that Dickens did and, 
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what’s more, he did not care to; he was contemptuous of psychology. Bakhtin declares that 
Dostoevsky saw in psychology ‘a degrading reification of a person’s soul, a discounting of 
its freedom and its unfinalizability’ (Poetics 61). Furthermore, as Terras has shown, there 
is a ‘pattern of deprecation of psychology in Dostoevsky’s later works. Psychological 
motivation, psychological subtlety, and psychological complexity tend to be associated 
with weakness, lack of faith, and negativism’ (49). Crime and Punishment abounds with 
dismissive and disdainful references to ‘nonsensical nervous trouble’ (113) and ‘damned 
psychology’ (428), yet despite this there is a great focus on madness and mental 
disturbance in the novel. Some seven major characters (Marmeladov, Raskolnikov, 
Svidrigaylov, Katerina Ivanovna, Sonya, the painter Mikolka, and Raskolnikov’s mother, 
Pulkeria Alexandrovna) are either suspected of or shown to be suffering from rational 
distortions, mental illness or mania at various points in the narrative. Dostoevsky was not 
interested in the ordinary or the mundane; rather he wished to reveal individual responses 
to the moments of greatest stress. Lavrin explains: 
he was preoccupied with the three main paths, leading one to the greatest 
tension of consciousness: the mystical experience, the crime, and the 
suffering...His explorations of the diseased mental states were not of a 
clinical kind. They were only a short-cut to that ‘inmost essence’ of man 
and life which average healthy conditions could not provide. (42) 
Dostoevsky’s Christian beliefs in humility, forgiveness and the potential to reform were to 
shape his artistic vision, and led him to interpret mental illness as spiritual illness. His 
abiding ‘curiosity about the darker recesses of the human psyche’ was tempered by his 
belief that the malefactor must be redeemable; for this reason a clinically true depiction of 
psychopathy would not work within his literary framework. The psychopath’s malevolence 
is hardwired; the condition is untreatable and he is therefore incapable of reform. Yet the 
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fact remains that the psychopathic mind has a great deal to offer a connoisseur of the 
aberrant and unusual. How, then, can it be explored within the confines of Dostoevsky’s 
literary schema? Dostoevsky’s solution to this problem was a complex splitting of the 
subject into several different characters: Raskolnikov becomes a schizoid personality.  
In Major Theories of Personality Disorder, Mark F. Lenzenweger and John F. 
Clarkin explain how the ‘normal personality is characterised...by an integrated concept of 
the self and an integrated concept of significant others’ (121). This structural unity 
constitutes the individual’s ego identity, underpins healthy self-esteem and permits the 
enjoyment of everyday life in the society of others. By contrast, in the ‘antisocial 
personality’, or psychopath (the most severe of the personality disorders), identity is 
entirely diffused and there is ‘a total incapacity for any non-exploitative investment in 
significant others’ (ibid. 140). Lenzenweger and Clarkin cite W. Fairbarn’s description of 
the schizoid personality ‘as the prototype for all personality disorders’ (ibid. 138), so its 
morphology here is significant both to my study of the psychopath and to Dostoevsky’s 
creative treatment of it. The psychiatrist R.D. Laing says of the schizoid personality: 
in the first place, there is a rent in his relation with his world and, in the 
second, there is a disruption of his relation with himself...he does not 
experience himself as a complete person but rather as ‘split’ in various 
ways...as two or more selves, and so on. (Divided Self 17) 
This concept of the individual split into ‘two or more selves’ is very interesting when 
considered in relation to Crime and Punishment. Raskolnikov experiences a dramatic 
disruption of his relation with himself which leads to the separation of his ego, superego 
and id. These aspects of his personality are embodied in the narrative in the characters of 
Svidrigaylov and Razumikhin, with Svidrigaylov representing Raskolnikov’s id, or 
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unconscious, and Razumikhin his superego. Raskolnikov himself represents the ego, or 
conscious mind. Significantly, the etymology of the characters’ names support this 
analysis. As Terras notes, the Russian word raskol’nik means ‘schismatic’ (70, note 10) – 
highly appropriate for a character with such pronounced identity diffusion that his ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ selves have been entirely separated. Svidrigaylov ‘has a foreigning’ (ibid.) 
which reflects his ‘othering’ function; whilst Razumikhin, as the conscience or ‘good self’ 
of the superego, has as its root the Russian word razum meaning ‘(good) sense’ (ibid.). 
 However, far from offering Raskolnikov freedom, the separation of his disparate 
‘selves’ increases his mental torment and distances him even further from his 
contemporaries. Lenzenweger and Clarkin state that ‘extreme splitting leads to a 
fragmentation of affective experience, which “empties out” interpersonal experience’ 
(138). The more detached Raskolnikov becomes from the various aspects of his 
personality, the more ‘apathetic, listless, distant, and asocial’ (ibid. 375) he is. The ‘true 
self’ becomes disembodied and dissociated; Raskolnikov killed Alëna Ivanovna by 
repeatedly striking her with an axe ‘hardly conscious of what he was doing, and almost 
mechanically’ (73). When he fled from the scene it was as though he ‘no longer knew 
quite what he was doing, and the farther he went the worse his condition became’ (ibid. 
83). In the days following the murder, Raskolnikov’s mental torment tells on his body and 
he succumbs to a fever. As he struggles to come to terms with his crime and deal with his 
crushing paranoia, he withdraws completely from the world, shunning those closest to him. 
The commission of the crime had depended on a split between Raskolnikov’s ‘true’ and 
‘false’ selves; however, the tension between the two leads to a further division. This is a 
typical complication of the schizoid personality, as Laing observes:  
the true and false selves lose their relatedness...but also they both in turn 
break into sub-systems within themselves. Thus, in the relationship that the 
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self has with itself, one finds the inner self splits to have a sado-masochistic 
relationship with itself. (Divided Self 83) 
This seems a good description of the tortured relationship that Raskolnikov develops with 
Razumikhin. Razumikhin is a symbol of social and psychological normativity and the 
representative of Raskolnikov’s superego. Despite the time that has elapsed since the two 
were together at university, from the moment of their first reunion Razumikhin goes to 
extraordinary lengths to help his friend. Yet Raskolnikov is at best dismissive and at worst 
contemptuous of Razumikhin, as though he cannot bear to be faced with this side of 
himself which he has since disavowed. 
 The disintegration of Raskolnikov’s unified self and the brutal murder of the 
Ivanovna sisters stem from Raskolnikov’s desire to prove himself a ‘superman’ to whom 
the normal rules of society do not apply. Suffering an existential crisis, a response to the 
pressures of modernity, Raskolnikov wishes to test whether he is a great man like 
Napoleon
19
 and the other ‘men of genius [who] had not heeded the isolated misdeed but 
marched straight over it without reflection’ (472). This championing of psychopathic traits 
runs throughout the novel and the ‘terrible fascination’ (ibid.) that Napoleon holds for 
Raskolnikov mirrors the reader’s own interest in the psychopathic figure. However, 
Raskolnikov’s experiment comes with great psychic risks, as Laing explains: 
[i]n phantasy, the self can be anyone, anywhere, do anything, have 
everything. It is thus omnipotent and completely free – but only in 
phantasy. Once commit itself [sic] to any real project and it suffers agonies 
of humiliation – not necessarily for any failure, but simply because it has to 
                                                          
19
 Napoleon Bonaparte is widely believed to have been a psychopath, his lack of affect and shallow emotions 
no doubt assisting him in his campaigns. For more on Napoleon see Alan Schom’s study, Napoleon 
Bonaparte: A Life (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998). 
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subject itself to necessity and contingency...The more this phantastic 
omnipotence and freedom are indulged, the more weak, helpless, and 
fettered it becomes in actuality. (Divided Self 84) 
When Raskolnikov tests his theory, then, he becomes not a Napoleonic ‘world-shaper’ but 
tormented and constrained, a prisoner of the situation he has created. The irony is that 
Raskolnikov was led to his heinous act by his empathy for the indiscriminate suffering he 
saw around him. Unable to accept that a just and compassionate God would allow such 
misery, Raskolnikov turns to nihilism, the rejection of all religious or moral principles. 
Without the centring of religion there are no absolutes; no divine decrees. Man is free to 
become a libertine, like Svidrigaylov, following his appetites without recourse to moral, 
religious or legal strictures. Raskolnikov comes to believe that not all men are created 
equal; there are those who must abide by society’s rules and those who are above them, to 
whom all is permissible. To him, Alëna Ivanovna is a ‘foul, noxious louse...no good to 
anybody, who sucked the life-blood of the poor, so vile that killing her ought to bring 
absolution for forty sins’ (498); he tells himself that despatching her would be a service to 
humanity rather than a crime. He originally expounded his idea in a journal article some 
months earlier and although the ‘superman’ concept is not in itself original, as Razumikhin 
points out, what Raskolnikov does bring to the debate is the idea of ‘bloodshed as a matter 
of conscience’ (253, original emphasis). Raskolnikov’s article posits the overstepping of 
ethical and social interdictions as a moral duty for qualifying persons, and this complicates 
the reader’s relationship with the crime. Reception of the murders is no longer a case of 
simple acceptance or disapprobation; one must also negotiate one’s understanding of 
Raskolnikov’s social philosophy. 
 Significantly, Raskolnikov has no overwhelming urge to murder the moneylender. 
He spends a great deal of time rationalising the act and is ultimately convinced of its worth 
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by a series of mundane coincidences. The galvanising factor is a chance encounter in the 
Haymarket, when he overhears some market traders speaking to Lizaveta and learns that 
Alëna Ivanovna will be home alone the following evening. It reminds Raskolnikov of an 
earlier occasion, when after his first visit to the moneylender he stopped off at a tavern and 
overheard another student telling a young officer how he could kill the old woman without 
compunction. Fate and circumstance seem to be conspiring against Raskolnikov, 
propelling him towards the commission of the crime, and ‘[t]his casual public-house 
conversation had an extraordinary influence on the subsequent development of the matter, 
as if there were indeed something fateful and fore-ordained about it’ (63). This sense of 
Raskolnikov’s helplessness and of the terrible inevitability of events helps to lessen his 
culpability; viewed as a victim of circumstance, rather than the evil perpetrator of a 
senseless crime, it is easier for the reader to negotiate his or her empathetic acceptance of 
the character. Raskolnikov’s distaste for the act of murder further strengthens the reader’s 
support for him. When he finally goes through with it, it is a triumph of reason over 
instinct and one only achieved, as we have seen, by the complex splitting of key 
components of his psyche. Yet in so doing ‘Raskolnikov has murdered his own better, i.e. 
meeker, self, as symbolised by his wicked destruction of the harmless Lizaveta’ (Conradi 
53) which brings, ultimately, his mental disintegration. Dostoevsky was fascinated by the 
indistinct nature of human consciousness – what Bakhtin terms unfinalizability – and, as 
Philip Rahv has noted, he was ‘the first novelist to have fully accepted and dramatized the 
principle of uncertainty or indeterminacy in the presentation of character’ (21). 
Dostoevsky’s focus on interiority allows him to create an extraordinarily intense and 
penetrating version of realism which highlights the dialogic nature of human 
consciousness and interaction. 
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Dostoevsky’s revolutionary literary techniques allowed him to create a 
psychological verisimilitude the likes of which had never been seen before. Indeed, 
Bakhtin contends that ‘the thinking human consciousness and the dialogic sphere in which 
this consciousness exists...becomes the object of authentic artistic visualization for the first 
time in Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel’ (Poetics 271). In contrast to Little Dorrit’s 
Rigaud, to whose psyche we are denied access, we spend much of Crime and Punishment 
inside Raskolnikov’s mind. Dostoevsky’s notebooks show that he originally conceived of 
the novel as a first person psychological account of a crime. However, initial drafts 
revealed the technique to be limiting and, ironically, distancing,
20
 in that Raskolnikov was 
only able to relay events after the fact. The lack of suspense and immediacy that this 
engendered saw the plan abandoned in favour of third person narration. The benefits of 
this are patent: the reader occupies a privileged position inside Raskolnikov’s head and 
from that vantage point experiences the pressures, terrors and fevered machinations that 
occupy him throughout the narrative. Indeed, the novel produces such a profound effect on 
the reader that early editions carried health warnings and, in a letter to John Addington 
Symonds, Robert Louis Stevenson remarked: ‘Henry James could not finish it: all I can 
say is, it nearly finished me. It was like having an illness’ (qtd. in Lord 3). Stevenson is not 
alone in his reaction to the novel. The extraordinary intensity of Dostoevsky’s narrative 
style and the barrage of ‘voices’ dialogically heaping pressure on Raskolnikov (and, 
through him, on the reader) produce an effect similar to the ‘brain fever’ to which 
Raskolnikov succumbs in the aftermath of the murders. The reader’s unique understanding 
of the pressures Raskolnikov is placed under helps him or her to empathise with the 
murderer in a way they might not in a less intense and involving text. As Gary Rosenshield 
has said: 
                                                          
20
 This is an issue which would later affect William Faulkner. See pages 138-139 for my discussion of the 
limitations of Faulkner’s experimental poetics in The Sound and the Fury. 
103 
 
[b]y presenting most of the action from the experiencing Raskol’nikov’s 
[sic] point of view, Dostoevskij [sic] induces us to commiserate with the 
murderer’s anxiety and suffering while appreciating their role in the 
resolution of the plot....Focusing on the experiencing self...makes the 
presentation of the murder more vivid and powerful. (406) 
Even as we condemn Raskolnikov’s warped theories and the evil acts they lead to, we 
celebrate his humanity. The narrative abounds with examples of his compassion and 
empathy; as noted previously, even his crime is based on his inability to accept the 
suffering he sees around him. He gives his last few copecks to Katerina Ivanovna to feed 
the starving Marmeladov children (24) and tries to save a drunken young woman, who 
appears to have been attacked, from being further abused by a predatory older man (46). 
Such altruistic acts stand out in stark relief in a novel concerned with human suffering, 
poverty and social injustice, and Raskolnikov’s instinctive desire to help the needy 
encourages an empathetic response in the reader. Ironically, though, the act of empathy 
which paves the way for his crime also implicates the reader, in that it leads to our 
narrative acceptance of his act of murder. As Raskolnikov leaves the wretched 
Marmeladovs his last few coppers, there follows a section of quoted monologue in which 
he details his outrage at the speed and ease with which Marmeladov and Katerina 
Ivanovna have grown used to accepting the money provided by Sonya’s prostitution: 
  ‘Men are scoundrels; they can get used to anything!’ 
   He pondered. 
 ‘Well, and if I am wrong,’ he burst out suddenly, ‘if men are not 
really scoundrels, men in general, the whole human race, I mean, – then all 
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the rest is just prejudice, imaginary fears, and there are no real barriers, and 
that is as it should be!’ (25) 
Fatefully for the Ivanovna sisters, the ‘barriers’ he imaginatively tears down include those 
interdicting acts such as murder. When Raskolnikov breaks this taboo, via the murders and 
his nihilistic philosophy, he enters a world without moral guidelines or guardians and it is 
a world in which he has the power to do entirely as he wishes. The only thing that could 
stand in his way is his own conscience. 
The idea of conscience, lacking in the true psychopath, is noteworthy and one I 
shall come back to throughout this study. For most of the novel, Raskolnikov scornfully 
rejects the idea that he has done anything wrong in murdering the old woman and therefore 
disavows all feelings of remorse or guilt. His attitude is troubling to the reader whose 
empathy has been won by descriptions of his crushing poverty and suffering; 
Raskolnikov’s strange lack of remorse is repellent and alienating and the reader is forced 
to condemn him once more when he boasts 
I longed to kill without casuistry, to kill for my own benefit, and for that 
alone! I would not lie about it even to myself! I did not commit murder to 
help my mother – that’s rubbish! I did not commit murder in order to use 
the profit and power I gained to make myself a benefactor to humanity. 
Rubbish! I simply murdered; I murdered for myself, for myself alone, and 
whether I became a benefactor to anybody else, or, like a spider, spent the 
rest of my life catching everybody in my web and sucking the life-blood out 
of them, should have been a matter of complete indifference to me at that 
moment! (401-402) 
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Despite his protestations, however, Raskolnikov clearly does feel guilt; its effects manifest 
in his fevers and hallucinations, depressions, apathy and erratic behaviour. His guilt is 
repressed; a risky tactic, as we know from Freud that there is always a danger that the 
repressed will return. Albert J. Guerard suggests that, at ‘a wavering line between 
conscious and unconscious understanding we see...actual persons and happenings 
interiorized and thus [becoming] psychic events’ (178-179). This appears to happen in Part 
III of the novel, when a mysterious stranger accuses Raskolnikov in the street: ‘the man 
raised his head and looked at him with sombre ominous eyes. “Murderer!” he said 
suddenly, in a low but clear and distinct voice’ (261). At this stage in the narrative the 
stranger appears to be a hallucination; Raskolnikov’s conscience transformed into a 
detached entity. According to psychotherapists Anthony Bateman and Jeremy Holmes, the 
hallucination of a persecuting figure is common to the schizophrenic subject in a paranoid 
state, where ‘elements of the fragmented self [are] projected into the outside world, [and] 
then take on elements of the projected self’ (219). This defence mechanism sees the 
subject project an unsettling part of himself which then ‘confronts him in a frightening 
way, but perhaps less terrifyingly than if the hatred [or, in this case, guilt] had remained 
entirely inside him’ (ibid.).  
The man appears a second time, in a horrific nightmare in which he leads the 
unwitting Raskolnikov back to the moneylender’s flat. The stranger disappears from sight 
as the two men mount the stairs and Raskolnikov enters the flat alone. Moving aside a 
cloak, Raskolnikov reveals the old woman huddled in a chair, with her face hidden. He 
strikes her repeatedly with the axe but she does not react until Raskolnikov crouches down 
and looks into her face. The old woman erupts into noiseless laughter and, seized by 
madness, Raskolnikov strikes her again and again. Laughter and whispering seem to be 
coming from every part of the flat, amplifying with every strike of the axe. Raskolnikov 
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‘tried to flee, but the entrance was full of people, all the doors stood open, and the landing 
and the stairs below were one mass of people, a sea of heads, all looking at him, and all 
silent, waiting, without a sound’ (267). This classic stress dream, where Raskolnikov finds 
himself unable to move or cry out, reveals the depth of the psychic trauma occasioned by 
his guilt. That the stranger led him to confront the scene, and thus his own guilt, is of 
course significant. Although we later learn that the mysterious stranger is a real person and 
a witness for Porfiry Petrovich, the investigating magistrate, the dream sequence described 
above clearly demonstrates the extent to which he has been interiorised by Raskolnikov, to 
become one of Guerard’s ‘psychic events’. As I noted in my discussion of Little Dorrit, 
this is a clear demonstration of how polyphony and heteroglossia can also have internal 
implications; with external dialogues affecting interior dialogues, which in turn are 
manifested externally. 
In Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, remorse is a natural response to a 
transgressive act that one regrets. Guilt, however, is a psychic manifestation of the 
realisation that an act has caused an irreparable rift between the subject and the maternal or 
paternal other. In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov’s guilt has two sources: the 
sublimated incestuous desire he feels for his sister and mother and the killing of the 
Ivanovna sisters. Both have led to an ‘irreparable rift’ between Raskolnikov and his 
mother, with his unresolved oedipal conflict adding a further insult to, and rift between, 
Raskolnikov and his late father. For Lacan, desire, when it concerns a loved one, is enacted 
to the extent that it accomplishes a desire for death. This is not a physical death, but what 
Lacan calls the ‘second death’. In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan arrived at this 
formulation in his discussion of Sophocles’ Antigone (442 BC), where he recognises that 
Antigone would only have felt guilty if she had failed to give her brother a proper burial. 
Guilt is therefore figured as the renunciation of desire, which is always desire for the other 
107 
 
of the unconscious oedipal fantasy. In following his desire to the limit, Raskolnikov 
brought himself to his second death; his desire to be a superman led him to attack the 
patrilineality of the symbolic order, dislocating himself from the Symbolic Father. In 
psychoanalysis, then, guilt appears as a signpost to the subject’s desire in relation to the 
desire of the other.  
In his essay, ‘Dostoevsky and Parricide’, Freud discusses the difficult relationship 
that Dostoevsky had with his own father as a boy. Freud argues that Dostoevsky’s oedipal 
desire to murder his father came horribly true when the father was actually murdered by 
his own serfs, leaving the boy crippled with guilt and craving punishment. Freud 
concluded that the experience turned Dostoevsky into a masochist; as Lavrin has noted, 
‘[h]e enjoyed piling upon himself voluntary suffering, misfortunes, and humiliations. In 
fact, these gave him a moral relief, and even stimulated his creative power’ (40). This 
desire to kill the parent and the attainment of ‘moral relief’ via self-torture seems highly 
relevant to Raskolnikov. He is forced to act when his mother writes to him explaining 
Dunya’s intention to sacrifice herself in a loveless marriage to Luzhin21 so that 
Raskolnikov may return to university. However, the murder of his family is too hideous a 
notion for his ego to deal with, so his attack on matriarchy is transferred to Alëna and 
Lizaveta. As we have seen, Razumikhin stands in the novel for Raskolnikov’s superego; he 
continues to look after Raskolnikov’s mother and sister when Raskolnikov sends them 
away. Despite his complex psychological transferences and splitting mechanisms, 
Raskolnikov is tortured by what he has done and is ultimately driven to confess. He 
experiences his loss of unity as the death of himself and, as Laing observes, considers 
                                                          
21
 It is interesting to note that Luzhin is figured as the most unappealing character in the novel. His 
narcissism, avariciousness and avowed desire to take a wife over whom he can ‘exercise absolute and 
unlimited dominion’ (295) is repellent to the reader, who comes to view him as even worse than the 
murderers Raskolnikov and Svidrigaylov. This empathetic quirk is in keeping with the ambiguity that runs 
throughout the novel. 
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himself the victim of the crime, rather than an executioner (Self and Others 66). When he 
finally confesses, it is not with a sense of remorse at the killing of the old woman (he 
constantly forgets about Lizaveta), but in an attempt to restore his psychic health and 
rejoin humanity. 
Raskolnikov’s attitude towards Lizaveta is curious, in that her death has no reality 
for him. He suppresses his memory of killing her (as evidenced by the dream described 
above) and focuses only on the murder of the old woman. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this. Guerard suggests that: 
[t]he classic explanation would be, of course, that only the pawnbroker’s 
murder was “intended” or “wished”. A psychoanalytic rendering might 
argue that the mother-component was so strong and hateful, at the critical 
moment, that the sister-component scarcely seemed to exist. (181) 
One can also surmise that Raskolnikov perceived Lizaveta, as an educationally-subnormal 
peasant, to be even less of a person than the ‘louse’ of an old woman and therefore beneath 
the notice of a ‘superman’ like him. Yet another, and perhaps more compelling, 
explanation is that during the murder Lizaveta acts as a substitute for Raskolnikov’s 
beloved sister, Dunya. The psychic pain brought by Dunya’s figurative death is too much 
for Raskolnikov to bear, so he represses the memory in a classic psychological defence 
mechanism. This is not a conscious action, as Bateman and Holmes explain: 
defences...are psychological configurations operating outside the realm of 
consciousness which minimise conflict, reduce tension, maintain 
intrapsychic equilibrium, regulate self-esteem and play a central role in 
dealing with anxiety whether it arises from internal or external 
sources...Repression ensures that wishes which are incompatible with 
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reality, superego demands, or other impulses, remain unconscious or 
disguised. (74) 
Dostoevsky also supplies the reader with a defence mechanism which helps to reduce the 
dissonance created by their complicity with the murderer. The sustained narrative focus on 
Raskolnikov’s philosophy, rather than his victims (Raskolnikov insists ‘I killed not a 
human being but a principle!’ (264)), spares the reader from some of the horror of the act. 
This shielding, or repression, of the abjection of murder makes it easier for the reader to 
maintain their empathetic connection with Raskolnikov and to focus on the philosophical 
and moral issues being explored. As Raskolnikov discovers to his cost, however, 
repression is not absolute. The anxiety that accompanies the repressed thought or memory 
remains, intensified by the ever-present fear that the repressed will eventually return to 
consciousness. Following the murder, Raskolnikov develops an intimate but sexless 
relationship with the selfless Sonya, a young girl forced into prostitution to feed and clothe 
the starving wife and children of her alcoholic father, Marmeladov. Although the memory 
of Lizaveta has largely been repressed, Raskolnikov increasingly identifies her with Sonya 
until the two women have been almost entirely elided in Raskolnikov’s conscious mind. 
Prior to his dream about ineffectively attacking the old woman again, Raskolnikov 
ruminates on his attitude to Lizaveta: 
Poor Lizaveta! Why had she to turn up?...It is strange though; I wonder why 
I hardly ever think of her, as though I had not killed her...Lizaveta! Sonya! 
Poor, meek, gentle creatures, with meek eyes!...Why do they not weep? 
Why do they not groan?...They give up everything...they look at you 
meekly and gently...Sonya, Sonya, gentle Sonya!... (265, original ellipsis) 
110 
 
Even when consciously addressing his feelings about Lizaveta’s murder, Raskolnikov 
almost instantly replaces her in his sympathies and lamentations with Sonya and the 
doubling of the characters becomes more pronounced as the narrative progresses. 
The theme of the double was a major one for Dostoevsky for the duration of his 
creative life, and through it he explored the instability and unfinalizability of the self. 
Significantly for my study of Crime and Punishment, the figure of the double was also 
used to explore concepts of morality. As Dmitri Chizhevsky has noted,  
[t]he appearance of the double raises a question about the concreteness of 
man’s real existence as an ethical individual. The problem of “stability”, of 
the ontological “fixity” of an ethical being is the real problem of the 
nineteenth century. (122).  
This sense of ‘fixity’ was a key concern for Dostoevsky; in Crime and Punishment, 
characters are not only doubled repeatedly but are also provided with parallels within the 
text. Everybody seems linked in one way or another, often by family connections: Porfiry 
is related to both Razumikhin and Luzhin; Luzhin was introduced to Dunya by the 
Svidrigaylovs, of whom he is a distant relative; there are two Mikolkas, symbolically 
linked; Katerina Ivanovna shares her surname with the murdered moneylender and her 
sister, etc. The links between the characters add to the feeling of claustrophobia within the 
narrative. According to Robert Lord, Dostoevsky’s fascination with the double grew from 
a stylistic requirement for a narrative device that would accommodate the dialogism 
inherent in his work. Lord argues that this 
inner dialogue was to become incarnate and to produce its own human 
forms. The projection or shadow became a stylistic necessity as soon as 
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Dostoevsky discovered the need for the interplay and counterpoint of 
‘voices’ which could not otherwise have been achieved. (218) 
The introduction of the double to the text allows Dostoevsky to explore the outer limits of 
human consciousness and identity. It is a narrative technique that allows Dostoevsky to 
explore Raskolnikov’s psychic agony when caught in a polyphonic maelstrom of 
conflicting voices, opinions and pressures from the people around him. More significantly, 
it offers shape and structure to the whole novel, drawing the reader closer to the characters 
and the torments they suffer. Perhaps the most widely discussed of the doubles in Crime 
and Punishment is Svidrigaylov. Described in the novel as ‘a very unpleasant character, 
extraordinarily corrupt and depraved, undoubtedly cunning, deceitful, and perhaps 
malicious’ (444), Svidrigaylov is nonetheless one of the narrative’s most fascinating and 
appealing characters. He represents the darkest elements of human consciousness and the 
reader’s attraction to him may be based on his or her recognition of the opposing good and 
bad selves inherent to humankind. The ambiguity Svidrigaylov embodies is written on his 
face: 
It was a rather strange face, almost like a mask: red and white, with a very 
light-coloured beard and still quite abundant fair hair. The eyes seemed 
somehow too blue, and their gaze too massive and unmoving. There was 
something terribly unpleasant in the handsome face, so extraordinarily 
young for its years. (449) 
This face, which is handsome but terrible, attractive yet terrifying, is full of contrasts and 
contradictions, much like the reader’s response to the character. Svidrigaylov shrugs off 
criticism of his ungentlemanly conduct towards Dunya by claiming that his very humanity 
should exculpate him from his most atrocious actions. When he says ‘I, too, am a man, et 
nihil humanum’ (269) he references the Roman playwright Terence who, in his comedy 
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Heauton Timorumenos (163 BC), writes ‘Homo sum et nihil humanum’: I am a man and 
reckon nothing human alien to me. This reference to humanity draws the reader into the 
frame; we too are human and therefore prey to the same passions and urges that trouble 
Svidrigaylov and Raskolnikov. So, when Svidrigaylov asks ‘am I a monster or am I myself 
a victim’ (269), the reader is surreptitiously prompted to ask this question not only of 
Raskolnikov but also of his- or herself. Empathetic support of Raskolnikov and enjoyment 
of the monstrous Svidrigaylov could be construed as morally suspect; however, one could 
argue that the reader is also the ‘victim’ of the poetics which have manipulated him or her 
into a position of empathy and identification at odds with his or her typical moral 
standpoints. 
Svidrigaylov’s claim to be ‘merely human’ implicates the reader, yet Dostoevsky’s 
poetics shield the reader from the consequences of this assertion. As we have seen, when 
the commission of Raskolnikov’s murderous plan causes the disintegration of his unified 
self, Svidrigaylov comes to stand for his splintered id or unconscious. This separation 
allows the reader some cognitive distance from the cruelty and depravity that Svidrigaylov 
represents. The reader’s fascination with Svidrigaylov brings with it a subconscious 
recognition of his or her own aggressive drives; the dispersion of these elements into 
separate characters allows the reader to externalise those personal traits which cause moral 
discomfort and disavow the relation of these characteristics to his or her ‘better’ self. In 
clinical terms, Svidrigaylov has a malignant narcissistic personality; a severely disordered 
psyche which is just one step away from full-blown psychopathy. Lenzenweger and 
Clarkin tell us that the malignant narcissist finds the expression of aggression both 
acceptable and pleasurable, and has zero impulse control. The main personality traits are 
‘grandiosity combined with ruthlessness, sadism, or hatred...[and] a total absence or 
deterioration of superego functioning’ (140) – mainstays of psychopath fiction all. Unlike 
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the psychopath, however, the malignant narcissist shows ‘some capacity for commitment 
to others and for experiencing authentic feelings of guilt’ (141). These traits offer great 
dramatic potential and the tension between the character’s tendency towards evil and his 
ability to form attachments and feel remorse is particularly interesting. Like Little Dorrit’s 
Rigaud, Svidrigaylov can be menacing and charming in equal measure; a fascinating and 
heady mix for the reader. 
 Svidrigaylov’s influence hangs heavily over the text from the beginning and, 
although we enjoy his characterisation, it is with increasing dread that we anticipate his 
appearance in the narrative proper. His cruel cat and mouse game with Raskolnikov does 
not disappoint. Raskolnikov is both repelled by Svidrigaylov and fascinated by him. 
Aware of his reputation as a conscienceless seducer and possible murderer, he is unable to 
deny the similarities between them and, as his mania develops, Raskolnikov finds himself 
increasingly drawn to him. As Conradi points out, during Svidrigaylov’s ‘nightmare 
appearance at Raskolnikov’s bedside in Part IV, he ingratiatingly insists on his kinship 
with Raskolnikov...[although] Raskolnikov experiences his sense of connection as a 
menace’ (59). As Raskolnikov’s psychic disintegration develops, however, he feels 
increasingly dissociated from society until the only people he feels a connection to are the 
disenfranchised prostitute Sonya and Svidrigaylov. Indeed, having initially been a source 
of anxiety for Raskolnikov, Svidrigaylov comes to represent refuge and understanding.  
Following his final harrowing interview with Porfiry, which culminates in a 
promise to arrest him within a couple of days, Raskolnikov finds himself instinctively 
hurrying to find Svidrigaylov: ‘What he hoped for from him he did not know himself. But 
some power over him lay hidden in the man’ (443). The reader is similarly drawn to 
Svidrigaylov, as evidenced by the way that s/he eagerly anticipates his fullest appearance 
in the text. One can rationalise that this is based in the hope that his presence will explain 
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the dread fascination that mental and moral aberrance hold for the reader; however, it 
could equally be based in a vicarious, carnivalesque enjoyment of the extreme. 
Svidrigaylov is widely accepted as the embodiment of Raskolnikov’s man without 
conscience to whom all is permissible, and in this we can read a subtle valorisation of 
psychopathic traits. Although tormented by ‘an infinite moral weariness’ (ibid.), 
Raskolnikov is not yet ready to renounce his ideal and hopes that Svidrigaylov will offer 
him ‘something new’ (ibid., original emphasis). Contrary to Raskolnikov’s expectations, 
however, his meeting with Svidrigaylov is not satisfactory; the superman Raskolnikov has 
built up in his mind seems changed, unsettled, and is unable to supply him with the 
answers he seeks. Svidrigaylov, drunk on a glass and a half of champagne, tells 
Raskolnikov that he is drinking ‘to help me pull myself together, because I am getting 
ready to go somewhere, and you find me in a peculiar mood’ (450). It seems that, even at 
this stage, Svidrigaylov is contemplating suicide: he tells Raskolnikov that without the 
distraction of debauchery ‘one might have to shoot oneself without more ado’ (451), and 
makes repeated references to Schiller. Friedrich Schiller was an eighteenth century 
philosopher, playwright, poet and historian who wrote extensively on the question of 
human freedom. In his discussion of the sublime, or incomparable greatness, he explored 
the notion of sacrificing oneself, contrary to one’s instincts, for conceptual ideals. 
Svidrigaylov admits to Raskolnikov that he is afraid of death and doesn’t like to hear it 
spoken of, yet we sense that his final show of ‘superman’ strength will see him surmount 
his fears in the ultimate triumph of philosophy over humanity.  
As the novel approaches its denouement, both men contemplate death. 
Svidrigaylov, having risen at 5am, shoots himself dead at a watch-tower after cryptically 
telling the watchman that he is going to America. At just the same time, Raskolnikov 
stands on a riverbank, considering suicide. The use of thresholds is notable here: both 
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events take place at dawn, the threshold between night and day; the two men are at the 
threshold of life and death; Raskolnikov stands on the threshold of solid ground and the 
water which threatened to engulf Svidrigaylov in one of his nightmares; indeed, even 
Svidrigaylov’s puzzling reference to America concerns a threshold, in that America in the 
1860s was still a frontier land, characterised by rugged individuality, where people were 
creating their own territories and shaping the psychic identity of their nation. Bakhtin 
demonstrates that ‘the threshold and its substitutes’ are important motifs for Dostoevsky, 
marking ‘the fundamental “points” of action in the novel’ (Poetics 170). For Bakhtin, the 
threshold is where ‘radical change, [and] an unexpected turn of fate takes place’ (ibid. 
169); when the motif relates to a person it denotes somebody ‘on the threshold of a final 
decision, at a moment of crisis, at an unfinalizable – and unpredeterminable – turning 
point for his soul’ (ibid. 61, original emphasis).  
 The unfinalizability explored by the novel extends also to the reader, via 
Dostoevsky’s narrative technique. There is no position of omniscient, easy comfort from 
where everything can be known; rather ‘Dostoevsky’s novels are designed in such a way 
as repeatedly to challenge the reader’s (and the character’s) easy identification of signifier 
with signified, sign with meaning, verisimilitude with reality’ (Jones 15). Although there is 
a heterodiegetic narrator who offers commentary on the proceedings, in the Dostoevskian 
polyphonic novel the narrator’s voice has the same weight as those of the characters; he 
does not have special privileges which he can share with the reader. Bakhtin views this 
strategy as essential to Dostoevsky’s view of the world as unfinalizable: ‘if any essential 
surplus of meaning were available to the author, it would transform the great dialogue of 
the novel into a finalized and objectivised dialogue, or into a dialogue rhetorically 
performed’ (Poetics 73). The reader, too, is on an equal footing with the narrator and the 
characters, able only to wait and see how events unfold.  
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Terras calls the narrator ‘selectively omniscient’ (64) and suggests that he dips in 
and out of the narrative in a quite unpredictable manner: ‘Occasionally the narrator’s 
observations stand apart from the drama...[other times] the narrator makes his presence felt 
by referring to the text itself...Sometimes that narrator will let his own emotions come to 
the fore’ (ibid.). The result can be quite dizzying. The reader is sometimes led to a 
particular conclusion (as with Terras’s example of the narrator describing Lizaveta as 
‘unfortunate’ during the murder (Reading Dostoevsky 64)); at other times the reader is 
confronted with the incongruity of the narrator’s feelings, such as the sympathetic 
treatment Raskolnikov receives despite being an arrogant, self-centred, cold-blooded 
murderer. Our attitude to Raskolnikov and Svidrigaylov shifts from revulsion to attraction 
and back again, over and over throughout the narrative. Ultimately our ambivalence 
becomes a kind of doubling or dialogism which shows the effect of the narrative’s many 
voices on our understanding of events and characters alike. Even this draws us 
empathetically closer to the characters, as Conradi has noted: ‘[i]n identifying with 
Raskolnikov and simultaneously being repelled by him, the reader has set up within him a 
tortured doubleness comparable to that by which Raskolnikov feels eaten alive’ (42). 
There is no familiar territory in Crime and Punishment; as soon as the reader begins to feel 
comfortable Dostoevsky introduces another voice or viewpoint to alter his or her 
perception. Jones explains:  
Changes in narrative point-of-view serve not principally to light up the 
subject from different angles, but more often to subvert the integrity of the 
reader’s perception of the imaginative world, particularly to subvert the 
refuge of the familiar, to lure readers into thinking they know ‘where they 
stand’ in relation to characters, setting and plot, only radically to undermine 
their suppositions. (14) 
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For Bakhtin, the dialogism of narrative and consciousness in Crime and Punishment is 
nowhere more apparent than in Raskolnikov’s first monologue at the beginning of the 
novel. The monologue occurs before Raskolnikov has decided to go through with the 
murder of Alëna Ivanovna and after he has received the letter from his mother detailing the 
circumstances of Dunya’s engagement. As Raskolnikov considers his position and the tone 
of his mother’s letter, he enters into a dialogic inner debate with each of the figures that 
will be central to the ensuing narrative: Dunya, his mother, Luzhin, Svidrigaylov, 
Marmeladov and Sonya. Bakhtin describes this kind of dialogized interior monologue as 
microdialogue; ‘all words in it are double-voiced, and in each of them a conflict of voices 
takes place...Dialogue has penetrated inside every word, provoking in it a battle and the 
interruption of one voice by another’ (Poetics 75). As Raskolnikov mulls over the 
proposed marriage and considers its implications, his mind turns to the events of recent 
days – conversations he has had, things he has read. Through these, the voices of the 
people concerned are able to dialogically enter the debate in a polyphony of distinctly 
individual, authentic ‘voices’. It is a powerful technique that helps the reader to better 
understand and empathise with Raskolnikov, as we realise that his decisions are not his 
alone but based on a cacophony of viewpoints and influences that constantly assail him. 
Indeed, this sense of Raskolnikov being bombarded by a bewildering variety of disparate 
perspectives that shape his response to the world around him is central to the novel. As 
Bakhtin has shown, ‘[i]n the subsequent course of the novel, nothing incorporated into its 
contents – people, ideas, things – remains external to Raskolnikov’s consciousness; 
everything is projected against him and dialogically reflected in him’ (ibid.). 
 These influences become so central to Raskolnikov’s experience of the world, so 
embedded within him, that they also manifest as what Bakhtin has termed a hidden 
dialogicality (ibid. 197). This is where even Raskolnikov’s private and innermost thoughts 
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are influenced by the perceived or anticipated responses of others; the words of the other 
are uttered neither out loud nor in Raskolnikov’s internal monologue, yet their influence is 
still felt in a profound and affecting manner. As Bakhtin puts it, ‘it is a conversation of the 
most intense kind, for each present, uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to 
the invisible speaker’ (ibid.). It is a testament to the effectiveness of the technique that the 
reader is able to accept this not just unquestioningly, but with recognition too. This sense 
that every word uttered influences and is influenced by every word uttered by others 
mirrors everyday human experience; we are each of us, even the psychopath, a mass of 
dialogized influences. It is a Lockean refusal of a priori knowledge that makes us all the 
sum of our experiences; a process which is, by nature, unfinalizable and ongoing. 
Dostoevsky recognised that a ‘very intensive kind of realism can be obtained...by 
concentrating on man’s inner world’ (Lavrin 29) and that the polyphonic novel was the 
best means of approaching this; however he also showed that consciousness is ultimately 
unknowable and indefinable. Bakhtin sums it up: ‘It is impossible to master the inner man, 
to see and understand him by making him into an object of indifferent neutral analysis; it is 
also impossible to master him by merging with him, by empathising with him’ (Poetics 
251). 
 With regards to the development of narrative techniques for representing aberrant 
psychology in fiction, then, Crime and Punishment is a landmark text. Dostoevsky is the 
first novelist to juxtapose a profound interest in the psychic state of deviant figures and a 
highly developed dialogic technique. Although the focalizing character is not 
psychopathic, the novel nevertheless represents a key point in the trajectory of the fictional 
psychopath. Dostoevsky’s poetics ensure that the reader is drawn into complicity, via 
narration, with a psychologically disordered criminal; the resultant solipsistic introspection 
is of great interest to the scholar of empathy. Furthermore, the novel’s extensive passages 
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of interiority demonstrate a deepening interest in the representation of consciousness, a 
concern which would occupy a central position in the narrative concerns of the twentieth 
century. The tensions between Dostoevsky’s subject matter and his poetics reveal that 
further development of the technique was possible; yet in highlighting the difficulties 
inherent to the task, Dostoevsky also highlights the opportunities – opportunities which 
would later be capitalised on by twentieth century novelists such as William Faulkner and 
Bret Easton Ellis. 
 
2.3 The Impact of Modernism: William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury 
William Faulkner’s experimental novel, The Sound and the Fury (1929), is a landmark text 
of high modernism which also marks a significant development in the representation of 
aberrant psychology in fiction. Faulkner wrote at a time of great advancements in the 
understanding of human consciousness and sensory perception; as the field of 
psychoanalysis expanded and grew in stature, artists of every discipline questioned the 
sense and logic of the world and explored conceptions of reality as multifaceted and 
subjective. Faulkner himself was fascinated with the representation of consciousness, 
having avidly studied great nineteenth century novelists such as Dostoevsky, Honoré de 
Balzac and Gustave Flaubert, and modernists including Herman Melville, Marcel Proust, 
Henry James, Joseph Conrad and James Joyce. He took narrative devices from each of 
them, combining and developing them to create a style of his own that best approximated 
his understanding of human perception. As Arthur F. Kinney notes:  
we can trace many of [Faulkner’s] strategies and techniques in the works of 
others: the autonomy of the novel in James, the use of images in Flaubert, 
the panoramic view of society in Balzac, the idea of the doppelganger and 
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the use of the family in Dostoyevsky [sic] and, most importantly, the 
development of consciousness in Melville, Conrad, Joyce, and Proust. (41) 
The lengthy passages of introspection characteristic of James and Dostoevsky were of 
great interest to Faulkner, as was the later stream of consciousness technique that they 
foreshadowed. The term ‘stream of consciousness’ was first used by William James in his 
Principles of Psychology (1890) as a means of describing the unbroken flow of sense 
perceptions in the conscious mind, and now refers to the narrative method for rendering 
perceptual, imaginative, emotional and cognitive activity. The earliest known example of 
stream of consciousness is Edouard Dujardin’s short novel Les Lauriers sont coupés 
(1888), a dechronologised story which relies on free association and attempts to depict the 
events of the story only as they impact on the protagonist’s consciousness. Although not 
wholly successful in Les Lauriers, Dujardin’s pioneering technique was highly 
inspirational to later novelists and was cited by Joyce as a major influence on his own 
work. Indeed, stream of consciousness was to become one of the key devices of the 
modernist movement (and beyond), developed and refined by writers such as Dorothy 
Richardson (Pilgrimage, published in twelve volumes 1915-1938), Joyce (Ulysses, 1922), 
Virginia Woolf (To the Lighthouse, 1927) and, of course, Faulkner himself. Abrams 
explains that, since the 1920s, stream of consciousness has described  
a special mode of narration that undertakes to reproduce, without a 
narrator’s intervention, the full spectrum and continuous flow of a 
character’s mental process, in which sense perceptions mingle with 
conscious and half-conscious thoughts, memories, expectations, feelings 
and random associations. (202) 
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The Sound and the Fury exemplifies these qualities as it tells the story of the Compson 
family via four monologues: interior monologues from each of the three Compson 
brothers, plus a more traditional authorial narration which Faulkner referred to as his own 
monologue. The brothers’ monologues represent a big departure from the narrative styles I 
have examined so far in this thesis; gone are the external view of Little Dorrit and the 
shifting first- and third person narration and free indirect discourse of Crime and 
Punishment. With no mediating narrator to show us the way, we must feel our way through 
the jumbled discourse of each of the brothers, a mélange of competing, often fleeting 
memories from the recent and distant past with the potential for confusing us as we 
struggle to ascertain where we are in time. The process is complicated by the aberrant 
mental states of each of the brothers: the first, Benjy, is a 33-year-old, non-verbal ‘idiot’ 
who has mentally never progressed beyond the age of three; the second, Quentin, is 
suicidal, obsessed with his sister and consumed by fantasies of incest and murder, and his 
monologue is possibly relayed to us post-mortem; the third monologist, Jason, is a 
psychopath who, despite his veneer of normality, is in psychological disarray as his 
elaborate web of lies threatens to collapse and reveal the truth of his situation. Although 
only one of the brothers is psychopathic and therefore an obvious candidate for analysis in 
this thesis, each of the monologues is worthy of inclusion due to their differing treatment 
of mental aberrance. Faulkner’s experimental poetics are noteworthy for their 
manipulation of the reader and the text, and his techniques would have far-reaching 
implications for the representation of both the psychopathic subject and of psychic 
disorder more generally. 
Each of the monologues recounts the events of a different day: Benjy’s day is April 
7
th
 1928; Quentin’s is June 2nd 1910; Jason’s is April 6th 1928; and the fourth monologue 
(sometimes referred to as Dilsey’s monologue although she is not the speaker) narrates the 
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events of April 8
th
 1928. Although each of the monologues deals with unique material 
pertaining to their particular days of locution, the discourse of the brothers in particular 
also has a lot of material in common (predominantly the loss of their sister, Caddy). This 
offers the reader multiple perspectives on the same events, none of which are definitively 
truthful. Such varied angles of vision express the modernist conception of reality as 
manifold and enigmatic. Even with the addition of the fourth, authorial monologue we are 
not given an absolute truth, as absolute truth does not exist. Faulkner’s poetics provide 
what Michael Millgate has called ‘Faulkner’s impassioned metaphor for the modern crisis 
of meaning’ (328); the polyphonic nature of the novel underscoring the essential 
unfinalizability of reality. Furthermore, by placing us, without mediation, inside the mind 
of the disordered subject, Faulkner also creates an important milestone in the 
representation of aberrant psychology in fiction.  
 The first monologue of the novel is the most fragmented, disordered and alienating 
of the entire text. Benjy suffers from an unnamed neurological condition which carries 
some of the markers of autism, including an inability to communicate verbally and interact 
socially, obsessive attachment to objects, rigid adherence to established routines, repetitive 
behaviour, and an inability to understand the chronological movement of time. 
Abstractions are beyond Benjy and he is unable to make causal links between events. The 
famous opening sentence of the novel, ‘Through the fence, between the curling flower 
spaces, I could see them hitting’ (3), illustrates his inability to conceptualise and the reader 
is made acutely aware of the perceptual challenges that lie ahead. Benjy reacts on a purely 
sensory level and is unable to discriminate between memories from the distant past and 
contemporary events. Time for him is a single instant; thought transferences, indicated in 
the text by the use of italics, break with temporal causality. Each dechronologised 
remembrance is lived anew in the now, and reported without commentary or subjective 
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opinion, forcing the reader to focus on the resonance of each episode in order to piece 
together its meaning within the wider context of the narrative. The weirdly intimate 
experience of viewing the world through Benjy’s eyes is bewildering enough to 
contemporary readers; in 1929, when no fictional antecedent for such a character existed, 
the experience must have been truly extraordinary. 
 Faulkner’s technique is as extraordinary as the experience itself. He shapes the 
‘associative, illogical, [and] spontaneous’ (Cohn 12) interior monologue with its ‘staccato 
rhythms, ellipses, [and] profuse imagery’ (ibid.) into a believable mindscape that allows a 
non-verbal man to figuratively narrate his story. In 1929, the interior monologue was still 
in its infancy and very much an experimental form. The most celebrated and successful 
precursor to The Sound and the Fury was Joyce’s Ulysses, but that was not an interior 
monologue in its purest form, as the novel also included significant sections of third 
person narration. In The Sound and the Fury, Faulkner perfected what Cohn has termed the 
‘autonomous interior monologue’ (17, Cohn’s emphasis) whereby the narrative is 
delivered to the reader directly from the subject’s mind, without authorial incursion or 
mediation, and in chronological order (i.e. from the beginning of the narrated day, to the 
end). Each of the brothers uses a slightly different monologic form which subtly reveals 
his personality and mental state. The reader takes meaning not just from the content of the 
monologues, but also from the fact and method of their reproduction. This is significant, as 
it helps to overcome some of the problems inherent to the technique, such as how a non-
verbal man like Benjy has the language to monologise, or whether any of the monologists 
is addressing an actual listener. In The Sound and the Fury, the moment of locution 
generally remains ambiguous and the reader cannot be certain whether events are reported 
as they happen, or are remembered at a later time. Dorrit Cohn suggests that the 
monologues in The Sound and the Fury are focused exclusively on the past and can 
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therefore be categorised as memory monologues. For Cohn, this infers that each of the 
monologues represents the mind’s replay of events at the end of the recounted day, before 
sleep in the case of Benjy and Jason and before suicide for Quentin (Sartre suggests that 
Quentin’s monologue could actually be relayed post-mortem, but this need not affect our 
characterisation of his discourse as memory monologue). The memory monologue, a 
variant of the autonomous monologue, combines an autobiographical form with mnemonic 
achronology to create ‘the illusion of the “uninterrupted unrolling” of a thought process’ 
(Cohn 185). Cohn explains: 
In contrast to other autonomous monologues, in memory monologues the 
present moment of locution is a moment emptied of all contemporary, 
simultaneous experience: the monologist exists merely as a disembodied 
medium, a pure memory without clear location in time and space. The 
monologic presentation itself is reduced to zero here, to a kind of vanishing 
point of the mnemonic process. (247) 
By removing the reader’s awareness of the act of locution, Faulkner frees him or her to 
focus exclusively on the remembered events and experience them as the character does. 
The remembering mind does not announce its recollections to the self with an ‘I remember 
when...’ Rather, addressing no-one, it ‘replays’ aural and visual scenes so that they appear 
to the self in exactly the same way that they did at their moment of origin. The effect of 
this technical device on the reader is not without its problems. With time, via 
remembrance, so radically dechronologised, the reader often feels adrift, unsure as to their 
temporal position and unclear about what is being relayed. This is particularly acute in the 
Benjy section as he relays events in an even, reportorial fashion and focuses on sensory 
perception. 
125 
 
The key to understanding events in Benjy’s monologue and the wider novel is to 
examine the triggers to memory, then extrapolate the causal links between the events being 
relayed. For instance, a memory from the day of Damuddy’s funeral, where the children 
are trying to glimpse the wake, gives way to a much later recollection of Caddy’s wedding. 
TP, who is looking after Benjy, has stolen some champagne, which he calls ‘sasprilluh’ 
(24), from the cellar, and they are both drunk. Benjy is unable to make a link between the 
‘soda’ he is drinking and his altered physical state and he has no conception of inebriation. 
Things happen to Benjy; he has no understanding of his own agency and this is reflected in 
his monologue. This passage is worth quoting at length: 
“Hush up.” T.P. said, trying not to laugh. “Lawd, they’ll all hear us. Get 
up.” T.P. said. “Get up, Benjy, quick.” He was thrashing about and 
laughing and I tried to get up. The cellar steps ran up the hill in the 
moonlight and T.P. fell up the hill, into the moonlight, and I ran against the 
fence and T.P. ran behind me saying “Hush up hush up.” Then he fell into 
the flowers, laughing, and I ran into the box. But when I tried to climb onto 
it it jumped away and hit me on the back of the head and my throat made a 
sound. It made the sound again and I stopped trying to get up, and it made 
the sound again and I began to cry. But my throat kept on making the sound 
while T.P. was pulling me. It kept on making it and I couldn’t tell if I was 
crying or not, and T.P. fell down on top of me, laughing, and it kept on 
making the sound and Quentin kicked T.P. and Caddy put her arms around 
me, and her shining veil, and I couldn’t smell trees anymore and I began to 
cry. (26) 
Unable to conceptualise his drunkenness or contextualise the incident, Benjy can offer no 
indications as to what is taking place. The reader must supply meaning for him- or herself. 
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It is only when we reach the reference to Caddy’s ‘shining veil’ that we can piece together 
the clues to arrive at an understanding of time and place: the unusual activity at the house, 
Benjy banished so as not to disrupt proceedings, the stocks of champagne in the cellar.  
Significantly, the scene of Benjy’s and T.P.’s drunkenness is interspersed with 
memories from the day of Damuddy’s funeral. Although the initial thought transference is 
marked by italics, subsequent time slippages are not. The passage goes directly from a 
drunken T.P. asking Benjy to “Git on the box and see is they started” (25) to Caddy saying 
“They haven’t started because the band hasn’t come yet” (ibid.). Here, Faulkner’s poetics 
deftly and subtly render both the movement of memory from prompt to linked episode and 
the dramatic and emotional resonance the two events have for the character. Benjy’s mind 
flits between the occasions, merging them into a single achronologous locus of 
significance and hurt. The fact that the temporal shifts are not marked by italics as 
elsewhere in the narrative demonstrates how these events are synonymous for Benjy; the 
conflation of funeral and wedding linking the literal death of Damuddy with the figurative 
death of Caddy and Benjy’s relationship, and of her place in the Compson family home. 
The end of the passage is deceptively simple; Benjy’s recollection that ‘I couldn’t smell 
trees anymore and I began to cry’ simplistically yet powerfully drawing together the two 
scenes. The scent of trees that characterised the Caddy of Benjy’s childhood evokes the 
innocence of a fearless little girl with muddy drawers disappearing up a tree so as to peer 
through a window and ascertain what is occurring in the parlour; the muddy drawers 
themselves act as an ominous prefiguration of the loss of Caddy’s innocence and her self-
harming forays into promiscuity, which she neither enjoyed nor understood (‘When they 
touched me I died’ (94)). That Caddy is gone, lost to Benjy forever, and his subconscious 
realisation of this is what causes him to cry. 
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The seeming simplicity of Benjy’s perceptual awareness of events belies the 
complexity of Faulkner’s narrative poetics. Faulkner’s demand that the reader take an 
active role in creating meaning from the text forces us to draw on what Kinney has termed 
our ‘constitutive consciousness’. Constitutive consciousness is the locus of the reader’s 
ability to select which evidence s/he will both take and reject from the text and the means 
by which those elements will be combined; it is ‘the integrated sum of our awareness of 
the structure of the work and the perceptions of all the characters whose thoughts are 
explicitly or implicitly provided for us’ (Kinney 101) The combination of the multiple 
perspectives offered by the text produce, in the constitutive consciousness, a Bakhtinian 
polyphony which mirrors the modernist conception of reality. Furthermore, the 
simultaneous collapse of temporal causation and conflation of events reveals the dialogism 
of the work, exemplifying the ‘ceaselessly shifting power relations between words, their 
sensitivity to each other, and the relativizing force of their historically motivated clashes 
and temporary resolutions’ (Vice 5) which typifies the Bakhtinian dialogic. Benjy’s 
stunted intelligence does not limit our understanding of events as we are able to pull 
together disparate references and allusions, to become active producers of meaning. We 
become, in a sense, an extension of Benjy’s psyche, performing for him the tasks of which 
he is incapable. The resulting intensity and sense of depth relates to both the characters and 
the narrative technique. François Pitavy explains: 
By amplifying all the vague, fleeting, latent, or forgotten thoughts of a 
character without being restrained by the latter’s limited intelligence or 
consciousness, [Faulkner] gives the reader the impression that he 
participates in that character’s life. He retains the emotional force of a 
subjective account while giving it the fullness and fluency of an objective 
one. Since a voice thus modulated seems at once external and internal to the 
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character, both emanating from him and enveloping him, a three-
dimensional effect not unlike that of stereophonic sound is produced. (qtd. 
in Kinney 101-102) 
Faulkner’s portrayal of Benjy’s consciousness reflects the modernist preoccupation with 
accurately representing the thinking, feeling human subject. His exploration of mental 
impairment was bold and original, yet for all its revelations about sensory and temporal 
perception it actually reveals Benjy’s objective, reportorial view of reality. Ultimately, it is 
the monologues of Benjy’s brothers, Quentin and Jason, which are of the greatest interest 
to this study of the fictional representation of mental disorder. They are significant as they 
juxtapose a seemingly ‘normal’ psychology with Quentin’s mental breakdown and 
preparations for suicide, and Jason’s thinly veiled psychopathy. Noel Polk argues that: 
Faulkner uses the mechanics of the English language – grammar, syntax, 
punctuation, spelling – as a direct correlative to the states of each of the 
narrators’ minds. The mechanical conventions of writing, then, sometimes 
work against the words themselves, so that they reveal things other than 
what the characters are saying; they work, in fact, to reveal things that the 
narrators are incapable of saying, or are specifically trying to keep from 
saying, things that have caused them pain or shame. (143) 
The monologue of Harvard student Quentin is articulate and coherent. It initially 
reads like a straightforward autobiographical monologue, moving chronologically through 
time, and based more in the world of concepts than in the sensory world of Benjy. Yet, like 
Benjy, Quentin is caught in the past, forever scarred by the loss of Caddy and doomed like 
his brother to ‘wander among memories and events which occurred over a period of as 
many as thirty years’ (Ruppersburg 21). Quentin’s experience and understanding of the 
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world is deeper than Benjy’s and his monologue is more complex; as Cohn notes the 
‘relationship between the account of the last day and the memories of earlier days is far 
more varied, and the text cannot be reduced to a consistent pattern’ (251). His incursions 
into the past present not as fleeting memories of moments relived, but as psychic 
bombardments of painful events that he is trying to stifle and ignore. The first instance of 
this, in paragraph five, shows how Quentin’s musings on the weather and a half-
remembered line from the John Keble hymn, Holy Matrimony, cause a barrage of thoughts 
related to Caddy’s wedding, Quentin’s torment over her loss of virginity, his obsession 
with incest and his ambivalent feelings about his place at Harvard: 
Thinking it would be nice for them down at New London if the weather 
held up like this. Why shouldn’t it? The month of brides, the voice that 
breathed    She ran right out of the mirror, out of the banked scent. Roses. 
Roses. Mr and Mrs Jason Richmond Compson announce the marriage of. 
Roses. Not virgins like dogwood, milkweed. I said I have committed incest, 
Father I said. Roses. Cunning and serene. If you attend Harvard one year, 
but don’t see the boat-race, there should be a refund. Let Jason have it. Give 
Jason a year at Harvard. (49) 
As Polk demonstrates, italics function differently for Quentin than they do for Benjy, 
representing his complete submersion in memory and ‘farthest remove from language’ 
(155). His ‘remove from language’ signals a loss of control, as indicated by the freefall of 
thoughts and images that invade his monologue. The irregular spacing between ‘breathed’ 
and ‘She’ signals typographically the depth of his submersion in memory and the 
abruptness of his break from reality. The distinction between the self-consciously ‘written’ 
style of Quentin’s monologue and freer, less formal manner of remembered speech in his 
discourse initially represents the opposition between his public and private selves; the 
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image of himself which he projects to the outside world and his truer, more natural self. 
Quentin’s monologue progresses in an orderly and straightforward fashion as he goes 
through his preparations for suicide, but rather than being reassuring or indicative of a 
sound mind, this order is synonymous with stasis and death; he functions as an automaton, 
performing his final tasks with a detached efficiency. However, as his narrative progresses, 
Quentin’s incursions into the past become more frequent and, as the events they replay 
become increasingly fraught, his mental degeneration is reflected in what Polk refers to as 
the ‘mechanical representation of his syntax, grammar, and punctuation’ (150). The 
formal, controlled method of narration gives way to a less cohesive discourse: 
One can trace Quentin’s psychic disintegration, his movements into and out 
of lucidity, in the degree of normality of his language’s representation, from 
the intricately structured sentences of some passages, to the almost 
complete disintegration of traditional language representation in others, 
especially in two scenes close to the end of his section that abandon 
punctuation and paragraph indentation, and in the penultimate paragraph of 
his section in which he finally yields up the capital “I,” the orthographical 
symbol of the fragile ego he has managed to cling to, to the lower case “i,” 
which represents graphemically his disintegrated self. (ibid.) 
Such typographical signalling of Quentin’s mental state does much to relay the physical 
effects that his remembrances have on him. The lack of punctuation evokes the increased 
heart rate and quickening breath that accompany the heightening of emotion, whilst the 
rejection of paragraph indentation suggests a contradictory flattening of emotion and a 
diminished sense of self, with the to-ing and fro-ing of his remembered exchanges 
becoming a single source of torment rather than a representation of opposition. 
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 Quentin’s further mental disintegration is starkly rendered in the passages depicting 
his challenges to Caddy over her sexual awakening, his imagined fight with Dalton Ames 
and his actual brawl with Gerald Bland. Following closely behind the highly-charged and 
symbolic incident with the Italian girl, whom Quentin calls ‘sister’, these passages reveal 
his subconscious feelings towards the girl who functions as a substitute for Caddy; an 
innocent, prepubescent Caddy whom Quentin can both protect and possess. As Mrs Bland 
and her party chat, Quentin drifts in and out of a reverie about Caddy’s sexual exploits and 
his own imagined confession of incest. The thought transferences are marked by italics, 
and the irregular spacing and the lack of punctuation and capitalisation create a reading 
pace that mimics how these thoughts bombard Quentin’s consciousness then eventually 
take over. As Quentin becomes more deeply immersed in his memories, the italics stop 
and the cadence alters, taking us from a barrage of invading, competing memories to 
events relived. The pace slows somewhat when the dialogue begins, giving the reader a 
sense of the weight the words carry for Quentin. Turn-taking is indicated by line breaks 
without indentation; there is no ‘she said’ or ‘I said’ to identify the speakers which 
suggests a merging, in Quentin’s mind, of himself and Caddy, and a loss of personal 
identity and status during the exchange with Dalton Ames. The blending of Quentin with 
Caddy signifies Quentin’s over-identification with his sister; his obsession with incest 
representing a way of merging with or becoming her.  
Faulkner’s poetics subtly render Quentin’s struggle with his wavering sense of self, 
as we see Quentin’s grasp of language break down as his identity disintegrates. This loss 
of control over language can be interpreted as the result of Quentin’s increasing retreat 
from the symbolic order and his foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father.
22
 For Lacan, the 
                                                          
22
 It is interesting to note that The Sound and the Fury predates the major theories of Lacan, who was in fact 
still training when the novel was published. Faulkner’s instinctive linking of language, signification and 
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Name-of-the-Father, or Symbolic Father, is the fundamental signifier from which all other 
signification proceeds. It bestows identity, naming and positioning the subject within the 
symbolic order, and also represents the oedipal prohibition of incest and the child’s 
renunciation of the phallus (The Psychoses 96). Without the interdictions of the Name-of-
the-Father, Quentin is adrift in the world and rapidly losing all sense of self. In ‘On a 
Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis’, Lacan noted that: 
It is the lack of the Name-of-the-Father in that place which, by the hole that 
it opens up in the signified, sets off a cascade of reworkings of the signifier 
from which the growing disaster of the imaginary proceeds, until the level 
is reached at which the signifier and signified stabilize in a delusional 
metaphor. (Écrits 481) 
Quentin’s ‘delusional metaphor’ manifests as his obsession with Caddy and their imagined 
incest. The eruption of the pure materiality of his real self creates a tension between his 
latent (potential) homosexuality and the social conventions of his time, and this tension 
attacks the linguistic structures that support his position in the symbolic order. As Quentin 
walks away after the fight with Bland, he is aware of his diminishing grip on himself: ‘As I 
descended the light dwindled slowly, yet at the same time without altering its quality, as if 
I and not light were changing, decreasing’ (107). 
 The merging of Quentin and Caddy intensifies Quentin’s impulses towards death, 
and as his sense of self wanes so does his grip on language. Millgate suggests that the 
following passage provides the key not just to this section, but to the book itself:  
...I seemed to be lying neither asleep nor awake looking down a long 
corridor of gray halflight where all stable things had become shadowy 
                                                                                                                                                                               
identity seems to be based on the author’s keen understanding of psychology and human nature, and it 
underscores the verity of Lacan’s later theory. 
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paradoxical all I had done shadows all I had felt suffered taking visible 
form antic and perverse mocking without relevance inherent themselves 
with the denial of the significance they should have affirmed thinking I was 
I was not who was not was not who. (107-108) 
As Millgate notes, ‘we realize that Quentin himself is at this moment not merely midway 
between sanity and madness but precisely poised between waking and sleeping, between 
life and death’ (298). The repetition of in-between states, be they Quentin’s degree of 
wakefulness, the quality of the light, etc., reinforces our sense of Quentin as a person 
drifting in and out of the symbolic order;
23
 the defining events of his life losing all 
signification. This slippage forces Quentin to question his entire existence and the 
language he uses to do this is revealing. Polk argues that Quentin’s references to shadows 
echo those that Macbeth makes in the speech the title of the novel is drawn from, whilst 
the line ‘I was I was not who was not was not who’ alludes to Hamlet’s existential 
musings (Reading Faulkner 138). Such rich yet subtle heteroglossia reminds the reader 
that both Macbeth and Hamlet suffered mental distress and struggles with personal 
identity, and s/he becomes starkly aware of Quentin’s use of the past tense: he has already 
decided to end his life. Again, Faulkner’s poetics deftly deliver complex, layered meaning 
via a few simply wrought words. Quentin’s use of ‘I was’ rather than ‘I am’ or ‘I will be’ 
anticipates his suicide; it also acknowledges the death of the personality he has been 
projecting. The shadowy reference to Macbeth’s speech following the death of his wife 
signifies Quentin’s multiple loss of Caddy not just as a sexual object, or the centre of his 
family, but the locus of his projected heteronormativity. The figurative death of Caddy 
leads directly to Quentin’s literal death of self, both psychically and corporeally, at his 
own hand. As soon as Quentin has conceptualised this loss or death of personal identity it 
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 It is also suggestive of the work that Bakhtin did on the use of thresholds in Dostoevsky, which I discuss 
on page 115. 
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becomes true and that self is gone; forgotten. His question ‘who was not’ asks who is the 
person, who has ceased to exist; who, exactly, has died? His personal identity fully 
dispersed, Quentin then loses touch even with the essence of the lost self; his ‘was not 
who’ asking not who that person was, but what that person was. By asking what the lost 
self represented or did, the emphasis moves to the materiality or essence of the person, 
rather than the name or defining characteristics of the person performing that identity. The 
absence of punctuation in the sentence creates a plurality of possible meanings whilst 
simultaneously removing any chance of ascertaining what the sentence actually signifies. 
Without punctuation the reader does not know how the words should be grouped and it is 
the positioning of the words which reveals their meaning. My reading of the sentence 
groups the words thus: ‘I was / I was not / who was not / was not who’ but they could 
equally be read as ‘‘I was... I was... not. Who was not? Was. Not. Who’ and this 
configuration gives an entirely different shade of meaning. With the second configuration 
and the addition of punctuation, we see Quentin tentatively seeking the words to describe 
his essence, before coming up short. This causes him to question his identity and his 
inability to do so forces him to consider the signification of each of the terms. In just 
eleven words Faulkner confounds the reader and elegantly portrays the total collapse of 
signification in Quentin’s mind. We are left fumbling for meaning not just in those eleven 
words but also in our own understanding of what is meant by existence, consciousness, 
agency, time and identity. 
 After the complexities of Benjy’s and Quentin’s monologues, the monologue of 
Jason comes as something of a relief to the beleaguered reader. As Cohn notes, his section 
has: 
a simpler structure, and one even hesitates to classify it as a memory 
monologue at all. Since it works its way relentlessly through the events of 
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April 6, with very few halts and detours, it comes closer to a simple 
autobiographical monologue. (253-254) 
There are some elements of memory monologue in Jason’s section, although it lacks the a-
chronicity of the genre. Of course, typological classification of Jason’s monologue is not 
necessary; what is important is how Faulkner’s poetics function and what they reveal to us 
about Jason’s mental condition. For all the seeming normality of Jason’s monologue, it 
actually reveals his psychopathy; his ‘mask of sanity’ slipping occasionally to reveal the 
novel’s most aberrant psychology. The simplicity of his monologue belies the complexity 
of his psychological profile. Cohn contends that: 
Jason is not the type of character who can take full advantage of the genre 
in which he speaks. Only a character heavily burdened with his entire past 
can be expected to dechronologize a discourse dealing with a specific past 
experience; the full deployment of the monologic genre’s mnemonic variant 
thus depends  on a mind that creates (and is created by) a “swarming and 
vigorous disorder of memory.” (255) 
Jason is not burdened with the past because he is a psychopath; his shallow affect and lack 
of remorse or guilt mean he cares little about events in the past, especially those of his own 
making. 
 Jason carries most of the markers of psychopathy, such as his grandiose estimation 
of self, pathological lying, and cunning and manipulative behaviour. He lives parasitically, 
stealing the cheques that Caddy sends for Miss Quentin’s upkeep whilst pretending to 
destroy them and bear the burden of providing for the household on his own meagre 
wages. He views his cruel and sadistic treatment of Caddy as righteous punishment for her 
behaviour years before, when the revelation that her baby was conceived before wedlock – 
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and therefore not her husband’s – lost him his promised career in banking: ‘And so I 
counted the money again that night and put it away, and I didn’t feel so bad. I says I 
reckon that’ll show you. I reckon you’ll know now that you can’t beat me out of a job and 
get away with it’ (129). Throughout his monologue, Jason fails to accept responsibility for 
his own actions, preferring instead to blame everybody else – Caddy, Miss Quentin, his 
mother and father, Quentin, Benjy, Dilsey and her family, Earl, and even the man at the 
telegraph office – for his hardships and misfortunes. What he fails to recognise throughout 
is that he is the architect of his own misery; he subconsciously creates discomfort for 
himself in order to validate his reassuring sense of victimhood. Painting himself as a 
victim in this way divests him of responsibility and gives him a sense of power; it 
transforms him from a talentless small-town bully into a wronged, outraged and decent 
man, nobly fighting back against intolerable odds. His needless pursuit of Miss Quentin 
and her beau from the fairground serves this purpose and Jason revels in the hardships he 
endures as he crosses ploughed fields on foot ‘with every step like somebody was walking 
along behind me, hitting me on the head with a club’ (150), or is besmirched or injured by 
nature:  
I had gotten beggar lice and twigs and stuff all over me, inside my clothes 
and shoes and all, and then I happened to look around and I had my hand 
right on a bunch of poison oak. The only thing I couldn’t understand was 
why it was just poison oak and not a snake or something. So I didn’t even 
bother to move it. (150-151) 
Jason’s monologue is suffused with a dark humour that not only brings a welcome levity 
to a challenging text, but also helps shape our attitude towards him. We often find 
ourselves laughing at him, as with the wryly stated delusion of persecution quoted above; 
we are also made constantly aware that Jason’s humour, such as his reference to the 
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castrated Benjy as the ‘Great American Gelding’ (164), is rooted in his unwavering 
cruelty. Jason’s sense of self is in many ways more warped than those of his brothers; as 
Millgate observes, ‘[h]e is in fact far less aware of what is actually real than his brother 
Quentin’ (336). Deeply paranoid and disturbed, Jason stands in stark contrast to the 
controlled and ordered manner of Quentin’s mental collapse. There is an elegance to 
Quentin’s breakdown; he remains a gentleman throughout. Jason’s discourse reveals his 
warped humanity; his base, unpleasant nature. Despite his delusions of grandeur, we find 
him to be talentless with an inherent nastiness born not of experience but present since 
childhood. 
 Regardless of the reader’s personal feelings towards Jason, his monologue is as 
close as the novel brings us to socially functional masculinity. That this ‘normality’ 
happens to be the subjectivity of a psychopath is as interesting as it is disquieting. His 
monologue is accessible in a way that those of his brothers are not, and this can be seen as 
a portent of the future of psychopath narratives. Faulkner showed the potential of the 
literary psychopath; his successors, and particularly the pulp writers of the 1950s and 
1960s, made the psychopath’s cold logic, lack of empathy and chilling veneer of normality 
a cornerstone of their work. Furthermore, Faulkner’s influence does not appear to have 
diminished with time; his influence can be felt on authors of the 1990s, such as Bret 
Easton Ellis, and his treatment of the functional psychopath also anticipates Jeff Lindsay’s 
Dexter. In terms of narrative techniques for representing aberrant psychology in fiction, 
then, The Sound and the Fury is a landmark text. Faulkner’s poetics offer new ways of 
accessing consciousness, creating the illusion of the ‘uninterrupted unrolling of a thought 
process’ (Cohn 185) which places us in direct proximity of the transgressive mind. Yet 
despite granting us access to the minds of the brothers, Faulkner’s technique does not push 
us towards them emotionally or empathetically; though immersive, their monologues feel 
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cold and distanced. One could view this as evidence of Faulkner’s modernist view of 
mankind as alienated and isolated, with each individual adrift in a bewildering world able 
only to make superficial and fleeting connections (as we do, with the text). And it can also 
be read as an evolutionary step yet to be taken in the fictional trajectory of the psychopath. 
Faulkner’s experiments with form represent a great developmental leap with regards to 
engendering reader empathy for aberrant subjects, via immersive narrative techniques. 
They also show that there is work yet to be done. Of the novel’s four monologues, it is 
Faulkner’s fourth, authorial monologue which allows for the greatest empathy. Benjy’s 
section is certainly emotive, but our sentiments are only roused when Benjy’s actions and 
emotional responses are relayed to us by other characters. It is when he is narrated that we 
feel, and even then we are feeling for Benjy rather than with him; our sympathy invoked 
via an external view, albeit a homodiegetic one. Similarly, it is the fourth, authorial 
monologue with its omniscient narration that allows the greatest warmth, in relation to the 
characters.  
As readers we find ourselves alienated by Benjy’s bewildering monologue, 
exasperated by Quentin’s estranged, overwrought and melodramatic monologue, and 
repulsed by Jason’s cold and unfeeling one. Dilsey’s, although not Dilsey’s, allows us to 
view the Compson household through her eyes and experiences. Dilsey is revealed as a 
kind, loyal and stoic woman. We feel kindly towards her and, because we like and respect 
her, we mirror her feelings of warmth and protection towards Benjy and feel sorrow and 
compassion for Caddy at the enforced loss of her baby. Yet contrary to the central conceit 
of this thesis, our empathy is achieved not via modernist proximity to consciousness, but 
by the good old nineteenth century omniscient narrator feeding us privileged information. 
Interior monologues based on sensory perception and the naturalistic unrolling of thought 
are the closest we will get, via literature, to someone else’s consciousness, but the effect is 
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paradoxically alienating. The monologues are so highly personal – the shifting, fleeting 
thoughts and associations of an individual’s inner discourse, rather than a monologue 
addressed to a particular reader or listener – that we by definition remain on the outside, 
looking in. As readers, we are constantly seeking meaning and any kind of marker which 
can pin us to an event or time. We barely get an opportunity to empathise, as we are too 
cognitively engaged, too challenged, to emote. For all of the stylistic innovations and 
immersive techniques of The Sound and the Fury, the text is so challenging to read that the 
reader remains distanced and unable to engage empathetically with the first three 
monologists. The empathetic contrast between the first three monologues and the fourth 
suggests that as readers we need to be led and narrated to in order to feel empathy, even 
when dealing with the interior monologues of first person narratives. The challenge of 
creating this effect was picked up on and developed by those novelists of consciousness 
who followed Faulkner, although it is interesting to note that Faulkner’s insights were 
pursued most avidly not in high literature but in the pulp fiction genre. Pulp married a 
populist form with an abiding interest in aberrant psychology and although Faulkner 
himself experimented with pulp via his 1931 novel Sanctuary, it was not until writers such 
as Horace McCoy and Jim Thompson seized the mantle that the techniques truly came to 
fruition. 
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Chapter Three 
Twentieth Century Psychos: An Explosion of Treatments. 
 
The Sound and the Fury notwithstanding, literary representations of psychopaths are most 
commonly found in crime fiction. The genre of crime fiction is arguably as old as the 
novel itself, with Daniel Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722) providing one of the earliest 
examples. Moll Flanders poses as a conversion narrative, written in the first person, and 
gives salacious details of the titular heroine’s criminal activities. Rather like the pulp 
writers this chapter will be largely concerned with, Defoe was not concerned with 
producing great works of art; his writing was a saleable commodity, using a colloquial 
style and showing a cheerful fascination with the lowest aspects of human life. As I 
observed in my discussion of Little Dorrit, this fascination can also be found in the 
Newgate novels and sensation novels of the nineteenth century; links can likewise be 
drawn between crime fiction and the Gothic tradition (Horsley 4; Simpson 26). However, 
it was not until the development of detective narratives that crime fiction really began to 
emerge as a distinct genre in a form we can still recognise today.  
From its inception in the 1840s, when Edgar Allan Poe established the conventions, 
to the ‘Golden Age’ of the 1920s and -30s, the detective-based offshoot of the genre 
enjoyed huge success, with figures such as Poe’s Dupin, Arthur Conan Doyle’s Holmes 
and Agatha Christie’s Poirot proving particularly successful. Golden Age detective fiction 
insulated the reader from the uncertainty of a rapidly changing world by offering neat 
resolutions to crimes. Its villains were typically scheming individuals intent on serving 
their own interests, and they were no match for the ratiocinative detectives tasked with 
solving the crimes and restoring order. This was uniquely reassuring to readers; the kind of 
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crimes they read about were unlikely ever to impact on their own lives, and the pleasure of 
the text lay more in joining in with the process of deduction and detection than the 
vicarious fulfilment of hidden wishes. A notable exception to this trend was R. Austin 
Freeman’s collection of short stories, The Singing Bone (1912), the birthplace of the 
‘inverted’ detective story. The inverted story begins with a depiction of the crime, a major 
departure from the standard structure which typically did not reveal the identity of the 
criminal until the denouement of the tale. This foregrounded the criminal mind in a move 
which Horsley has declared to be ‘one of the major sources of generic change during the 
course of the twentieth century’ (36), an innovation which paved the way for other 
narratives told from the perspective of the villain.  
As interest in villains grew, so did the villain’s increasingly graphic and fulsome 
representation and the twentieth century is a rich repository of psychopath fiction. This can 
be linked, in part, to social and cultural events, and in part to the fact that medical 
understanding of psychopathy was becoming progressively sophisticated. The seeping of 
this awareness into popular culture led to an increase in the number of fictional depictions 
of psychopathy and a concomitant improvement in the quality of representations. The 
period also saw significant developments in literary technique, with modernism and 
postmodernism having a particularly pronounced effect on the representation of 
consciousness. This chapter will chart the psychopath’s progress through the crime fiction 
of the early- to mid-twentieth century, exploring the social, cultural and historical events 
which were impactful. I will consider narrative poetics in the context of time and genre, 
and examine how the cumulative influences of the twentieth century led to the emergence 
of the ‘non-fiction’ novel, a form which would prove instrumental in the rise of the serial 
killer subgenre which was to be so prominent in the latter part of the century. 
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3.1 The Thirties: Gangsters, Poverty and the Paperback Revolution  
The move away from law and into criminality became increasingly prevalent during the 
inter-war years, and examples of this trend can be found in both high and low culture. Pulp 
magazines relied heavily on criminal and semi-criminal protagonists (Horsley 79) and, 
whilst not commonly known for the quality of their content, they did enjoy high sales as 
audiences lapped up the adrenaline-fuelled detective and adventure stories that populated 
their cheaply-produced pages. The most influential pulp title, Black Mask, which was 
established in 1920 and reached its sales peak in the early 1930s, carried stories by such 
genre-defining luminaries as Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler; at the other end 
of the literary scale, respected authors such as William Faulkner and Graham Greene were 
producing novels which married a commercial form with masterly, often experimental 
writing. The fact that the period saw a commingling of lowly genre fiction with writers 
now recognised as canonical speaks not only to the financial merits of publishing this kind 
of material, or to the fascination that the criminal protagonist held for the period’s authors, 
but also to a deep need to write truthfully about the dark side of the real world. 
Faulkner’s bleak yet compelling novel Sanctuary (1931) gave readers a shocking 
glimpse of human evil bolstered by humanising details from the villain’s medical and 
ancestral history. Faulkner’s malefactor is a terrifying rapist, kidnapper and murderer 
named Popeye, whose inhumane and brutal actions are as incomprehensible to the reader 
as they are to the characters in the book. As with The Sound and the Fury, Faulkner uses a 
multi-perspectival narrative technique, but he never grants us an internal perspective of 
Popeye. He remains at a distance from the reader; the narrative contains no self-quoted 
monologue, and his thoughts are not narrated by an external source.
 24
 Instead, our view of 
him must come via the other characters and the heterodiegetic narrator. Although we can 
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 This is reminiscent of Dickens’s treatment of Rigaud, in Little Dorrit. 
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clearly see his impact on the world and on the people around him, we are never given 
access to his motivation. In many ways, this is the most disturbing element of a bleak, 
unrelenting novel which highlights the callousness and alienation inherent to the modern 
condition but offers no answers or resolution. It is not until the end of the novel that we are 
offered some sociological and hereditary basis for Popeye’s behaviour. We learn that 
Popeye’s mother brought him up alone, having been deserted by her husband three weeks 
after her shotgun marriage and left with the syphilis that would ravage her and her unborn 
child. Popeye was born stunted, sickly and presumed blind. Popeye’s shaky genetic 
heritage is also apparent in the delusional pyromaniac grandmother who cares for him 
whilst his mother works, but who is ultimately killed by a devastating fire she has set in 
the family home. Popeye is unharmed but, callously, the narrator of the story tells us that 
he ‘might well have been dead’ (308); bald until the age of five, he was wizened and frail, 
prone to convulsions and already attending an institution. Perhaps most tellingly, the 
young Popeye showed precocious sadism, having mutilated and killed two lovebirds, and 
later a half-grown kitten, with a pair of scissors; acts which led to him being placed in a 
juvenile detention centre. Although it could be argued that Popeye’s upbringing and the 
ravages of syphilis account for his behaviour (the disease, in its advanced stages, can cause 
mental degeneration and personality change), there are enough clues in the narrative to 
lead us to deduce that he is in fact exhibiting the symptoms of an acute personality 
disorder (although Cleckley discounts psychopathy, see Mask of Sanity page 194). 
However, far from explaining or excusing Popeye’s behaviour, this detail actually serves 
to complicate it. Popeye’s aberrant psychology acts as a symbol of extreme alienation in 
the modern world and is also highly representative of the increased focus that Faulkner 
places on subjectivity. Sanctuary represents Faulkner’s attempt to write a more saleable, 
less experimental multi-perspectival novel than the earlier The Sound and the Fury and, 
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although notable on many levels, it is not a landmark text in terms of the trajectory of the 
fictional psychopath. We do not empathise with Popeye; despite the mitigating 
circumstances of his birth and upbringing, he remains unknowable, alien and ‘other’.  
Arguably the first crime novel to humanise its villain was W.R. Burnett’s Little 
Caesar (1929). It represents a turning point in depictions of the fictional villain in that it 
was one of the first texts to deliver its narrative from the point of view of the villain. As 
Burnett himself noted, Little Caesar showed  
the world seen through the eyes of a gangster. It’s commonplace now, but it 
had never been done before then. You had crime stories but always seen 
through the eyes of society. The criminal was just some son-of-a-bitch 
who’d killed somebody and then you go get ‘em. I treated them as human 
beings. (qtd. in Horsley 121-122) 
Burnett was significant in that his novel (and its 1931 film adaptation) offered a somewhat 
sympathetic view of the criminal protagonist, as a tragic figure failing in his pursuit of the 
(alternative) American Dream. Although he is satirised by the text and in some ways 
depicted as a comic figure, Rico is also figured as vulnerable, flawed and ultimately very 
human; a portrayal quite at odds with earlier representations of the criminal ‘other’. He is, 
in fact, ‘other than other’ – not quite like us, but not so different either. Burnett’s satire 
humanises Rico, allowing readers to empathise with the villain in a way that hadn’t been 
seen before; his novel therefore marks a significant point in the trajectory of the fictional 
psychopath. His novel taps into the growing cultural fascination with gangsterism in the 
1920s and 1930s, sparked by the notoriety of ‘real life’ mob bosses such as Al Capone. 
Capone captured the public imagination due to his two-sided reputation as a fearless and 
ruthless mob boss, and a (somewhat) philanthropic patrician known for his generosity 
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towards the poor (Bergreen 400). Although the figure of the gangster can stand as an 
unsympathetic symbol of rampant capitalism and individualism, it also offers a tantalising 
glimpse into a life of excitement and excess steered by an untrammelled id. The fact that 
the 1920s and 1930s gangster was often an underprivileged and uneducated immigrant, 
who had risen above the position accorded him by American society, added to his allure. 
He stood in opposition to the social structures and institutions – themselves often 
considered corrupt – that controlled and restricted ordinary people, and offered an 
alternative view of modernity. As Robert Warshow notes, in his seminal essay ‘The 
Gangster as Tragic Hero’, the gangster ‘is what we want to be and what we are afraid we 
might become’ (86). As the gangster story typically charts the protagonist’s rise and fall, it 
offers the reader a chance to flirt with transgression before order is restored.  
The trend for exploring the darker side of human experience via bleak, alienating 
and increasingly violent texts is perhaps best understood in relation to its social and 
political context. The early twentieth century was tumultuous and aggressive; against a 
backdrop of global Depression, gangsterism, and rapid urbanisation, the comforting 
narrative devices of earlier genres appeared increasingly irrelevant in a world where 
vicissitude seemed to be the only certainty. As man’s capacity for violence and brutality 
was revealed via the horrors of war and want, narratives depicting base nature and mean 
streets became more widespread. Graham Greene’s This Gun for Hire (1936) brings 
together many of these themes in a text which highlights the alienation and isolation of the 
modern condition. Told via a predominantly third person heterodiegetic narration, it is the 
story of Raven, a psychopathic, hare-lipped assassin hired to kill the Czechoslovakian 
Minister of War and thereby drag Europe into armed conflict. There is little in Raven’s 
behaviour for the reader to empathise with; he is cold, cruel and remorseless, and from the 
very outset we are told that ‘[m]urder didn’t mean much to Raven. It was just a new job’ 
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(1). His behaviour should repulse the reader, yet it is strangely compelling. We do not 
empathise with him; his characterisation is too distancing, his portrayal too unpleasant. But 
we do feel a pull towards him, based on our feeling that the society which has shaped this 
monster deserves to have him in its midst.  
Double-crossed by his employer, Raven finds himself turned from hunter to 
hunted; as he crosses the country in pursuit of the man who betrayed him, the reader 
marvels at his resourcefulness and strength. Significantly, it is during his kidnap and 
intended murder of the proto-feminist heroine, Anne, that the reader begins to warm to 
Raven. Greene gradually introduces humanising details, such as Raven’s sudden tears 
when Anne shows him a modicum of compassion, to highlight the impact that Raven’s 
upbringing has had on him. His harshness contrasts strongly with Anne’s warmth and we 
cannot help but feel for him when we learn that ‘[h]e was used to fear. It had lived inside 
him for twenty years. It was normality he couldn’t cope with’ (49). Our connection with 
Raven is gradual and grudging; Greene sets him up as an archetypal villain but then slowly 
shows the man within. It is not until we are a third of the way into the novel that we are 
given an explanation for Raven’s demeanour and behaviour. Born in poverty and an 
outcast from the start, we learn, Raven is the product of his environment and his physical 
deformity; society has left him cold and emotionless, twisted by cruelty and fear: 
He had been made by hatred; it had constructed him into this thin smoky 
murderous figure in the rain, hunted and ugly. His mother had borne him 
when his father was in gaol, and six years later when his father was hanged 
for another crime, she had cut her own throat with a kitchen knife; 
afterwards there had been the home. He had never felt the least tenderness 
for anyone; he was made in this image and he had his own odd pride in the 
result; he didn’t want to be unmade. (76-77) 
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Greene’s attack on modern society draws readers in, forcing them to acknowledge their 
own alienation and dispelling any cosy notions of community and inherent human 
goodness. Even the kindly socialist Minister whose murder is to bring about war is 
described negatively as ‘a grubby old man without friends, who was said to love humanity’ 
(1). An air of distrust surrounds the Minister’s socialist values; he is only ‘said’ to love 
humanity. There is an unspoken suggestion here that such a thing is impossible and 
pointless; even an alleged philanthropist is friendless and unloved in cruel and heartless 
modernity.  
In fact, suspicion and paranoia were a feature of the time. In This Gun for Hire 
boundaries are blurred; hero and villain are hard to tell apart and most of the protagonists 
become outcasts at some point in the narrative. This sense of moral turpitude and a rapidly 
shifting teleology highlights many of the fears and concerns of the period. It was not only 
the novel’s backdrop of a Europe teetering on the brink of war that resonated with 1930s 
readers, but also mistrust of the Establishment. Even though Raven has kidnapped Anne at 
gunpoint and threatened to kill her, she facilitates his escape as she makes her own and, 
once free, does not report him to the authorities:  
she had evaded Raven, leaving him there in the bathroom of the little empty 
house, and Raven’s affairs no longer concerned her. She wouldn’t give him 
away; she was not yet on the side of the big organised battalions; but she 
wouldn’t help him either. (62) 
Greene also addresses contemporary fears about corruption; business, crime and politics 
are intertwined in the text. The revelation that the Minister was assassinated to bring about 
a war that would financially benefit Midland Steel may seem sensational, but the storyline 
speaks to growing concern (undiminished today) about the links between big business, 
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government and wrongdoing. The owner of Midland Steel, Sir Marcus, is portrayed as a 
joyless psychopath whose ‘most vivid emotion was venom’ (130), and his lack of affect 
allows him to kill with impunity: ‘[t]he deaths he had ordered were no more real to him 
than the deaths he read about in the newspapers’ (202). His unsympathetic portrayal in the 
novel stands in stark contrast to the more nuanced character of Raven, and Sir Marcus 
functions simultaneously as a critique of capitalism, a critique of Britain’s class system, 
and a critique of a narcissistic and alienating modernity. 
 Brian Diemert argues that Graham Greene’s interest in the thriller or detective 
novel stems from a desire to subvert traditional structures of authority in a genre which he 
considered to be ‘propaganda for the ruling classes’ (95). He views Greene as part of a 
challenge to Golden Age detective fiction which was taking place on both sides of the 
Atlantic, via a reworking of the thriller by Greene and his contemporaries in Britain, and 
by the emergence of hardboiled fiction in America. However, it is my view that such 
developments were not spearheaded entirely by politicised authors; there were also market 
forces at play. It was at around this time that publishing underwent a period of great 
change, via the introduction of the paperback format. The mass-market paperback was 
pioneered in Germany by Albatross Books in 1932, from whom Penguin Books in England 
took much of their inspiration. Although the Albatross project was curtailed by the 
declaration of war, Penguin’s 1935 UK launch revolutionised the industry, mass-producing 
lightweight and inexpensive books which could be easily picked up at railway stations and 
other locations of convenience not previously associated with the sale of books. Its success 
was replicated in America by the iconic Pocket Book imprint, which first left the presses in 
1939. Pocket Book initially produced a limited number of respected classics, before 
establishing itself as the home of hardboiled and noir fiction. Popular taste of the time was 
still for the detective-based fictions of Agatha Christie, although their depictions of the 
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upper classes and country houses were unrepresentative of the readers who consumed 
them. Although these tales offered a welcome diversion from the difficulties of the day, 
which included mass unemployment, the crushing poverty of the Great Depression and the 
rise of the political far right, there was a growing desire amongst the reading public for 
tales which better reflected contemporary experience and offered more recognisable 
settings. Paperbacks filled this void by bringing their tales back down to street level and 
providing what O’Brien has termed ‘a microcosm of American fantasies about the real 
world’ (2); a ‘vision of the lurid underside of life’ (ibid. 11). 
The result was a new kind of genre fiction which coupled the investigative angle of 
traditional detective fiction with hard-edged ‘crook-as-investigator protagonists’25 
(Horsley 76) to create ‘tough guy’ or hardboiled fiction. Following the lead of pre-
paperback, genre-defining writers such as Dashiell Hammett, whom in his essay ‘The 
Simple Art of Murder’ (1950) Raymond Chandler credits with rescuing crime fiction by 
bringing it back to the real world, hardboiled and noir fiction were increasingly used as a 
means of critiquing an unforgiving and harsh society and contemporary discourses of 
criminology, psychology and so on. The pat endings supplied by Christie were replaced by 
ambiguity and indeterminacy; tacit acknowledgement that real life teems with threats that 
cannot be easily neutralised. Although essentially moral figures, private investigators like 
Hammett’s Sam Spade and Chandler’s Marlowe operate on the edge of legality, occupying 
a grey space between failing structures of bourgeois society, and ‘the disruptive forces 
threatening the social order’ (Diemert 94). 
The cultural paranoia explored by authors like Greene did not diminish; rather it 
grew more pronounced as the century progressed, reaching fever pitch in the 1940s and 
                                                          
25
 In the new millennium Jeff Lindsay would take this to extremes in his series of Dexter novels, where the 
focalizing character is a serial killing blood spatter expert for the Miami Dade Police Department. See 
section 4.2. 
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1950s. With many of the old certainties gone, the world was increasingly figured as a 
chaotic place of great danger. The atrocities of World War Two ratcheted up the fear, 
previously unimagined horrors having laid bare man’s dark potential; whilst fascism, 
rampant McCarthyism, and Cold war paranoia laid waste to earlier notions of selfhood and 
one’s place within a unified society. The anxiety which characterises the period pervades 
its cultural output and, as Woody Haut has observed, ‘[p]aranoia is essential to pulp 
culture writing and an agent capable of energizing and corrupting both narrative and 
nation’ (Pulp 14).  
 
3.2 The Forties: Freud, Nihilism and Horace McCoy 
Horace McCoy’s Kiss Tomorrow Goodbye (1948) embodies all of the tropes described 
above. Often described as the most nihilistic of the hardboiled writers, McCoy’s novels are 
bleak, relentless and intelligent, showing a broad understanding of psychoanalytical 
theory, sociological polemic and policing and forensic science techniques. Largely ignored 
as a ‘serious’ writer in his native America, McCoy was revered by French intellectuals 
who ranked him alongside Faulkner and Hemingway. As Paul Duncan notes, McCoy’s 
fiction is populated by unsympathetic characters who ‘are drawn into, and then consumed 
by, the abyss’ (80). There are no ‘good guys’ in Kiss Tomorrow Goodbye; everybody the 
reader encounters is corrupt, dissolute and unpleasant. The homodiegetic narrator and 
focalizing character is Ralph Cotter, a murderous, misogynistic, misanthropic, escaped 
convict and armed robber, who also happens to be a Phi Beta Kappa scholar and self-
proclaimed psychopath. Phi Beta Kappa is America’s most prestigious academic honour 
society, governed by the motto ‘Love of learning is the guide of life’. With the grandiosity 
so typical of the psychopath, Ralph wastes no opportunity to showcase his superior 
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intellect and connoisseurship; he looks down on his accomplices as ‘fools, mere passers of 
food’ (67). He makes frequent references to the period’s valorisation of the gangster, but 
dismisses Alvin Karpis, Pretty Boy Floyd and John Dillinger as ‘bums’ who ‘got to the 
top’ despite a complete absence of talent and intelligence. Ralph debunks the deterministic 
and environmental theories of crime so often cited in defence of the Depression-era 
gangster; he chose a life of crime, his ‘love of learning’ guiding his decision-making and 
ensuring him a high degree of success in his criminal endeavours: 
I’m sure my career doesn’t reflect too much credit on the school. It does 
prove one thing, though – it proves that I came into crime through choice 
and not through environment. I didn’t grow up in the slums with a drunk for 
a father and a whore for a mother and come into crime that way. I hate 
society too, but I don’t hate it because it mistreated me and warped my soul. 
Every other criminal I know – who’s engaged in violent crime – is a two-bit 
coward who blames his career on society. I need no apologist or crusader to 
finally hold my lifeless body up to the world and shout for them to come 
and observe what they have wrought. (235) 
To prove his point, Ralph intends to spend his ill-gotten gains on a gold Cartier identity 
bracelet inscribed with the words: ‘Use me not as a preachment in your literature or your 
movies. This I have wrought, I and I alone’ (236). Such an overt attack on the sometimes 
facile causality theories of contemporary society is typical of McCoy, who seems at pains 
to distance himself from his populist genre and mark himself out as a learned writer of 
distinction. 
 McCoy’s erudition is apparent throughout Kiss Tomorrow Goodbye and the novel 
has a heavy focus on myth and psychoanalysis. Its ambitious, overtly stated Freudian 
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subtext was certainly topical; in the 1930s and -40s, American psychiatry was 
revolutionised by Freudian psychoanalysis and McCoy, writing in 1948, seems to have 
been in its thrall. The novel makes multiple references to neuroses, complexes and 
psychoanalysis; Ralph’s obsession with the heiress Margaret is based on her role as a 
catalyst for the return of the repressed: ‘It was that girl, that goddamned girl with the white 
face and the black hair who had broken into my sanctuary again and uncovered more of 
the fetishes’ (311). The repressed in Ralph’s case is the oedipal scenario played out with 
his grandmother (who at that time he thought was his mother) when he was aged six, 
which resulted in him murdering her in order to avoid the threatened castration by his 
grandfather: ‘Your grandfather shall punish you for this…he will do to you what he did to 
the ram’ (337, original emphasis). Fragmented memories of the incident escape from his 
subconscious with increasing regularity as we near the end of the novel and Ralph’s 
mental disintegration. Despite his frequent proclamations that ‘Oedipus is dead, and the 
sepulchre is sealed. The road back to the womb is closed forever’ (289), the novel ends 
with Ralph’s death and his return to the figurative womb. Shot three times by Holiday, 
Ralph reports that 
I could see nothing and could feel nothing, but I had a vestige of awareness 
left that made me know that I was pulling my knees up and pushing my 
chin down to meet them, and that at last I was safe and secure in the 
blackness of the womb from which I had never emerged. (346) 
This ending opens up several very interesting avenues of enquiry. The first relates to 
McCoy’s extreme nihilism; as Ralph’s mental collapse accelerates he begins to feel 
physically diminished. He does not feel Holiday’s bullets as he has ‘nothing left with 
which to feel’ (345); his very reality is under threat. Forced to confront the materiality of 
his existence, he experiences a traumatic eruption of the real into the symbolic order. For 
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Lacan, the real is the state of nature which the pre-oedipal human subject inhabits prior to 
his or her entrance into language. It is a state in which there is nothing but need and the 
search for satisfaction. Lacan tells us that the real is ‘the impossible’ (Fundamental 
Concepts 167), since it is outside of language and can therefore not be expressed, imagined 
or integrated into the symbolic order. It includes hallucinations and symbolic dreams, like 
the ‘dream phantasy’ (Kiss Tomorrow 336) that Ralph experiences as he confronts the 
repressed memories of his oedipal experience in boyhood. Significantly, Freud posited that 
an unresolved Oedipus complex could result in a child becoming aggressive, over-
ambitious and vain. Having failed to identify with the correct parent, the child also fails to 
internalise morality and may find him- or herself unable to comply with societal rules. 
Such hubris and deviance are indicative of the psychopathic personality and, as we have 
seen, the psychopath lacks a superego, functioning instead on pure id. The neo-natal infant, 
too, is without a superego as it does not develop until the child is between the ages of two 
and seven. During the mirror stage, when the child begins to recognise itself as distinct 
from the world and separate to its mother, the sense of lack causes the child significant 
anxiety. Its response is to desire reunion with the mother/other, to make the other a part of 
itself as it was during the neo-natal months spent in the Lacanian real. Of course, this 
desire can never be satisfied and the child is instead confronted with a permanent symbol 
of its loss and lack. Yet, by a complex manoeuvre – be it actual or hallucinated – Ralph 
appears to achieve this reunion by returning to the womb. 
 As Holiday confronts Ralph over his murder of her brother, he loses sense of who 
she is: ‘She was Tisiphone. Tisiphone, Alecto…and where was the third? Wasn’t there a 
third?’ (345). Ralph’s tortured subconscious and much vaunted intellect combine 
Holiday’s actions with her symbolic role to figure her as the Furies, netherworld goddesses 
who avenged crimes against the natural order. The Furies hunt down and drive mad those 
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who kill blood relatives and in this respect Ralph has sinned more than once, having 
murdered not only Holiday’s brother but also his own grandmother and possibly his 
younger brother too. As she exacts her revenge, Holiday morphs into Tisiphone, or 
Vengeance, who in Greek mythology punished crimes of murder and hatred, and Alecto, 
or Anger, ‘the unceasing pursuer’ (337) who punished moral crimes, and crimes of 
ambition and lust. That Ralph is unable to remember the third Fate, Megaera, or Jealousy, 
could indicate that at this point in the narrative she is in fact the most significant of the 
three. She is representative of the all-consuming jealousy that Holiday has been feeling 
about Ralph’s relationship with Margaret (whose name bears an interesting similarity to 
Megaera), which has prompted her to turn against him. More importantly, Megaera also 
embodies Ralph’s subconscious feelings towards Holiday at this moment of emasculation; 
Holiday’s drawn gun is a phallic symbol of the potency that Ralph no longer has. Her 
bullets penetrate Ralph three times and he can only submit to their power.  
The mythic significance of this episode also echoes Sophocles’s tale, Oedipus Rex, 
where Oedipus was tortured by the Furies for trying to change his fate. When Ralph rejects 
Margaret, having hallucinated then collapsed at the golf course, his fate is sealed. 
Following his collapse, Ralph apologises for screaming, explaining ‘It’s not very manly to 
scream’ (338). His collapse was in fact silent but it indicates his loss of control and 
agency; to underscore this point Margaret takes his gun from him: ‘“…you won’t be 
needing this any more”, she said. She flung something from her, and in a moment I heard a 
splash in the lake. It was my automatic. No, I wouldn’t be needing that any more…’ (338). 
Margaret, who has functioned as his Grandmother’s double and thereby facilitated the 
return of the repressed, is also figured as Alecto at this point. In rejecting Margaret Ralph 
rejects his fated oedipal union with his grandmother, thereby invoking the wrath of the 
Furies who punish his insubordination by sending him insane. Ralph’s psychic 
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disintegration almost complete, he begins to desire reunion with the mother/grandmother; 
to subsume the other in a return to the neo-natal months spent in the real. However, Ralph 
seems to manage to go even beyond the neo-natal and achieve what Gregory Zilboorg has 
termed the ‘normal person[’s] ever unconscious trend to return to the quietistic, prenatal 
state, a wish to return to intra-uterine existence’ (349). Having penetrated deeper than the 
‘zero state at the heart of the hardboiled novel’ (O’Brien 80), McCoy’s hero becomes not 
dead but unborn; his guilt and significance wiped from the face of the earth, the narrative 
simply ends. This oedipal wish never to have left the womb and therefore never to have 
existed reflects the increasingly nihilistic zeitgeist, and the cultural anxieties expressed in 
McCoy’s text prefigure the tropes explored by Patricia Highsmith and Jim Thompson in 
the 1950s. 
 
3.3 The Fifties: Cold War Paranoia and the Unstable Self 
A major strand of 1950s crime fiction is noir, an often bleak and cynical genre closely 
related to the hardboiled fiction with which it shares many concerns. Duncan describes 
noir as a genre which gives the reader ‘ample opportunity…to gaze into the minds of bad, 
dark people on the edge of society’ (7); little wonder, then, that it should prove to be a 
fertile source of psychopath fictions. Of course, no discussion of 1950s noir fiction is 
complete without substantial attention being paid to Jim Thompson and Patricia 
Highsmith. Although ostensibly very different writers, with divergent narrative styles, both 
were prolific authors (writing 29 and 22 novels respectively) whose works charted the 
darkest recesses of the human mind, dealing with themes of guilt, culpability and the 
dissolution of the self. Their novels are steeped in the Cold War paranoia of the time; 
moody and at times bleakly humorous, they demonstrate that nothing is as it seems and 
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appearances can be deceptive. From Thompson’s folksy Lou Ford in The Killer Inside Me, 
to Tom Ripley, Highsmith’s master of deception, the reader is constantly made aware of 
the performativity of identity and the fragility of the self. Although largely unappreciated 
in their native U.S. during their lifetimes, due to their lowly status as writers of crime 
fiction, both demonstrate masterly control of their subject matter, their poetics deftly 
manipulating readers to positions of identification quite at odds with the conservative 
values of their day. More recently, their psychological intensity has led to comparisons of 
each with Dostoevsky and both writers have been accorded canonical status within the noir 
genre. Now, Thompson and Highsmith are seen as writers who raise questions about 
identity and challenge standard conceptions of good and evil. Significantly for this study, 
they do so through representations of charming yet ruthless psychopaths. 
 
3.3.1 Jim Thompson 
Jim Thompson’s novels teem with psychopaths and serial killers who move freely in 
society, their aberrance hidden behind a veneer of normality. Thompson’s oeuvre focuses 
on the ordinariness of the psychopath; the arbitrariness of identity and, notably, the 
disparity between the inner self and the self projected, are themes which run throughout his 
work. Although his career as an author was long and prolific, with works being produced 
from the early 1940s until well into the 1970s, Thompson’s finest work appeared in the 
1950s, a decade which Haut has described as ‘an era of psychotic behaviour and suicidal 
impulse, of shadows, square jaws and dangerous women’ (Pulp 12). The tensions and 
uncertainties of the period colour his work; nothing is as it seems, no one can be trusted, 
and there seems to be no limit to man’s cruelty and depravity. His characters are typically 
shallow, opportunistic and cruel; a scathing indictment of what Thompson saw as the 
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modern condition. His novels often end with scenes of apocalyptic violence and mental 
collapse, events painted as inevitable in a society where ‘people [are] pushed and twisted 
to such extremes that dissolution is all that awaits them’ (Haut, Pulp 21). Of course, many 
of the writers of the period shared these same concerns and in many ways Thompson’s 
work is simply an expression of zeitgeist. Where he differs from his contemporaries, 
however, is the sheer power and diversity of his narrative style. He marries the tough-
talking, wise-cracking style of hardboiled writers like Hammett and Chandler with the 
psychological intensity of Faulkner and Dostoevsky; his writing is also experimental and 
surreal, with incursions into what Anthony Boucher has referred to as ‘sheer Guignol 
horror’ (qtd. in Stanfield 154). Yet for all of his experimentation, Thompson also achieves 
a verisimilitude with regards to characterisation that allows the reader to recognise and 
identify with human traits common to all. 
Thompson’s most famous creation, Deputy Sheriff Lou Ford in the 1952 classic 
The Killer Inside Me, is a prime example of Cleckley’s ‘mask of sanity’. Lou hides his 
psychopathy in plain sight; posing as a simple, ingratiating, tender-hearted ‘rube’, he is 
able to maim and kill as the mood strikes him without raising suspicion. The dual aspect of 
Lou’s personality underscores the essential ‘unknowability’ of human nature, even though 
the reader is treated to privileged information regarding Lou’s emotions, thought processes 
and motivations. By having Lou narrate his tale himself, Thompson gives the reader 
unprecedented access to the psychopathic consciousness and in so doing has created what 
Stanley Kubrick called ‘probably the most chilling and believable first person story of a 
criminally warped mind I have ever encountered’ (Killer Inside Me, 2006 edition, cover 
matter).  
Thompson was an erudite man fascinated by, though dismissive of, 
psychoanalytical theories and his knowledge of mental conditions adds veracity to the 
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novel. Lou lives in the house once occupied by his physician father, whose untouched 
office still contains 
endless files of psychiatric literature, the bulky volumes of morbid 
psychology…Krafft-Ebing, Jung, Freud, Bleuler, Adolf Meyer, 
Kretschmer, Kraepelin…All the answers were here, out in the open where 
you could look at them. And no one was terrified or horrified. I came out of 
the place I was hiding in – that I always had to hide in – and began to 
breathe. (22) 
This seemingly innocuous paragraph sets the tone for the narrative which will follow. The 
multitude of names, a veritable roll-call of psychological luminaries who all wrote 
extensively on psychopathy, suggests the plurality of meaning inherent to modern life and 
anticipates the variety of explanations that Lou will offer for his behaviour as the novel 
progresses. His reference to ‘morbid psychology’ suggests that, for Lou, the theories 
contained in the volumes threaten to take all the joy out of his psychopathy. He revels in 
his condition; his poor behavioural controls and lack of remorse and affect allowing him to 
mischievously amuse himself with no thought for how his behaviour may impact on 
himself or others. The connotations of death that the word ‘morbid’ carries could further 
imply the death of the relevance or accuracy of such theories to Lou’s condition, thereby 
acting as a clue to the reader of the misinformation tactics that he will employ later on in 
the narrative. Lou hints at this when he teasingly says that all ‘the answers’ are there, but 
the question, of course, is which answer is the right one? The careful reader must further 
decide whose questions Lou is offering to answer – are they the reader’s questions? Or are 
they questions being asked by Lou and other characters within the diegesis? Do they relate 
to Lou in particular, or psychopathy and mental aberrance in general? There’s a 
metatextual quality to this passage which aligns the reader’s reading of the novel and his or 
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her implicit search for meaning and understanding of the enigmatic psychopath, with the 
scientific drive to elucidate the condition. Significantly for this study of the poetics of 
identification, the passage also begins Lou’s subtle manipulation of the reader’s 
sympathies. We learn that with everything ‘out in the open’, there’s no need for Lou to 
hide his true personality. Within the safe confines of his father’s office he can drop his 
mask and be himself, and it is liberating for Lou to be in an environment where this true 
self is ‘normal’ and accepted, without a censorious society judging his choices. Lou’s 
revelation that in the office he can come ‘out of the place I was hiding in – that I always 
had to hide in – and [begin] to breathe’ positions Lou as a childlike innocent, a victim we 
should pity and make allowances for. 
 Thompson’s poetics manipulate the reader as a psychopath plays with his prey. Lou 
ingratiates himself to us via his seemingly frank account of the murders and investigation; 
his early positioning of himself as a man fighting valiantly to control what he calls ‘the 
sickness’ encourages a sympathetic response from the reader and helps us to accept him. 
Lou’s manipulation of the reader is so subtle that it is hard to recognise all of the ways in 
which he works to control our response to the text. I have noted above how, via reference 
to ‘the sickness’, he linguistically controls the reader’s emotions; what is less obvious is 
the fact that it is also done graphemically. By always writing ‘the sickness’ in italics, Lou 
is able to stress both its potency and its otherness, positioning his condition as less a part of 
him and more as something which is happening to him and which he struggles daily to 
suppress. This reinforces, on a subconscious level, the reader’s conscious understanding of 
Lou as a man battling against the odds and trying to do the right thing, simultaneously 
eliciting a sympathetic response and reducing Lou’s level of culpability.  
The archetypal unreliable narrator, Lou offers psychological explanations for ‘the 
sickness’ (8) then contradicts himself by offering other suggestions which cancel out his 
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earlier claims. Such manipulation is typical of the ‘real life’ psychopath, who will tell his 
audience whatever it wants to hear in order to invoke the desired response. As a writer of 
crime fiction, Thompson was no doubt aware that one of key attractions for readers of 
lurid material is the desire to understand the ‘why and how’ of aberrant behaviour. Lou 
responds to this by offering justifications to satisfy all camps: the psychoanalytical – it’s a 
result of the trauma he suffered after being sexually abused by his masochistic 
housekeeper, Helene, during childhood, plus guilt at his adopted brother taking the blame 
for a crime that Lou committed, both of which can be attributed to his father, thereby 
invoking an oedipal conflict; hereditary – his father had ‘the sickness’, as evidenced by the 
photograph of Helene, her body criss-crossed with scars inflicted by Dr. Ford; the 
biological – Lou diagnoses himself as suffering from an acute case of schizophrenia; the 
societal – nobody stopped him, despite all of the clues that he offered to the detectives and 
citizens involved in and affected by the investigation into the murders; the absence of 
theory – Lou finally hints that he may in fact be perfectly sane and free from disorder, his 
acts of murder emanating from an inherent evil rather than any causal theory. Each of 
these theories has their appeal for different audiences: if trauma is the cause, then Lou can 
be cured by therapy; if ‘the sickness’ is hereditary or biological, then no one is to blame; if 
society is at fault then we are all culpable but lessons can be learned for the future. The 
suggestion of evil, of course, is much more disquieting as it not only threatens the security 
of all society; it also poses uncomfortable questions about human nature. The refusal of 
narrative closure alerts the reader to the fact that Lou is toying with him or her and, as 
Leonard Cassuto has noted, forces us to view everything he says with suspicion (132).  
Such mischievous narrative play suffuses the entire novel, which is presented as 
Lou’s written testimony. By suggesting and then contradicting the causality theories, Lou 
brings the reader’s attention to the fictionality of his narrative and this extends not just to 
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the content of his testimony but also to the way in which it is delivered. Throughout the 
novel, Lou addresses the reader directly, drawing him or her into the narrative. When 
speaking of his discussions with County Attorney Howard Hendricks, Lou says ‘I wish 
you could have seen him sweat’ (90). On the surface, his remark seems fairly innocuous; 
friendly, humorous and naturalistic. Yet it is also quite controlling. It makes the reader 
complicit, dragging her or him to Lou’s side and forcing a moment of self-reflection as we 
realise that we are enjoying the image of Hendricks squirming uncomfortably. 
Furthermore, the narrative is suffused with a dark humour which not only adds levity to an 
otherwise unsettling read but has the added effect of making Lou seem likeable and 
roguish, rather than disturbed and dangerous. Even when he has painstakingly described 
the way in which he has beaten his girlfriend, Amy Stanton, to death, Lou’s description of 
his exasperation at watching her suffer because the bum he is to frame for the murder is 
late can still raise a smile from the reader: ‘Hell, she hadn’t had a real breath now in almost 
thirty minutes, and it was hard as hell on her. I knew how hard it was and I held my own 
breath for a while because we’d always done things together’ (166). We smile because his 
comments are ludicrous; this psychopath’s idea of compassion being a moment’s 
synchronised breath-holding in honour of the closeness he and his girlfriend had once 
shared. 
 Lou’s narrative handling of Amy’s murder is one of the most interesting aspects of 
the novel. He controls it as he controls the reader; teasingly revealing snippets of 
information about the murder before pulling back. Comments such as ‘I guess I’m not 
ready to tell about it yet. It’s too soon, and it’s not necessary yet’ (153) add to our 
impression of Lou as a victim of his condition, suffering from the ‘loss’ of his girlfriend. It 
also reveals his lack of affect and highlights the extreme narcissism at the heart of 
psychopathy. Lou uses the time in between his brushes with full disclosure to blame others 
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for his crimes: ‘It was no use. I’d done everything I could. I’d dropped it in their plates and 
rubbed their noses in it. And it was no use. They wouldn’t see it. No one would stop me’ 
(161). In a Ripley-esque psychic manoeuvre (more of Ripley later), Lou also reveals that 
as he feels no guilt at Amy’s death, he is therefore not guilty of her murder. Lou attempts 
to disguise obfuscations by positioning his reticence as a desire to attain full disclosure: ‘I 
guess there’s another thing or two I need to tell you first, and – but I will tell you about it. I 
want to tell you, and I will. Exactly how it happened. I won’t leave you to figure things out 
for yourself’ (161). Even as he is withholding information and confusing the reader with 
misinformation and red herrings, Lou is manipulating the reader’s sympathies. His 
repeated direct addresses to the reader heighten the reader’s level of imaginative 
involvement with the text, as he suggests that his delays are for the reader’s benefit. 
Ultimately, though, he is toying with us; the reasons and theories he gives for his 
behaviour are untrue – the whole thing is just a fiction. Lou makes this explicit when he 
draws attention to the fact that we are reading his written testimony, rather than viewing 
events from a privileged omniscient position, as with a traditional heterodiegetic narrative. 
This metafictive strategy heightens readerly engagement with the character and with the 
act of reading itself, as we become increasingly aware of the stylistic techniques at work in 
the narrative.
26
 Lou even discusses writing style, talking disparagingly of what we might 
term the poetics of mental/narrative breakdown (favoured, as we have seen, by Faulkner 
and McCoy), and claiming that his narrative regressions and delays are borne of a desire to 
tell the full story, however lengthy and laborious a task that might be: 
In a lot of books I read, the writer seems to go haywire every time he 
reaches a high point. He’ll start leaving out punctuation and running his 
words together and babble about stars flashing and sinking into a deep 
                                                          
26
 This anticipates Ellis’s postmodern manipulation of narrative, which I will explore in Chapter Four. 
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dreamless sea. And you can’t figure out whether the hero’s laying his girl or 
a cornerstone. I guess that kind of crap is supposed to be pretty deep stuff – 
a lot of the book reviewers eat it up, I notice. But the way I see it is, the 
writer is just too goddam lazy to do his job. And I’m not lazy, whatever else 
I am. I’ll tell you everything. (161) 
Thompson himself made great use of the techniques that Lou derides; his 1953 novel, 
Savage Night contains just such a passage when Little Bigger, the consumptive hit man, 
begins his mental collapse towards death. 1954’s A Hell of a Woman is also experimental, 
carrying a significant section of interlarded narration at the end of the novel which 
demonstrates the bifurcated consciousness of the schizophrenic protagonist, Dolly Dillon. 
Lou’s objection appears to be less about stylistics and more about his desire to control 
readers by influencing both their response to the text and their relationship to him as the 
narrator.  
Despite his protestations, Lou does shape his poetics to his mental state. Towards 
the end of the novel, the narrative voice shifts from the first person to the third, to the 
second, and then back to the first again, charting as it does Lou’s shifting psychological 
condition. When the whole of Chapter 25 is delivered in the second person, a form rarely 
employed in literature, it appears to give a sense of Lou’s detachment from reality. It is as 
though he is outside himself; removed from the story and from social significance, his 
actions must be performed by someone else. For Mark Seltzer, this represents:  
the paroxysms of self-location in the killer’s accelerating and explosive 
violence. The final act of murder and self-murder takes the form of a final 
identification, of a final literalization: this time a terminal collapse of 
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“private” interior and “public” cliché, private body and public collapse. 
(168) 
This is a compelling argument, but not one I feel able to agree with. For me, the shift in 
narrative voice is not evidence of the controlling Lou’s psychic dissolution but rather a 
devious and deliberate stylistic attempt to manipulate the reader into a position of 
identification and empathy with the killer. The constant references to ‘you’, ‘you’ve’ and 
‘your’ put the reader into the narrative frame, in place of Lou. The reader becomes the 
psychopathic killer, pacing his home, throwing nitric acid on the volumes of psychology, 
and preparing the house so that it will ignite when the police fire their guns. Even with the 
return of the first person voice in the final chapter of the novel, Lou continues to drag the 
reader into collusion with him. As the house explodes, taking Lou and Joyce with it, Lou 
muses existentially on the meaning of life and the existence of the afterlife:  
…And they all lived happily ever after, I guess, and I guess – that’s – all. 
Yeah, I reckon that’s all unless our kind gets another chance in the 
Next Place. Our kind. Us people. 
All of us that started the game with a crooked cue, that wanted so 
much and got so little, that meant so good and did so bad. All us folks. Me 
and Joyce Lakeland, and Johnnie Pappas and Bob Maples and big ol’ Elmer 
Conway and little ol’ Amy Stanton. All of us. 
All of us. (220) 
The first reference to ‘our kind’ seems to refer to psychopaths, a category the reader 
probably would not put him- or herself into. Yet Lou’s subsequent references to ‘Our kind. 
Us people’ make it clear that he is including the reader at this point. Indeed, he goes on to 
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include each of his victims, people who represent all shades of moral and legal guilt and 
innocence. In so doing, Lou simultaneously paints himself as a blameless victim, and the 
reader as a guilty procurer and consumer of evil acts. The final reiteration of ‘All of us’, 
standing apart from the rest of the text, suggests the futility of an existence where each 
person is doomed to a life and death of meaningless oblivion, the good alongside the bad, 
with nothing to differentiate them. It is a fittingly bleak end to a novel which ultimately 
underscores the contemporary fear that the age can offer ‘no salvation, no point’ (O’Brien 
149). 
 This sense of the era’s hopelessness pervades much of Thompson’s work and his 
novels are populated by desperate, emasculated men and fearsome, vicious women. As we 
have seen, Lou Ford is keen to depict himself as the hapless victim of a childhood sex 
assault by Helene, his father’s housekeeper. Lou claims that his experience with Helene 
has tainted his relationship with all women and that when he kills Joyce and Amy it is 
really Helene that he’s attacking. Whether this is true for Lou or simply another 
manipulative use of pop psychology is a moot point. What is clear is that masculinity in 
the era was embattled and the fears surrounding the loss of agency and masculine potency 
were reflected in the literature of the day. In Savage Night, for instance, the tough-guy hit 
man, who talks like a character from a Hammett or Chandler novel, is actually a five-feet-
tall consumptive who doesn’t know how old he is. The point about his age is significant as 
we don’t know whether he has yet passed the threshold to adulthood. As a gangster/hit 
man, Little Bigger defines himself in the context of a dominant masculinity yet he retains 
an immaturity which is characterised by his sexual inadequacy (intercourse makes him 
vomit) and his restless inability to settle down in a normative relationship with Ruthie. He 
looks young enough to pass for a college student, yet is desperate to prove himself as a 
man who should be feared, admired and respected. Significantly, the person he wishes to 
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impress with his masculine performance is known only as ‘The Man’, the simplicity of his 
nomenclature and use of capital letters underscoring the notion of violence and aggression 
as symbols of virility. For all his efforts, Little Bigger finds himself diminishing, getting 
smaller and smaller as the narrative unfolds. The surreal climax of the novel sees Little 
Bigger locked away in a remote cabin in the wilds of Canada with the disabled and 
downtrodden Ruthie, who he suspects is working for The Man: ‘And I seemed to be 
shrinking more and more, getting weaker and littler while she got stronger and bigger’ 
(145). The narrative descends into the kind of chaos so derided by Lou Ford, with howling 
goats that do and do not exist, and lapses between rationality and insanity indicated by the 
use of italics. The novel’s nightmarish ending sees Little Bigger hacked to death by Ruthie 
who has been growing increasingly strong and mobile. The symbolism here needs little 
unpacking: the man diminishes as the woman grows stronger, then loses parts of himself, 
bit by bit, until there is nothing left for him to do but crawl off and die. As descriptions of 
mid-twentieth century masculine angst go, this really could not be clearer. Interestingly, 
Little Bigger’s death, in a dark recess in the basement of the cabin, has echoes of the death 
of Ralph in Kiss Tomorrow Goodbye and seems to suggest a return to the pre-lingual, pre-
natal state represented by the womb. One can also read it as solace found in oblivion; a 
common trope in the nihilistic 1950s. There’s a sense that if you strip away everything that 
makes a man – his reasoning, sanity, agency, social standing, etc. – until all that is left is a 
twitching, bloody stump, then he will surely wither and die. In Little Bigger, Thompson 
seems to be offering a metaphor for the modern condition where values such as 
compassion and fraternity are no longer prevalent or valued and masculinity has lost its 
mythic status and phallic power.  
Indeed, the loss of phallic power is a recurrent theme for Thompson. A Hell of a 
Woman ends with a castration, told two ways in a lurid and terrifying interlarded narration. 
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One version of events has Fred Jones (a pseudonym, representative of everyman, for Frank 
Dillon, the novel’s protagonist) drugged by Helene27 who then saws off his penis as 
punishment for disappointing her; the other version sees Fred get high on marijuana, 
cocaine and heroin before sawing his own penis off with broken glass because ‘she 
was…entitled to it. and anyway I wasn’t going to need it any longer’ (185, original 
emphasis). Both of the narratives end with Helene laughing and screaming at Fred, who 
throws himself out of the window, presumably to his death. The message is clear: whether 
women are to blame for castrating men, or men are responsible for their own lack of 
potency, the current situation is intolerable. This theme is made even more overt in 
Thompson’s 1954 novel, The Nothing Man, a story told by Clinton ‘Brownie’ Brown, 
whose penis was blown off in the war. Like Lou Ford, Brownie is an unreliable narrator 
who draws our attention to the materiality of the novel as a literary artefact: ‘Take me, 
which you are doomed to do for some two hundred pages. Take me’ (39). The title of the 
novel and the nature of Clinton’s injury make the central concern of the novel crystal clear. 
The loss of his penis – literally his manhood – physically figures Brownie’s mental and 
emotional loss of agency, aggression, power and virility. Brownie’s impotence is so 
pronounced that not even the murder of three women can reinscribe his masculinity; his 
soft and harmless persona means that even in the face of compelling evidence, nobody will 
believe that he could have committed the crimes. In this novel, Thompson captures the 
crushing ennui of the post-war period; life is empty, banal and meaningless, with 
                                                          
27
 Lou’s Ford’s childhood housekeeper in The Killer Inside Me was also called Helene. Lou’s sexual 
experience with her precluded him from successfully resolving his Oedipus complex, thereby denying him 
access to healthy adult subjectivity and masculine identity. Thompson’s reuse of her name here reveals her as 
emblematic of invidious, castrating womanhood. Both books also have characters named Joyce; one is a 
slovenly wife and the other a prostitute. In each case, Joyce is a woman the protagonist is trying to escape, 
but who ultimately proves instrumental in his downfall. For Thompson, Joyce is representative of the power 
and resilience of woman; she is the root of all man’s dissatisfaction and trouble. Lou Ford also reappears: in 
Wild Town (1957), in which Joyce also features as a scheming, murderous gold-digger; and under the thinly-
veiled pseudonym Tom Lord in The Transgressors (1961). Nick Corey in Pop. 1280 (1964) is also 
unmistakably modelled on Ford. Thompson’s re-use of the enigmatic Ford seems to indicate his admiration 
for the charismatic psychopath. This does little to counteract accusations of Thompson’s misogyny. 
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characters ‘[l]iving not as men but human gadflies’ (214). There’s a sense of quiet 
desperation, borne of living in an alienating culture which places little value on human life 
and where even the newspapers, surely a reflection of society itself, are ‘puerile…façades 
for emptiness’ (200). Like so many of Thompson’s creations, Brownie feels himself split 
between his public and private selves, although ‘the real me – the me-in-charge-of-me’ 
(34) is never seen. The unstable self, vacillating between various performances of personal 
identity, mirrors the conflicts of the 1950s, a decade which has variously been described as 
a time of ‘vapid celebration of the established order and a fearful atmosphere of 
repression’ (Mellen 186) and ‘an era of affluence and complacency’ (Cohan ix). For 
Cassuto, ‘Thompson’s stories of people unglued registered the fears and concerns boiling 
beneath the prosperity of post-war America’ (130), yet the lasting popularity of the novels 
suggests that the truths they contain are transcendant, rather than time-bound. 
 
3.3.2 Patricia Highsmith 
The universals one can identify in Thompson can also be found in the work of Patricia 
Highsmith. Like Thompson, Highsmith was fascinated with masculine performance, the 
mutability of identity and the tensions between repression and desire, and her tales reflect 
contemporary cultural anxieties. The acceptable social faces of her psychopaths allow 
them to wreak havoc with impunity and they are at once compelling and utterly terrifying. 
 
Strangers on a Train  
Highsmith’s debut novel, Strangers on a Train, published in 1950, charts the slow moral 
and mental disintegration of two strangers who, following a chance meeting on a train, 
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become embroiled in a life of murder, paranoia and crumbling selfhood. Dissolute socialite 
Charles Bruno, a prototypical psychopath, has an unresolved Oedipus complex and wishes 
to dispose of his father. Sober architect Guy Haines is heartbroken and angry, having been 
betrayed by his wife. When Bruno suggests to Guy that they commit murder for each other 
– ‘I kill your wife and you kill my father! We meet on the train, see, and nobody knows we 
know each other. Perfect alibis!’ (30) – Guy is sickened and appalled. Bruno, however, is 
thrilled by his idea and, having successfully murdered Guy’s wife, Miriam, begins to 
pressure Guy into killing his father. Tormented by guilt and fear over Miriam’s death, Guy 
eventually gives in and shoots the old man, at great psychic cost to himself. 
 Strangers on a Train has none of the charm or humour of the later Ripley series; 
rather it is a tense, unsettling meditation on the nature of evil and the essential instability of 
self. Highsmith’s terse prose and ‘karate-chop syntax’ (Winterson np) keep the reader on 
edge, and, as none of the characters are particularly pleasant or appealing, sympathy for 
them is in short supply. Guy, although initially portrayed as a moral and hardworking 
figure, proves also to be a judgemental, cold and somewhat haughty man. Bruno, by 
contrast, is dangerous and criminally-minded but also passionate, vibrant and spontaneous. 
The forces of attraction and repulsion work on the reader as surely as they work on the 
characters themselves, leaving him or her in a kind of empathetic limbo. Yet Highsmith 
does manage to draw readers in, making them complicit not only as consumers of literary 
transgression but also as human beings prone to the same biological drives and mental 
weaknesses as the characters in the book. When, prior to the murders, Guy tells Bruno that 
he is not the type of person who could ever kill, Bruno exclaims:  
That’s exactly where you’re wrong! Any kind of person can murder. Purely 
circumstances and not a thing to do with temperament! People get so far – 
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and it takes just the least little thing to push them over the brink. Anybody. 
Even your grandmother. I know. (26) 
The reference to ‘your grandmother’ reminds the reader that, although the situation in the 
novel is fictional, the characters are speaking of human universals which apply to the 
reader too. When Guy disapprovingly tells Bruno that he reads too many detective stories, 
he references contemporary debates about the causes of crime. As we shall see later on in 
this chapter, during my discussion of Meyer Levin’s 1956 documentary novel, 
Compulsion, detective fiction was often considered a corrupting influence. Guy’s reference 
to it here sees Highsmith poking fun at or perhaps challenging her readers, and it again 
forces us to consider our own position in relation to the novel and the issues it raises with 
regards to reception. 
Relationships between the characters in the novel are fraught; Bruno is friendless, 
except for his mother, and although Guy is loved by the kind and selfless Anne, his guilt 
forces them apart. Bruno, inexorably drawn to Guy by a sublimated homosexuality, both 
repulses and attracts Guy who feels an affinity and oneness with the man he vehemently 
rejects. As the narrative unfolds, Guy increasingly feels that Bruno represents a secret side 
of himself; that they are two separate parts of the same personality, the light and the dark, 
the ego and the id. As they talk on the train, Guy views Bruno as the very essence of evil: 
‘All he despised, Guy thought, Bruno represented. All the things he would not want to be, 
Bruno was, or would become’ (30). Yet, by the time Guy has decided to commit the 
murder, he has accepted their kinship and acknowledged his love for Bruno: ‘He was like 
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Bruno. Hadn’t he sensed it time and time again, and like a coward never admitted it? 
Hadn’t he known Bruno was like himself? …He loved Bruno’ (134, my ellipsis).28  
Significantly, following the murders the two characters begin to merge. Guy finds 
himself hardening, gradually able to accept his new self. His growing aberrance is written 
on his body and he seems split, like Jekyll and Hyde. The face that looks back at him from 
the mirror is unrecognisable as his own; his eyes have become Bruno’s eyes. Guy’s 
awareness of this doubling announces itself to his conscious mind via a recurrent 
nightmare in which a mysterious figure ‘in a great cape like a bat’s wing sprang suddenly 
into the room’ (164).29 On asking ‘Who are you?’ Guy sees that the figure is Bruno and 
tries to fight him with all his might. Unaffected by Guy’s attempts to strangle him, Bruno 
finally answers ‘You’ (ibid.). The bedroom, as a private space or inner sanctum, signifies 
Guy’s consciousness. The symbolic ‘other’, as represented by a vampiric Bruno who 
threatens to consume Guy, did not have to force entry; a way in was left open to him. The 
dream reveals how Guy has subconsciously allowed Bruno, and the evil that he represents, 
to enter into his life and into his mind; he did not guard against him and the little resistance 
that he did put up was futile. Although figured by Guy’s subconscious as indomitable, in 
the aftermath of the murders the real Bruno becomes increasingly paranoid and fearful; 
drunk and obsessive, his self-assured swagger is a thing of the past. Abject, he begins to 
decay; his moral rot figuring externally in his bloated face and ‘corpse-like body’ (196). 
Bruno spends more and more time with Guy, fascinated by his life and relationships, and 
                                                          
28
 Guy seems to have engaged in a process of projective identification, where undesirable elements of the self 
are projected onto the other, who the subject then identifies with. Whilst this manoeuvre aims to prevent 
psychic injury it can actually increase anxiety, as Klein explains: ‘By introjecting and reintrojecting the 
forcefully entered object, the subject’s feelings of inner persecution are strongly reinforced; all the more 
since the reintrojected object is felt to contain the dangerous aspects of the self’ (186). 
29
 There are obvious parallels here with the scene in Bram Stoker’s Dracula where the Count enters the 
bedroom of Mina Harker and attacks her as she sleeps (282). Intertextual references of this kind create 
dialogic associations in the reader which colour their reading of the present text; here, Bruno is imbued with 
the strength and diabolic menace of Count Dracula, whilst Guy is temporarily feminised as he merges, 
dialogically, with Mina. The horror associated with Stoker’s creation (and its subsequent revisions in popular 
culture) colours this scene and adds to our sense of dread and foreboding. 
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Guy tolerates Bruno’s visits because the jouissance they cause – ‘some torture that 
perversely eased’ (ibid. 197) – feels like a fitting penance for the crime he has committed. 
When Guy disposes of his gun by throwing it off his boat, he is also letting go of the last 
vestiges of his old self and giving himself over entirely to a life of lies and dishonesty: 
He held the gun in both hands over the water, his elbow on the bowsprit. 
How intelligent a jewel, he thought, and how innocent it looked now. 
Himself – He let it drop. The gun turned once head-over, in perfect balance, 
with its familiar look of willingness, and disappeared. (200) 
The gun, bought for its beauty many years before, represents his earlier, innocent and 
unsullied self. The capitalisation of ‘He’ demonstrates the split between his two selves: 
‘Himself’, who he must let go, and ‘He’ who is now in charge. Of course, a capitalised 
‘He’ is most commonly associated with references to God; its use here underscores how 
all-powerful this new self is. Guy has always held that everything is doubled, both within 
and without the person. He has previously maintained to Bruno that each person has a 
doppelgänger, ‘a person exactly the opposite of you, like the unseen part of you, 
somewhere in the world, and he waits in ambush’ (228). In folklore, doppelgängers are 
mortal enemies and Guy and Bruno, in allowing their selves to merge, have wrought their 
own destruction and left themselves no place in the world. 
This sense of the tortured, paranoid individual adrift in a callous, bewildering 
world, harnesses the air of suspicion that pervaded Cold War America and coloured its 
cultural products. Masculine crisis suffuses the works of both Highsmith and Thompson; a 
reflection of the disruption to traditional gender roles in society wrought by such seismic 
events as the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War, both of which 
forced more women into work and altered family dynamics. The impact of the war can 
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also be felt in contemporary attitudes to mental health (specifically trauma), and musings 
on the nature of good and evil. In accepting ‘the full complement of evil in himself’ (220), 
Guy is forced to also acknowledge ‘a natural compulsion to express it’ (ibid.) and even the 
possibility that he may have  
enjoyed his crime in some way, derived some primal satisfaction from it – 
how else could one really explain in mankind the continued toleration of 
wars, the perennial enthusiasm for wars when they came, if not for some 
primal pleasure in killing?’ (ibid.) 
For Bruno and Guy, murder becomes a source of phallic power that reinscribes their 
masculinity. Bruno, in particular, feels that killing Miriam has made him a man. He is 
thrilled to see coverage of the murder in all of the newspapers, and when, prior to the 
murder, he realizes that killing her will benefit not just Guy but also any other ‘nice guy’ 
who might meet her in the future, he swells at the thought of his own importance: ‘His 
energies that had been dissipated, spread like a flooded river over land as flat and boring as 
the Llano Estacado he was crossing now, seemed gathered in a whole vortex whose point 
strove towards Metcalf like the aggressive thrust of the train’ (60). The barely sublimated 
sexual imagery of the ‘aggressive thrust’ of the train, and the ‘vortex’ of Bruno’s 
‘energies’ demonstrates the extent to which Bruno’s intended obliteration of Miriam for 
the benefit of his fellow men functions not just as an attack on this particular woman, but 
on the whole of womankind. 
 In Strangers on a Train Highsmith uses a conventional heterodiegetic narrator and 
extensive free indirect discourse which brings the reader closer to the characters. She 
explores the darkness at the core of humankind with an intensity and depth quite 
uncommon at the time, particularly within the crime fiction genre. We do not see 
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conventional justice in the novel; no criminal investigation, righteous arrest or legal 
penalty. Instead, her characters’ punishment comes from within, via their slow, psychic 
disintegration as guilt (in the case of Guy) and fear eat away at them. They embody Guy’s 
theory that ‘[e]very man is his own law court and punishes himself enough’ (229), positing 
the idea that natural law has greater validity than state administered justice, and suggesting 
that instinct reigns supreme over reason. We do not empathise with Bruno’s murderous, 
monstrous ennui, but we are fascinated by it and its enervating effect on Guy. Both Guy 
and Bruno, though surrounded by people, are isolated and alone in the novel – Highsmith’s 
way of highlighting, perhaps, an alienating modernity in which no one can be said to really 
know or trust another person. Guy’s journey from upstanding citizen, avowedly incapable 
of killing, to cold-blooded murderer demonstrates how an individual cannot know what he 
is capable of until extreme circumstances push him to act. And this is why Strangers on a 
Train represents an important point in the trajectory of the fictional psychopath; it posits 
evil as normal, natural and inherent to us all. 
 
The Talented Mr Ripley 
This notion of the ordinariness of the psychopath gains fullest expression in Highsmith’s 
most famous novel, The Talented Mr Ripley (1955). Tom Ripley is the archetypal 
psychopath: a grandiose, manipulative, compulsive liar; he is criminally versatile, highly 
intelligent, callous and unempathetic, with a lack of affect. Despite this, he has also been 
described as ‘perversely entertaining’, ‘a wickedly attractive figure’, and ‘the most 
charismatic psychopath in modern literature’ (Dirda np). Ripley is perhaps also one of the 
most famous psychopaths in modern literature and his enduring popularity is due in no 
small part to the way in which Highsmith’s poetics guide the reader to a position of 
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identification. The story is told via Highsmith’s usual heterodiegetic omniscient narration, 
brought to life by extensive use of free indirect discourse. As noted during my discussion 
of Strangers on a Train, Highsmith’s prose is stark and intense, with an austerity quite at 
odds with the lurid, sensationalistic writing often associated with crime fiction. This 
simplicity extends also to Tom himself, lending him an authenticity which makes him 
seem knowable in a way that perhaps Lou Ford and Popeye are not.  
The plainness of Highsmith’s poetics belies the complexity of their effect on the 
reader. Omniscient narration is usually associated with truth and impartiality, and the 
unwary reader could be forgiven for assuming that everything they read of Tom’s early life 
is the absolute truth. However, the narrative is most definitely slanted in Tom’s favour, 
with the free indirect discourse presenting his thoughts and feelings to us in a subtle, 
almost surreptitious way. This technique insidiously brings the reader closer to Tom, both 
stylistically and emotionally, with a restraint that makes it difficult for the reader to realise 
that s/he is being manipulated towards Tom’s point of view. And this is part of 
Highsmith’s genius; in telling her story of a controlling yet charming psychopath, she 
deftly controls her readers and leads them towards a position of identification without them 
ever realising that they are not in control of their responses to the text. Her poetics mimic 
exactly the psychic manoeuvres of the psychopath. So, when we learn that Tom’s murders 
are not motivated by madness or greed and that he is driven to right what he considers to 
be wrongs visited on him by fate and circumstance, we may not question the logic. Tom 
did not want to murder; events forced his hand. And although he is never given to self-
pity, Tom feels that he is the victim in the narrative; a position that readers are happy to 
accept because they too are victims, though in this case of Highsmith’s insidious prose. 
We learn that Tom was orphaned at an early age and brought up by a resentful, uncaring 
and unsympathetic aunt and, when told that Tom’s early life was difficult and devoid of 
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love, the reader cannot help but feel for him and the perceived hardships and injustices that 
he suffered. However, a closer and more critical look at the narrative could reveal his 
tribulations to simply be the ‘me, me, me’ bleatings of a hard-done-to psychopath. Aunt 
Dottie wiping his juvenile nose is seen by Tom, and thus by us, not as solicitous care but 
as evidence of her hatred for him whenever he had a cold. Likewise, ‘piddling cheques for 
the strange sums of six dollars and forty-eight cents and twelve dollars and ninety-five’ 
(33) sent to the adult Tom are perceived as money ‘tossed…to him, like a crumb’ (ibid.), 
rather than amounts scraped together by a caring and penurious old woman acting far 
beyond her duty to an orphaned nephew. The litany of injustices continues: as a young 
man, he attempted to escape that life by hard work and employment, but it didn’t work out 
and he was fired from his first job after just two weeks: 
he remembered how horribly unjust he had thought it. He remembered 
deciding then that the world was full of Simon Legrees, and that you had to 
be an animal, as tough as the gorillas who worked with him at the 
warehouse, or starve. He remembered that right after that, he had stolen a 
loaf of bread from a delicatessen counter and had taken it home and 
devoured it, feeling that the world owed a loaf of bread to him, and more. 
(36) 
Here, Highsmith subtly manipulates the reader to a position of identification by marrying 
her unemotional prose with loaded cultural references. Simon Legree, for instance, is a 
vicious slave trader from Harriet Beecher Stowe’s ground-breaking anti-slavery novel 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852). His inclusion here allows the reader to overlook the fact that 
Tom turned his back on honest labour after a failed first attempt only two weeks in 
duration, and encourages us to focus instead on the cruelty and greed with which Legree’s 
name is synonymous. The fact that Tom then stole bread and ‘devoured it’ positions him 
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as a starving and destitute wretch who asks little of the world, rather than a piqued thief 
with a sense of entitlement. Indeed, the simplicity of Tom’s needs will be one way in 
which Highsmith endears him to us as the novel progresses. His aim is not to amass wealth 
and live the life of an international playboy. He simply wants to belong and to have a 
defined place in the world, rather than being a perpetual outsider: ‘He only wanted a home, 
a base somewhere, after years of not having any. And Rome was chic’ (115). Highsmith 
tugs at our heartstrings and makes us think of our own insecurities, but her prose is never 
mawkish; a throwaway reference to Rome’s chicness is all it takes to lift the mood and 
raise a wry smile. Even as we recognise Ripley’s weaknesses and foibles we accept him; 
they serve only to make him more human, more acceptable, more like us. 
 As the narrative progresses, Tom proves himself to be industrious, thorough and 
earnest – all traits that are highly prized in society and which endear him to the reader. 
Tom works hard at his deceptions, spending hours practising Dickie’s voice and 
mannerisms; even his painting style. As he considers the story he will tell to the police, 
following the unplanned murder of Freddie Miles, Tom creates an elaborate scene of 
drunken disorder in his home, even though he knows that he will have cleaned it up by the 
time the police arrive: ‘the point of the messy house was that the messiness substantiated 
merely for his own benefit the story that he was going to tell, and that therefore he had to 
believe himself’ (126). Tom also works hard at his self-improvement, spending two hours 
per day learning Italian and poring over books on history, architecture and art. Having 
decided on the type of person he wants to become – a sophisticated, serious and privileged 
young man of leisure – he sets about living that life in earnest. He immerses himself in the 
culture of Rome and his accomplishments soon outstrip those of Dickie, Marge and 
Freddie who seem base in comparison. When we read that: 
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He visited a Byzantine palace, the Palermo library with its paintings and old 
cracked manuscripts in glass cases, and studied the formation of the 
harbour, which was carefully diagrammed in his guidebook. He made a 
sketch of a painting by Guido Reni, for no particular purpose, and 
memorized a long inscription by Tasso on one of the public buildings. (159) 
we cannot help but experience, in a strange, small way, a sense of pride in his 
achievements. We feel, as Tom feels, that he is now living the life that should have been 
his, had fate, fortune and accident of birth been kinder to him. Later, Highsmith and Tom 
voice the sentiments which the reader seems to have felt spontaneously (but which were 
obviously invoked by Highsmith’s poetics) and thereby validate the reader’s feelings 
towards Tom:  
Did the world always mete out just deserts [sic]? Had the world meted his 
out to him?...In the first part of his life fate had been grossly unfair, he 
thought, but the period with Dickie and afterwards had more than 
compensated for it. (244)  
Of course, there is also something chilling about Tom’s lack of guilt and remorse at the 
murders and deceptions he has committed; the fact that he feels only a sense of entitlement 
serves to remind the reader that he is not the charming, hardworking young man of his 
projections, but an emotionless and dangerous psychopath. Yet Highsmith does not allow 
the reader to dwell on this fact and skips instead to meditations on the death penalty, the 
shortness of Tom’s young life and the fact that he has not yet visited all of the places he 
wants to see in the world. In so doing, Highsmith deftly manoeuvres the reader from a 
potentially censorious, anti-empathetic position to one of sympathy with Tom. This is 
bolstered by the revelation that, whilst mimicking Dickie and his ‘mediocre paintings’ 
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(ibid.), Tom has discovered a genuine love of art and a desire to act as a patron to 
struggling young painters. Tom is thereby transformed once more into a character that the 
reader can support in good conscience. His is not a capitalist dream. His desire to be a 
benefactor, selflessly helping others, positions him more as a young man of means on a 
nineteenth century Grand Tour than an avaricious conman and killer, and stands in positive 
contrast to the industrialist figure of Dickie’s father, Herbert Greenleaf. This enables the 
reader’s identification with Tom and also builds on the theme of Tom’s cultural growth, as 
explored earlier in the novel. However, whilst portraying Tom as an epicure, bon vivant 
and art aficionado, Highsmith is careful to ensure that the reader recognises that Tom’s 
bourgeois desires and needs, although based on an appreciation of the finer things in life, 
do not reflect a gross consumerism. His consumption of good food, wine, art and culture is 
meaningful rather than the empty capitalism that would later be explored in Ellis’s 
American Psycho. Tom is an aesthete; his Venetian home with its marble floors and 
‘furniture that did not resemble furniture at all but an embodiment of cinquecento music 
played on hautboys, recorders, and violas da gamba’ (184) is evidence of that. Dickie’s 
money has allowed him to be the person he always wished he could be. More significantly, 
his materialism is based on the fact that it functions as evidence of his materiality; 
something tangible to counteract the intangibility of his sense of self: ‘Possessions 
reminded him that he existed, and made him enjoy his existence. It was as simple as that’ 
(214). 
 The unstable self is perhaps the most important theme in the novel, which positions 
personality as performative and mutable, rather than fixed and instinctual. Tom’s adoption 
of Dickie’s identity seems to happen spontaneously; it is neither forced nor a difficult task, 
rather it occurs naturally and organically. From very early on in the narrative, Tom is 
aware of the similarities between himself and Dickie: 
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They sat slumped in the carrozza, each with a sandalled foot propped on a 
knee, and it seemed to Tom that he was looking in a mirror when he looked 
at Dickie’s leg and his propped foot beside him. They were the same height, 
and very much the same weight, Dickie perhaps a bit heavier, and they 
wore the same size bathrobe, socks, and probably shirts. 
Dickie even said, ‘Thank you, Mr Greenleaf,’ when Tom paid the 
carrozza driver. Tom felt a little weird. (58-59) 
The reference to a mirror here is interesting as the mirror, in reflecting the self, has the 
effect of separating the mind from the body. The two become distinct objects, physically 
separated. Identity, in the projected form of the physical self, is pushed further into the 
world as a detached entity to be contemplated and deliberated over. Furthermore, Tom’s 
unconscious mirroring of Dickie lends an eeriness to the scene; an uncanny presentiment 
of what lies ahead. Although at this stage Tom has not consciously considered murder, on 
noticing the physical similarities between him and Dickie and hearing himself addressed 
by the Greenleaf name, Tom’s interest in becoming Dickie Greenleaf is piqued. It is 
reminiscent of the scene at the beginning of the novel when Herbert Greenleaf suggests 
that Tom may be able to persuade Dickie to return from Italy, if he were to travel out there, 
at Mr Greenleaf’s expense. Tom instinctively recognises ‘a possibility. Something in him 
had smelt it out and leapt at it even before his brain’ (10). There’s a sense here of 
something quite primeval at work; a response from Tom’s reptilian brain which occurs 
before his neocortex, or ‘thinking brain’, has chance to engage. Later, in the carrozza, a 
similar process seems to have taken place, setting in motion a train of events which lead 
Tom inexorably towards murder and his new life as Dickie Greenleaf. Indeed, Tom’s 
initial appropriation of Dickie’s persona seems to occur without Tom’s even realising it; 
with a phrase here and a gesture there, the reader sees Tom gradually and unconsciously 
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morphing into his friend. As Tom told Dickie in the early days of their relationship, he can 
‘impersonate practically anybody’ (51). Tom has a gift for appropriating the mannerisms, 
gait and bearing of a person which, when garnished with the appropriate clothing and 
accessories, allows him to offer very convincing performances. The reader first sees this 
soon after the scene in the carozza when, alone in Dickie’s home, Tom tries on Dickie’s 
suit and impersonates him in the mirror. Quite literally ‘trying him on for size’, Tom finds 
him to be a very good fit. When Dickie walks in and suggests that Tom may be ‘queer’ he 
is actually questioning not just Tom’s sexuality, but his true identity and masculine 
performance – issues which go right to the heart of 1950s fears of male crisis. The fact that 
Dickie tells Tom that his assumption is based on ‘the way you act’ (70, my emphasis) 
points again to the performative nature of identity. 
When the murder has been committed and Tom is living as Dickie in Rome, the 
doubling becomes so pronounced that he actually starts to become Dickie, with ‘Tom’ 
being as alien/other to him as anyone else. Rather than being his own true self, ‘Tom’ 
becomes a persona that he must adopt as circumstances demand. The split between the two 
characters becomes so defined that he must consciously rehearse the role of Tom, in case 
Marge should pay him an unexpected visit to enquire about Dickie’s whereabouts: ‘It was 
a good idea to practice jumping into his own character again, because the time might come 
when he would need to in a matter of seconds, and it was strangely easy to forget the exact 
timbre of Tom Ripley’s voice’ (105-106). Tom’s reference to himself in the third person 
here demonstrates how completely he has separated from the Ripley persona. Tom wears 
the habits of a person like a costume that he can shrug on and off and the theatricality of 
this analogy reinforces our sense of the performativity of identity. However, the split 
between the two ‘selves’ becomes more pronounced as the deception develops, until Tom 
comes to see the binary personalities as two separate people. It’s no longer Tom Ripley as 
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himself, plus Tom Ripley being Dickie Greenleaf; it’s Tom and Dickie as two separate 
individuals. As with the mirror analogy discussed above, the identities of Tom and Dickie 
become detachable to the point that they may be picked up and put down at will, before 
being played out in the host body of Tom Ripley. The pronounced separation of self is 
made clear when Tom considers opening a bank account with Dickie’s money in the name 
of Tom Ripley. He notes that it would be practical, as ‘[a]fter all, he had two people to take 
care of’ (117), and the reader is made chillingly aware of Tom’s psychic ownership of the 
two identities. Tellingly, the split between the two personas is so absolute that Tom comes 
to believe that he is not responsible for Freddie’s murder – because Dickie did it. The 
benefits of such a complex cognitive manoeuvre are clear: freed of responsibility for 
Freddie’s murder, Tom is able to resume ‘normal’ life, his interest in the case no more than 
that of any of Dickie and Freddie’s other friends. He is not weighed down by fear of 
apprehension, in fact ‘[t]he only thing that really interested him was whether the police had 
found anything that actually incriminated Dickie in the murder of Freddie Miles. And he 
could hardly say that really interested him personally’ (171). However, by this point in the 
narrative Tom is so divorced from his old identity that he cannot simply stop acting and 
relax as himself; there’s nothing of him left. Rather, he must continue to perform, 
pretending to be the person he used to be. This is made clear when Tom travels to Venice 
under his own identity and chooses a mid-range hotel: ‘It was clean, inexpensive, and 
convenient to points of interest. It was just the hotel for Tom Ripley’ (167). Here, 
Highsmith’s poetics give the reader an outsider’s view both of Tom’s hotel choice and of 
Tom himself. With typical stark simplicity Highsmith renders the distance between Tom 
and his self, as we realise that Tom doesn’t just have to imagine how his selection will 
look to the police, he must also imagine Tom. 
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 In subtly mapping the insubstantiality of Tom’s identity and sense of self, 
Highsmith invokes the reader’s own sense of disenfranchisement and bewilderment in a 
cold and often baffling modernity, and in so doing she again secures our complicity. At 
odds with the ‘tough guy’ masculine paradigms so prevalent in the 1950s, Tom cries easily 
and his emotionality suggests an endearing fragility. This softens us to many of the worst 
acts in the book, such as Tom’s disrespectful dumping of Freddie’s body, and allows us to 
continue to empathise with and accept the psychopath. The scene positions Tom as the 
victim again, with Freddie as a philistine deserving of his fate: 
He dragged the limp body roughly now, scraping the face in the dirt, behind 
the last tree and behind the little remnant of tomb that was only a four-feet-
high, jagged arc of wall, but which was probably a remnant of the tomb of a 
patrician, Tom thought, and quite enough for this pig. Tom cursed his ugly 
weight and kicked him suddenly in the chin. He was tired, tired to the point 
of crying, sick of the sight of Freddie Miles, and the moment when he could 
turn his back on him for the last time seemed never to come. (130) 
The reference to the ‘tomb of a patrician’, a member of the hereditary aristocracy of 
ancient Rome and a cultured person of high birth, with sophisticated manners and taste, 
loads the scene with heteroglot meaning by offering a cultural and historical contrast to 
Freddie, who was also born to privilege yet remained unrefined and vulgar. The stub of 
tomb shows how ‘low’ Freddie is compared to the patricians of ancient Rome; that a stub 
is adequate for this ‘pig’ demeans, debases and belittles him. Significantly, though, 
Highsmith’s moves towards empathy are also laced with jolts of ugly realism. The 
violence of the unexpected kick is in stark contrast to Tom’s piteous and pathetic tears, and 
shows clearly the less winsome side of his personality. Yet even as we recoil from the 
blow and the man who delivered it, we are drawn back towards him by the very next line. 
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It places Tom back in his habitual underdog position and allows the reader to support him 
once more, both from a shared sense of victimhood in a tough world in which it is hard to 
gain purchase, and from a more elevated position of sympathy. That we can view Tom as a 
victim even as he is dragging the corpse of a man he has recently murdered says much for 
the power of Highsmith’s poetics; shifting positions of empathy and identification keep the 
reader sufficiently in flux to disrupt our usual moral responses and enable us to accept this 
emotionless killer as our (anti)hero.  
In positioning Tom as a likeable victim rather than a heartless and dangerous 
aggressor, Highsmith ensures that the reader empathises with, and thus supports and 
accepts, him. His voyage to Greece at the end of the novel represents his stepping out from 
Dickie’s shadow to forge his own life in a brave new world and the loyal reader is happy 
to see this evidence of Tom’s personal growth. Even though he fears capture having 
learned that Dickie’s belongings have been discovered in Venice, he does not fear arrest. 
Significantly, his terror of open water has also vanished. Water has strong associations 
with death in the novel but Tom no longer fears it. Having finally been able to embrace 
life, accomplish so much and enjoy it all, Tom’s dread of the void or abyss has abated. At 
the tender age of twenty-five he is able to stare down death, feeling that it is a price worth 
paying for the experiences his crimes have afforded him. Again, with remarkable sleight of 
hand, Highsmith coolly manoeuvres the reader into a position of empathy that permits him 
or her to focus on the triumphs of Tom’s personal growth, rather than the fact that he has 
literally got away with murder. For Horsley, the absence of punishment or consequences is 
a large part of the appeal of the Ripley novels, which she describes as ‘a fantasy of 
impunity sustained by lack of narrative closure’ (132). This lack of closure is also rather 
unique, in that until this point the psychopaths we have dealt with have all had their 
comeuppance in one way or another. Indeed, a quick survey of the titles considered in this 
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thesis shows that from the late-nineteenth century to the mid-1950s, seven of the fictional 
killers died, two confessed, and a further two were castrated or otherwise emasculated. The 
Talented Mr Ripley, then, marks an interesting new direction in the trajectory of the 
fictional psychopath and its ‘fantasy of impunity’ would colour the serial killer subgenre 
which took hold in the latter part of the twentieth century. Intriguingly, the stepping stone 
between the two would come not from fiction but real life. 
 
3.4 Documenting Death: The Birth of the Non-Fiction Novel 
With the publication of In Cold Blood in 1966, Truman Capote heralded the creation of ‘a 
serious new art form: the “nonfiction novel”’ (Plimpton np), which he described as ‘a 
narrative form that employed all the techniques of fictional art but was nevertheless 
immaculately factual’ (ibid.). Although the truth of Capote’s claim to have created an 
entirely new genre and the veracity of his ‘facts’ have been challenged repeatedly since the 
book’s release, it remains a landmark text which has had a significant impact not only on 
subsequent ‘true crime’ writing, but also on fictional representations of murder and crime. 
In November 1959, Perry Smith and Dick Hickock brutally murdered four 
members of a Kansan family: Herb Clutter, his wife Bonnie, and their teenaged children, 
Kenyon and Nancy. Perry and Dick targeted the family in the mistaken belief that Herb 
kept a safe filled with at least $10,000 dollars; in reality the robbery netted them 
‘[b]etween forty and fifty dollars’ (Capote 248), a portable radio and a pair of binoculars. 
The Clutters were upstanding members of the community; active in their church, hard-
working, clean-living and universally liked. The brutality of their deaths was 
incomprehensible, particularly given the low financial gain the killers had made. The town 
of Holcomb was rocked by the crime, which came to represent what Capote later described 
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as a ‘collision between the desperate, ruthless, wandering, savage part of American life, 
and the other, which is insular and safe’ (Plimpton np) – a theme of great resonance in 
mid-1960s America. Using a four-part structure to weave together testimony from all of 
the key players in the narrative with extensive reporting of the criminal proceedings and 
detailed psychiatric profiles not heard in court, In Cold Blood attempts to understand and 
explain the seemingly inexplicable crime. The result was seismic: it offered readers 
extraordinary access to the minds of the two murderers via comprehensive psychological 
analysis, considered the impact of environmental factors on their actions, and, perhaps 
most startlingly of all, offered a very human, very sympathetic view of the man who pulled 
the trigger on the Clutters. Earlier true crime narratives had reserved their sympathy for the 
victims of crime, portraying the killers as unrelatable monsters which, according to David 
Schmid, helped to protect the reader from the uncomfortable notion that the killer they 
were reading about had anything in common with them (Natural Born Celebrities 195). By 
contrast, In Cold Blood, is at pains to humanise the killers; Perry Smith in particular. 
Although Dick was the driving force behind the robbery, it was Perry who actually 
committed the murders, cutting the throat of Herb Clutter, then shooting him at point blank 
range, before executing the rest of the family, one-by-one. Capote is unsparing in his 
depictions of the crimes and the callous disregard that Perry and Dick had for their victims, 
yet his narrative also reveals Perry’s humanity. Investigators were puzzled to find that 
Kenyon, tethered to a pallet in the basement of the Clutter home, had been given a pillow 
by Perry, to ensure his comfort before he was killed. Herb’s throat was cut whilst Perry 
was in a fleeting, dissociative state (‘I didn’t realize what I’d done till I heard the sound’ 
(247))
30
 so he shot him dead, an act of brutality becoming a humane killing to spare a man 
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 One is reminded here of the fugue state that Raskolnikov enters during the murder of Alëna Ivanovna in 
Crime and Punishment which I discussed earlier (see page 98). 
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undue suffering: ‘The man would have died anyway, I know that, but I couldn’t leave him 
like he was’ (ibid.).  
Indeed, the novel abounds with descriptions of Perry as a lonesome, damaged 
‘child-man’ (226), ‘an exiled animal, a creature walking wounded’ (341); the victim of a 
chaotic and loveless broken home and poor genetic heritage. Capote skilfully renders the 
paradox of Perry’s warped humanity and our moral equivalency, with the subtlest of details 
which foreground the process of storytelling whilst simultaneously alerting us to the 
absence of an identifiable narratorial voice. The first part of the novel consists of 
alternating sections which shift between the victims and the killers. Following the 
discovery of the Clutters’ bodies and their removal by a cortege of four ambulances, the 
scene shifts to a hotel room in Olathe, where 
…Perry lay sleeping with a grey portable radio murmuring beside him. 
Except for taking off his boots, he had not troubled to undress. He had 
merely fallen face down across the bed, as though sleep were a weapon that 
had struck him from behind. The boots, black and silver-buckled, were 
soaking in a washbasin filled with warm, vaguely pink-tinted water. (83-84) 
The juxtaposition of the funereal procession of ambulances, watched grimly by affected 
members of the community, and Perry peacefully sleeping underscores his callousness – 
he is untroubled, conscienceless and lacking affect. Face-down on a bed, like a felled 
victim, we are made simultaneously aware of his status as victim in the narrative and 
reminded of the people he has recently slain in their beds (Bonnie and Nancy in 
particular). The slight tug towards sympathy that we feel on reading of him being 
metaphorically ‘struck…from behind’ is sharply arrested by the image of the blood 
spattered boots soaking in the basin. The domesticity in this simple vignette is at once 
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banal and disturbing, reminding us again of the terror that the Clutters suffered in the 
sanctity of their home. The unnamed narrator never passes comment on the story or its 
players, yet his feelings and intentions become increasingly plain from the way that he 
manipulates the reader into a position of empathy with Perry and expresses his revulsion 
for Dick. Dick, described by Special Agent Alvin Dewey of the Kansas Bureau of 
Investigation as ‘empty and worthless’ (341), is revealed as the true psychopath of the pair. 
His malevolence is written on his body, in a Lombrosan misshapenness:  
It was as though his head had been halved like an apple, then put together a 
fraction off centre…his eyes not only situated at uneven levels but of 
uneven size, the left eye being truly serpentine, with a venomous, sickly-
blue squint that although it was involuntarily acquired, seemed nevertheless 
to warn of bitter sediment at the bottom of his nature. (42) 
This description crackles with evil, from the ‘venomous squint’ of the left eye (left is the 
side of the Devil), to the references to apples and snakes which suggest original sin and a 
role in the fall of the innocent and trusting. Although the text does provide biographical 
detail and expert psychiatric evaluation of Dick, he is never treated sympathetically; rather 
his callousness reinforces the reader’s empathy for Perry, particularly when it is revealed 
that Dick manipulated Perry into committing the murders. Having listened to Perry’s 
baseless boasts of murder when the two were in prison together before the crime 
Dick became convinced that Perry was that rarity, ‘a natural killer’ – 
absolutely sane, but conscienceless, and capable of dealing, with or without 
motive, the coldest-blooded deathblows. It was Dick’s theory that such a 
gift could, under his supervision, be profitably exploited. (66) 
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To ensure that the reader remains distanced from Dick, Capote grants him less narrative 
space than Perry. Dr Jones’s diagnosis of Dick as suffering with ‘a severe character 
disorder’ (295) does temper the reader’s view of the righteousness of Dick’s hanging 
(guided by Capote’s poetics, of course), but he retains an aura of evil which is absent from 
Capote’s portrayal of Perry. 
In fact, Capote’s portrayal of Perry is extremely sympathetic. Much has been made 
of this over the years, with some critics and contemporary observers alleging that the two 
men were engaged in a homosexual relationship. Whether this is true or not can never 
actually be proved as both men are now dead, but what seems certain is that Capote felt a 
kinship with Perry. According to Ralph F. Voss, this affinity was based on a number of 
parallels that Capote perceived between Perry’s life and his own (including abandonment 
in childhood, outsider status and attachment issues) and a recognition that, were it not for 
good fortune, his own life may have turned out like Perry’s (Voss 16-17). Like Perry, 
Capote’s difference was visible; he was small and flamboyant with an unusually high-
pitched voice and these features, combined with his overt sexuality, made him very 
noticeable. Capote grants a great deal of narrative space to physical descriptions of Perry 
and whilst this is partly a stylistic device which adds to Capote’s gothic handling of the 
material, it is also a Derridean example of text as psyche, where the ‘unconscious is 
operative in language all the time’ (Wright 121). Capote’s frequent references to Perry as a 
‘child-man’ whose feet do not touch the floor when seated in an adult chair seem to draw 
on pathological issues of Capote’s own, relating to ideas of childhood and masculine 
performance; feelings of being stunted in some way, of not having advanced sufficiently or 
of not being taken seriously. It is possible that Perry evokes in Capote juvenile feelings of 
never being good enough to gain his mother’s love (she rejected him repeatedly throughout 
his life before her suicide in 1954 (Voss 33)); the author’s championing of Perry could 
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therefore perhaps be viewed as a championing or saving of his own young self. However, 
Capote’s depiction of Perry is consistently ambivalent; his narrative mirroring the 
attraction of repulsion so common to psychopath fiction. In this way his relationship with 
Perry mirrors the reader’s own. However beguiling the psychopath may be, the reader 
remains aware that the fascination is based in part on an externalisation or projection of 
personality traits that s/he finds unacceptable. Capote, like the reader, sees traces of his 
shadow in the killer; the moment of recognition mirrors that in Stevenson’s Dr Jekyll and 
Mr Hyde and it is at once terrifying and terrifyingly attractive.  
 As Capote conducts his painstaking research for the book and strives to divine the 
reasons behind the Clutter killings, he occupies the same position as the reader of the 
fictional text. The reader is therefore able to draw parallels between Capote’s experience 
of researching and writing his novel and his or her own experience of reading a novel 
about psychopaths. The motivations, rewards and ambivalences are the same for both 
parties; this alignment of reader and author strengthens the reader’s acceptance of Capote 
and his project (which is ostensibly to engender reader empathy for Perry and, to a lesser 
degree, Dick, whilst raising questions about the righteousness of capital punishment). 
Whilst analysis of the author is often a fallacy in critical practice, it seems appropriate for 
In Cold Blood. Despite his claims of absence and objectivity, Capote is ‘in’ the text 
whether he admits it or not; his presence and opinions are felt via his handling of the 
material. Capote’s omissions and inclusions and chosen areas of focus and emphasis, when 
combined with his contemporary media presence (and continued cultural interest in him 
and his work) and the huge pre-publication publicity that he generated for the book, 
provide the reader with such a strong sense of the author that he becomes, by extension, an 
additional character in the narrative. The reader’s awareness of literary construction does 
not detract from the text’s dramatic effect; rather the reader enters a state of imaginative 
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involvement (see section 1.5) in which engagement continues alongside an awareness of 
the stylistic and aesthetic qualities of the narrative technique. In our awareness of medium, 
we see here both an extension of the literary experiments of Faulkner, McCoy and 
Thompson and a foreshadowing of Ellis’s virtuosic postmodern poetics. 
 Throughout the novel, Capote intersperses omniscient, heterodiegetic narration 
with testimony which is allegedly recorded verbatim. Capote’s claims of ‘95 
percent…absolute accuracy’ (Plimpton np) in his transcriptions from memory (he did not 
use a notebook or Dictaphone during his interviews, as he believed that they inhibited his 
subjects) have been broadly challenged, although for my purposes this matters little; what 
is important is the narrative effect that his poetics achieve. The interweaving of testimony, 
free indirect discourse and heterodiegetic narration has the effect of making the narrative 
simultaneously more realistic and more novelistic, as it adds veracity to the subjects’ 
recollections. When Marie, Alvin Dewey’s wife, recounts the moment that her husband 
received a telephone call announcing the capture of the killers, she speaks in detail about 
the situation, the conversation she had with her husband and their feelings at the news, yet 
it is an unrelated remark she makes about her son having previously been very ill with 
encephalitis – ‘…we thought we might lose him. But I don’t want to talk about that’ (215) 
– that makes the scene come to life. Seemingly throwaway remarks by the narrator, such as 
his description of the sister of Lowell Lee (Perry and Dick’s Death Row neighbour) as ‘an 
intelligent but rather plain girl’ (313), also add to the effect by giving the impression that 
the narrator does not flinch from reporting the truth, however unpalatable or unseemly it 
may be. Capote’s poetics make full use of novelistic techniques for scene-setting and 
mood-building, also; a description of Dick’s face as ‘puffy, pallid as a funeral lily, 
gleam[ing] in the weak winter sunshine filtering through the bar-shrouded glass’ (334) is 
loaded with portent and symbolism which could not be conveyed via reportage. The 
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marrying of the two writing styles allows Capote to deftly manoeuvre the reader to a 
position of empathy with Perry under the guise of accurately rendering the impressions of 
the other characters. The following passage is so rich it is worth quoting at length: 
After Hickock’s dismissal, Nye and Church crossed the corridor, and 
looking through the one-way observation window set in the door of the 
interrogation room, watched the questioning of Perry Smith – a scene 
visible though not audible. Nye, who was seeing Smith for the first time, 
was fascinated by his feet – by the fact that his legs were so short that his 
feet, as small as a child’s, couldn’t quite make the floor. Smith’s head – the 
stiff Indian hair, the Irish-Indian blending of dark skin and pert-impish 
features – reminded him of the suspect’s pretty sister, the nice Mrs Johnson. 
But this chunky, misshapen child-man was not pretty; the pink end of his 
tongue darted forth, flickering like the tongue of a lizard. (226) 
This scene succinctly renders the ambivalence that Perry provokes in all those who meet 
him, whilst triggering an emotional response in the reader. That the scene is visible but not 
audible demonstrates how Perry is a man who is subject to the scrutiny and influence of 
others, but is often without agency. His tiny feet, unable to touch the floor, emphasize his 
status as a damaged child in a man’s body; with the reference to him as a ‘child-man’ 
underscoring his sense of helplessness and lack of import or impact in the world. In 
referencing his ‘Irish-Indian’ heritage, the policemen are focusing on Perry’s otherness. 
Both groups endured low social status in America at that time and when the policemen 
note Perry’s ‘stiff Indian hair’, ‘dark skin’ and ‘impish’ (for which we can read devilish, 
demonic and mischievous) features, there are definite undertones of racism. Yet even as 
the officers focus on Perry’s otherness, Capote’s poetics ensure that the reader is aware of 
the heteroglot meanings their comments create in the dialogic; of the shortcomings, 
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disadvantages and difficulties that Perry has endured. This prevents the reader from tipping 
over into feelings of disgust and losing his or her empathetic connection with the killer. 
Reference to Perry’s ‘pretty sister, the nice Mrs Johnson’ suggests that he too could have 
turned out well had circumstances and fate been kinder;
31
 whilst the use of her title, rather 
than her Christian name, underscores her respectability. However, the reference to 
Barbara’s niceness and beauty also acts as a counterpoint to Perry’s ‘misshapen’ ugliness, 
with his lizard tongue betraying him as animalistic and non-human, whilst also referencing 
his reptilian brain and predatory nature. Capote deliberately tugs the reader towards and 
away from Perry so that s/he is aware of the conflicted feelings of pity and revulsion that 
he inspires. 
 Having successfully manipulated the reader’s emotions and established his or her 
empathetic connection with Perry, Capote secures the reader’s complicity by introducing 
the psychiatric evaluations of Doctors Jones and Satten. Their evidence, disallowed in 
court due to the narrow definition of legal sanity and culpability of the M’Naghton Rule, 
proves that Perry, as a paranoid schizophrenic, should not have been held responsible for 
the murders. Capote’s inclusion of the medical reports functions as proof of the 
righteousness of his sympathetic treatment of the killer and also ratifies the reader’s 
support of Perry. In so doing, he relieves the reader of her or his conflicted support for 
Perry and validates the humanity of both Perry and his supporters. Capote’s forensic use of 
psychoanalysis and environmental causality theory has allowed him to create a detailed 
psychological study which raises the status of crime fiction, granting it a level of 
respectability unknown by writers such as Highsmith and Thompson. However, he was not 
the first to merge in-depth psychological analysis and true crime: Meyer Levin’s 1956 
‘documentary novel’ Compulsion had similar aims.  
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 There are echoes here of the parallels between Capote and Perry, and the impact of fate and fortune upon 
their lives, which I noted above. 
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In thinly-fictionalised form, Compulsion tells the story of the infamous Leopold 
and Loeb case of 1924. Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, two wealthy and prodigious 
university students, were convicted of the abduction and murder of 14-year-old Bobby 
Franks. The case, which was frequently referred to as the ‘crime of the century’ sent 
shockwaves through American society as it was a seemingly motiveless crime committed 
solely to prove a philosophical point. Leopold and Loeb (renamed Judd Steiner and Artie 
Strauss by Levin) considered themselves to be Nietschean übermenschen, or supermen, to 
whom the rules of society did not apply
32
 and the crime, according to Levin, ‘was a crime 
for its own sake…a crime in a vacuum, a crime in a perfectly frozen nothingness, where 
the atmosphere of motive was totally absent’ (272). Like Capote, Levin blended novelistic 
technique with documentary fact; however, as John Hollowell has noted, ‘in the Library of 
Congress system, [In Cold Blood] is placed under non fiction, in a category of “social 
pathology” including murder case histories…Compulsion…a remarkably similar book…is 
placed in the catalogue system under fiction’ (83). The difference is that Levin thinly 
disguised his events by changing the names of the protagonists and inventing certain 
scenes for dramatic effect (charges which were also laid against Capote, although he 
denied them). Such a merging of fact and fiction is endemic within crime fiction and 
Joseph Grixti, in his discussion of the allure of serial killers such as Jeffrey Dahmer, 
describes the fictionalizing process as a vital way for readers to cognitively separate the 
killers from ‘normal’ people like the reader and recontextualise them in an unthreatening 
way: 
Fictionalizing figures like…[Ted] Bundy as inhuman monsters is one way 
of coming to terms with the dislocations that they generate in order to 
preserve the preferred contours of our own identity. Popular fiction, 
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 There are parallels here with Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment.  
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because of its very generic and formulaic nature, frequently acts as a frame 
of reassurance which allows us to safely engage in this exploratory process. 
(qtd. in Simpson xv) 
What is interesting about Compulsion and, later, In Cold Blood, is that they begin to 
reverse this process, relocating the criminal from monstrous other to ‘one of us’. There 
has, of course, been a gradual shift towards this throughout the twentieth century,
33
 as 
evidenced by my discussion of the earlier texts in this chapter; what is notable here is not 
just the extent of the change but also its application to real persons rather than just fictional 
constructs. Like Capote, Levin sought to understand the causes of violent crime and 
assuage the terror felt by society in the face of such senseless brutality. Levin’s narrator, 
cub reporter Sid Silver, occupies a central position in the narrative and he provides a 
‘normal’ counterpoint to the killers. Silver attends the same university as Judd and Artie, is 
a member of the same fraternity as Artie and is equally prodigious academically. The 
cultural fear that homicidal compulsion is an inherent part of every human being is 
explored through the overlapping experiences of Sid and the killers: 
I grappled with the image of Judd Steiner, someone like myself, my 
own age, a prodigy like myself, graduating at eighteen, in the same school, 
reading the same books, and attracted to the same girl. 
If we were in so many ways alike, surely I would come to 
understand him. And yet he had done that most incomprehensible, most 
horrible murder. Yes, he had done it. I knew it. (231) 
                                                          
33
 This trend was rooted in the Enlightenment, as evidenced by Halttunen’s scholarship on Puritan murder 
narratives which I referenced in section 2.1. From the late eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century, 
popular responses to murder were shaped by execution sermons. Halttunen observes that this was a 
‘formulaic demonstration that all murders were simply natural manifestations of universal depravity, [with a] 
tendency to express surprise, not that one sinner had committed this crime, but that everyone else in the 
community had not’ (4). Schmid also discusses Puritan murder narratives; see Natural Born Celebrities pp 
179-182. 
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Recognition of shared humanity carries with it a fear of shared guilt and Sid, and the 
broader society which he represents, looks to science, in the form of psychoanalysis, for 
reassurance that he will not also be gripped by a murderous and senseless compulsion to 
kill. The novel offers a deep and incisive Freudian analysis of the crimes and their drivers, 
which greatly exceeds the scope of the analysis in the original case. As Paula S. Fass has 
shown,  
the new psychology transformed [Leopold and Loeb] from Nietzschean 
criminals…into vulnerable boys…and linked them to the ordinary boys of 
America. The change made their crime less distant, but it may well have 
made it more broadly frightening. (936) 
Yet for all their vulnerability and familiarity, the reader does not empathise with Judd and 
Artie. Levin’s poetics keep the reader in an external, spectatorial position, and s/he 
remains on the outside, looking at them like two courtroom exhibits or laboratory 
specimens. Compulsion is very much a product of its time, addressing 1950s concerns 
about masculinity, sexuality, delinquency and psychology from within a stifling 
framework of repression. It was not until the freedoms of the 1960s and Truman Capote’s 
masterful handling of In Cold Blood that the fictional trajectory of the psychopath would 
advance significantly. As Hollowell says: 
In Cold Blood exemplifies the seemingly random, meaningless crime that 
became symptomatic of America in the sixties. For implicit in the story of 
the Kansas killings are larger questions about the social dislocations of the 
sixties and the failure of conventional morality to explain away the 
senseless violence we read about daily in the newspaper. (85) 
197 
 
These social fears, and narrative handling of them, would be exemplified in the serial killer 
subgenre which came to prominence in the latter part of the twentieth century and will be 
explored in the next chapter. It combined what John Arlott, in his foreword to William 
Bolitho’s classic study of ‘real life’ crime, Murder for Profit (1926), described as ‘a 
sensitive dual accuracy, the accuracy of history and the accuracy of imaginative 
understanding’(7). We can see these dual accuracies building in Compulsion and reaching 
fruition in In Cold Blood, before carrying over into the emergent serial killer subgenre via 
pulp fiction-inspired psychopathic protagonists who are both psychologically plausible and 
accurate, and chillingly recognisable.   
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Chapter Four 
The Normalisation of Psychopathy? The Serial Killer Subgenre and  
the Impact of American Psycho. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the mid-twentieth century saw an explosion of fictional 
and fact-based (sometimes referred to by the portmanteau ‘factional’) treatments of 
psychopathy and a number of texts produced during this period proved crucial in the 
formation of the serial killer subgenre. The popularity of this subgenre has pushed 
psychopathic characters out from the cultural peripheries and into the centre ground and 
the development of the figure has led to an extraordinary dialogue between fact and 
fiction. Literary representations have become psychologically accurate to such a degree 
that the FBI training academy in Quantico teaches its students using not only case 
materials on ‘real life’ serial killers such as Ed Gein but also the novels of Thomas Harris 
(Haut, Neon 215). The traditional definition of a serial killer is someone who has killed 
three or more people over a period of more than a month, with a ‘cooling-off’ period 
between each murder (the timeframe and cooling-off period are important, as they help to 
differentiate serial killing from mass murder, which consists of four or more killings in a 
single incident, and spree killing, which is typically identified as two or more murders 
without a cooling-off period), although, in 2005, the FBI changed the definition to the 
‘unlawful killing of two or more victims by the same offender(s), in separate events’ 
(Morton 9). Special Agent Robert Ressler, who, alongside John Douglas, founded the 
FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit, claims to have brought the term into common usage in 
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1976,
34
 whilst working on the ‘Son of Sam’ case in New York. Douglas, who was the 
inspiration for Special Agent Jack Crawford in Harris’s Red Dragon (1981) and The 
Silence of the Lambs (1988), pioneered modern criminal profiling techniques. In his 1995 
book, Mindhunter: Inside the FBI’s Serial Crime Unit, Douglas asserts that modern 
detection techniques actually have a basis in literature:  
though most of the books that dramatize and glorify what we do, such as 
Tom Harris’s memorable The Silence of the Lambs, are somewhat fanciful 
and prone to dramatic license, our antecedents actually do go back to crime 
fiction more than crime fact. C. August Dupin, the amateur detective hero 
of Edgar Allen Poe’s 1841 classic “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” may 
have been history’s first behavioral profiler. (32) 
It seems appropriate that detectives such as Dupin, Holmes and Poirot, who work on 
ratiocination and an uncanny ability to inhabit the mind of the villain, should have so 
coloured modern profiling techniques, as it underscores the symbiotic relationship between 
literature and science, fact and fiction; the one feeding into the other. This dialogism also 
extends to the reader and his or her relationship to the literary psychopath, as during the 
period of entrancement (see Chapter 1, section 1.6) one must allow for a temporary 
merging of consciousness with the psychopathic figure.  
 As I explained in the previous chapter, popular fascination with the fictional 
psychopath built steadily during the twentieth century. The impetus for this phenomenon 
was manifold, resting in a number of cultural spurs including World War Two, the trauma 
of the Holocaust and the seismic cultural and economic changes which followed in their 
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 Although the FBI can certainly be credited with the popularisation of the term, it was first brought into use 
a decade earlier, in John Brophy’s 1966 treatise on serial murder The Meaning of Murder. For more detail on 
the formalisation of the nomenclature of serial murder see Schmid, Natural Born Celebrities, pp 66-101. 
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wake. Opposition to the dominant culture grew throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
influencing the cultural output of the period. Some literature, as we have seen, became 
more challenging and experimental, whilst movies also became increasingly violent. 
Robert Bloch’s pulp fiction novel Psycho (1959) was a great success; Hitchcock’s faithful 
adaptation of the novel, in 1960, secured its position as one of the founding texts of the 
serial killer subgenre. The impact of the film cannot be underestimated and its enduring 
success reveals the extent to which audiences have embraced encounters with aberrant 
psychology. As Cassuto has noted, ‘Psycho long ago left the horror and crime genres 
behind to become part of the cultural lexicon’ (242). This transcendence of niche literary 
genres speaks also to the trajectory of the literary psychopath, which has seen him move 
from the margins to centre stage. Although psychopathy is a relatively obscure condition, 
affecting only 1% of the population, the psychopath has become such a clearly defined and 
well-explored figure that most people can give a fairly accurate description of the 
behavioural and emotional manifestations of the disorder. I should note at this point, 
however, that Norman Bates of Psycho is not actually a psychopath. He is psychotic, with 
a multiple personality disorder composed of at least three facets:  
There was Norman, the little boy who needed his mother and hated 
anything or anyone who came between him and her. Then, Norma, the 
mother, who could not be allowed to die. The third aspect might be called 
Normal – the adult Norman Bates, who had to go through the daily routine 
of living, and conceal the existence of the other personalities from the 
world. (148) 
I won’t engage in an in-depth analysis of the text here as, although it is certainly relevant 
to my discussion of the serial killer subgenre, it deals neither with psychopaths nor any 
particular advancement of narrative technique. Rather, it sits within the conventions 
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established by authors such as Jim Thompson, who I explored in the previous chapter: a 
deranged killer with a benign public façade, black humour, a keen focus on disturbed 
psychology, plus knowledge of legal process, psychoanalysis, and contemporary cultural 
concerns about issues such as sissies and Momism. The key points of interest, from the 
perspective of this study, are the interplay between fact and fiction, and the effect that the 
novel and subsequent movie adaptation had on the serial killer subgenre as a whole. 
Hitchcock’s film brought the serial killer subgenre to a far broader audience than the novel 
alone could be expected to reach and it has had greater longevity than Bloch’s fairly 
average book would have done had it stood by itself.  
Bates was based on the real life American serial killer, Ed Gein, whose grotesque 
crimes gripped the horrified public when he was apprehended in 1957. Unable to cope 
with the death of his mother, Gein admitted to exhuming the bodies of recently deceased 
middle-aged women then tanning their skins to make grisly home furnishings and 
souvenirs. As his mania heightened he decided to create a ‘woman suit’ from the tanned 
hides of his victims, in order that he may wear it and live as a woman. Gein’s crimes were 
so singular that they have made an indelible impression on the Western psyche and he has 
subsequently influenced numerous cultural outputs across music, film and literature. His 
literary incarnations include Jame Gumb in The Silence of the Lambs, who wanted ‘a vest 
with tits on it’ (146), and American Psycho’s trophy-taking Patrick Bateman.  
Thanks to the vividity of Thomas Harris’s characterisation and the extraordinary 
resonance of Gein’s crimes, Jame Gumb remains one of fiction’s most unsettling villains. 
Harris’s reliance on research is legendary, as is his relationship with the FBI. Special 
Agent Ressler reportedly gave Harris unprecedented access to case files on a number of 
high-profile killers, including Gein. The material he was able to gather allowed him to 
create killers and investigators who were both psychologically and factually plausible. 
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Simpson compares the synergy between fact and fiction and the relationship between 
Ressler and Harris to ‘the Möbius strip of what Jean-Francois Baudrillard refers to as 
“simulacra”’ (71), in that FBI ‘fact’, based on nineteenth century fiction, is then used by 
Harris to create ‘reality’-based novels. A simulacrum is an image or representation of 
something that ultimately replaces reality, to create what Baudrillard has termed the 
‘hyperreal, produced from a radiating synthesis of combinatory models…It is no longer a 
question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is a question of substituting the 
signs of the real for the real’ (1-2). Fiction becomes fact and fact becomes fiction, until the 
distinction between the two is difficult to see. This focus on psychological and scientific 
verisimilitude was to have a profound and lasting impact on the depiction of the 
psychopath in literature and its effect can be felt on creations such as Bateman and Dexter, 
who I will discuss shortly. Harris has been so influential on the genre that he is broadly 
agreed to have created the template for contemporary serial killer fiction. From the 1980s 
to the present day, his creations have gripped readers and, as Simpson states, ‘Harris is 
perhaps the man most directly responsible for the 1980s and 1990s explosion of interest in 
serial killers, the current cycle of fictional narratives of serial murder, and the future shape 
of the mythos itself’ (83). Harris’s novels are police procedurals rather than the 
homodiegetic psychopath narratives that this thesis is largely interested in; my analysis of 
his work here is therefore necessarily short and aims to delineate his role in establishing 
the serial killer subgenre and bringing the psychopathic character into the centre ground. 
From my point of view, the most interesting thing about Red Dragon and The Silence of 
the Lambs is their treatment of the psychopathic psychiatrist and cannibalistic killer, 
Hannibal Lecter, who has transcended his fictional base to become part of the cultural 
imaginary. In large part this was due to the massive success of Jonathan Demme’s 1991 
203 
 
film version of The Silence of the Lambs; however, I think a great deal of Lecter’s power 
lies in Harris’s depiction of him as an epicure, aesthete and man of culture.  
Lecter is self-possessed and mysterious, with an almost clairvoyant insightfulness 
which suggests that, like the mindhunters, he is able to inhabit the psyches of others. His 
own psyche remains closed, however (at least in the first two novels in the Lecter series), 
and this enigmatic combination of knowing and inscrutability makes him a figure of 
fascination, both intra- and extradiegetically. In Red Dragon, Will Graham describes 
Lecter as a breed apart, a ‘monster’ that cannot be classified: ‘They say he’s a sociopath 
because they don’t know what else to call him. He has some of the characteristics of what 
they call a sociopath. He has no remorse or guilt at all…But he doesn’t have any of the 
other marks…’ (64). Although the novel begins some three years after Lecter’s arrest and 
incarceration, diegetic media interest in him remains fevered, suggesting that the fictional 
public, like the novel’s real life readership, has a great appetite for stories relating to the 
Doctor and his crimes. Professional curiosity also endures; medical journals are keen to 
publish Lecter’s articles, psychology students are desperate to include him in their theses 
and psychiatrists at the secure psychiatric facility where Lecter is held initially see him as 
‘an opportunity to make a landmark study’, before realising that he is ‘impenetrable, much 
too sophisticated for the standard tests’ (Silence 10). Lecter’s intradiegetic allure mirrors 
the appeal he has for readers, who are similarly eager to understand the impenetrable 
psychopath. It is significant, too, that in both Red Dragon and The Silence of the Lambs 
the FBI approaches Lecter for help in apprehending Francis Dolarhyde and Jame Gumb, as 
this offers a metanarrative of the dialogic process in which the real life Bureau and the 
author of the novels are engaged. 
Interestingly, given Lecter’s extraordinary cultural cachet, he is actually a very 
minor character in Red Dragon. Other than a few letters that he writes, Lecter only 
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‘physically’ appears in about twelve pages of the 420 page novel, yet he occupies a 
principal narrative space. And, although he is more central to The Silence of the Lambs, he 
is neither the most aberrant figure nor the controlling consciousness in either book. Indeed, 
in both novels Lecter provides a kind of middle-ground between the psychologically 
scarred investigators and the monstrous killers they pursue. Dolarhyde and Gumb are 
completely alien and othered; although some sympathy is possible, for instance when we 
read of Dolarhyde’s tortured childhood or Gumb’s gender dysphoria, we cannot empathise 
with these figures. Whilst we may like and admire Graham and Starling and will them to 
success, we cannot help but notice that they do not have the same prepossessing mental 
strength as Lecter. Graham’s ‘pure empathy and projection’ (Dragon 179) is described by 
Dr. Bloom as a ‘gift’; yet compared to Lecter, who has no empathy, we are forced to 
question just who has the gift and who has the curse. This subtle championing of 
psychopathic traits leads us to identify with Lecter in a way that is slightly at odds with the 
usual positions of empathy in the police procedural novel. As Black has noted in his study 
of detective fiction: 
it has become a convention of the genre to portray the sleuth at odds with 
the established police force. In fact, the literary figure of the detective 
typically was and continues to be an extraordinary, marginal figure who 
frequently bears a closer resemblance to the criminal he pursues than to the 
police officers with whom he supposedly collaborates. (43) 
Although the detective is traditionally the locus of empathy in such novels, in Harris’s 
fiction the reader’s identification with the detective simultaneously pushes him or her 
closer to the psychopath. That Graham and Starling are in thrall to Lecter adds to the 
destabilising effect; the reverence with which Dolarhyde views Lecter is enough to remind 
us of the danger that the Doctor represents, but not enough to counter his beguiling 
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influence. Although effective, this in itself does not constitute any major advancement of 
the depiction of psychopathy in literature. What Harris did do, however, was achieve 
bestseller status with serial killer narratives which led to an extraordinary concentration of 
such fictions during the 1980s and 1990s. By the end of that period, the novels being 
produced were portraying levels of violence and disaffection that would have been 
undreamed of earlier on in the century. The number of authors writing about psychopaths, 
including Dennis Cooper, James Ellroy, Poppy Z. Brite, Joyce Carol Oates and Bret 
Easton Ellis, reveals that this was not an anomaly but a cultural movement. 
 
4.1 Patrick Bateman, ‘The Boy Next Door’ 
Of the late twentieth century authors listed above, it is Bret Easton Ellis who has had the 
greatest cultural impact. His American Psycho courted controversy before it was even 
issued and the story of its troubled release is now the stuff of publishing lore. Just months 
before it was due to be published in 1990, the book was dropped by its original publisher, 
Simon & Schuster (who forfeited the $300,000 advance paid to the author), after leaked 
excerpts from galley proofs printed in Time and Spy magazines were met with fierce 
disapprobation. Just two days later, Ellis signed a new contract (and secured a second, 
undisclosed advance) with Random House, a more prestigious publisher, who released the 
book under its Vintage imprint the following year. An extraordinary backlash followed, 
with critics almost uniformly appalled by the novel’s extreme violence and alienated by 
Ellis’s narrative style. An enraged National Organization of Women called for Random 
House and the book to be boycotted, with Tammy Bruce, President of the Los Angeles 
Chapter, describing American Psycho as ‘a how-to novel on the torture and 
dismemberment of women’ (New York Times, December 6th 1990). Roger Rosenblatt of 
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the New York Times descried not just the ‘gratuitous degradation of human life’ but also 
the novel’s grammar (‘Let's trust that Vintage will at least clean up the grammar when it 
publishes the book next month’), and labelled Ellis’s prose ‘childishly gruesome’, 
‘pointless’, ‘themeless’, and ‘loathsome’ (16th December 1990). Numerous other 
commentators concurred and even the more accepting reviewers, such as Fay Weldon, 
who called it a ‘seminal book’ (Guardian 25th April 1991), advised caution: ‘I don't want 
you to actually read [this] book. I did it for you’ (ibid.). Academic attention followed, with 
Elizabeth Young in particular delivering an excellent and insightful early piece of criticism 
of what she considered ‘a classic text at the end of the high postmodern period’ (121-122) 
in her 1992 book, Shopping in Space: Essays on America’s Blank Fiction, co-authored 
with Graham Caveney. In more recent years, critics have increasingly turned to the 
complexity of Ellis’s poetics, the impact of his unreliable narrator, the novel’s satire, 
whether Bateman’s violence is ‘real’ or simply the ravings of a madman, and even if 
Bateman himself actually ‘exists’ or is the alter-ego of one of the other characters. For our 
purposes, of course, the important issue is the American psycho himself – how he is 
portrayed, how that portrayal works on the reader’s emotions, and the ultimate effect of 
this transaction on the development of literary portrayals of psychopathy. The critical 
accounts I have explored have almost uniformly denied any possibility of reader 
identification with the titular psychopath, focusing instead on the alienating nature of 
Ellis’s prose. Condemnatory in their response to the novel’s violence, commentators have 
largely ascribed it a single, unvarying function and effect which is resolutely negative and 
distancing. However, I contend that both the violence and Bateman’s aberrance are multi-
layered, with an undulant and complex narrative function which resists generic 
classification. I find that an empathetic response to Bateman is not only possible but 
encouraged, and that it plays a vital role in our negotiation of the novel’s most troubling 
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content. Worrying, perhaps, if one accepts C. Namwali Serpell’s suggestion that ‘[t]here is 
no interpretation of American Psycho that is not, in effect, an interpretation of the critic’ 
(66), yet this seems to be the key to understanding the negativity the book has garnered. 
Critics appear to have been unable to accept or acknowledge identification with Bateman 
for fear of aligning themselves with the psychopath or his deeds, but, as I shall show 
shortly, Ellis’s poetics ensure that the reader’s relationship to his psychopath is strategic 
and shifting, rather than self-revelatory. 
Perhaps the first thing to note about the novel is the way that it has metamorphosed 
from a niche text to a cultural landmark, propelled by the controversy surrounding its 
release and by Mary Harron’s film adaptation in 2000. American Psycho’s popularity has 
been so enduring that, in 2011, Publisher’s Weekly ran an interview with Ellis to celebrate 
the twentieth anniversary of the book’s release, in which interviewer Annie Coreno 
referred to Bateman as ‘one of the most recognizable characters in fiction’ (10). American 
Psycho is the key text responsible for the normalisation of psychopathy which took place 
in the late twentieth century. Drawing on the ordinary, ‘everyday’ psychopaths of 
Thompson and Highsmith, Ellis’s antihero certainly looks normal – a 26-year-old, tanned 
and stylish Wall Street financier with model good looks and a finely-honed physique is 
hardly what one would imagine when conjuring up a mental image of a homicidal 
psychopath – and in the earliest pages of the novel he seems fairly reasonable too. 
Bateman is repeatedly referred to as ‘the boy next door’ (11), harmless and unremarkable: 
“Patrick is not a cynic, Timothy. He’s the boy next door, aren’t you honey?” “No I’m not,” 
I whisper to myself. “I’m a fucking evil psychopath” (19). His repeated and increasingly 
desperate attempts to identify himself as the psycho of the novel’s title end in failure, with 
his admissions unheard, ignored, misheard or disbelieved. Even a ten-minute long 
confession detailing ‘thirty, forty, a hundred murders’ (338), left on Harold Carnes’s 
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answerphone, is dismissed as a joke because ‘Bateman’s such an ass-kisser, such a brown-
nosing goody-goody’ (372) that he could never be believed capable of such crimes. The 
reader of the book vacillates between feelings of pity, empathy and revulsion, as Ellis’s 
poetics manipulate him or her to contradictory emotional responses to the novel’s 
challenging content. 
 Written almost exclusively in the first person, American Psycho also generally uses 
the present tense which not only gives it immediacy and makes it seem more real, but also 
works to draw the reader into the narrative process as Bateman’s confidante. Yet, despite 
these usually empathetic techniques, the flat and emotionless way in which the narration is 
delivered is simultaneously alienating. The narrative devices give a sense of the 
temporality of Bateman’s existence, its focus on surface and the extreme narcissism of not 
just the narrator but the entire age. In a 1991 interview with Roger Cohen from the New 
York Times, Ellis explained the book’s aesthetic by quoting from the novel: ‘Surface, 
surface, surface was all that anyone found meaning in…this was civilization as I saw it, 
colossal and jagged’ (360). Despite its well-deserved reputation for containing scenes of 
staggering violence and pornography, the bulk of the book is actually made up of mind-
numbing lists of consumer products, detailed descriptions of designer attire and bizarre, in-
depth critiques of mainstream pop acts such as Whitney Houston and Huey Lewis and the 
News. The intentional tedium of these passages was attacked by early critics of the novel 
such as Naomi Wolf, who declared American Psycho to be ‘the single most boring book I 
have ever had to endure’ (34); however, by focusing on the surface effect of these sections, 
such commentators fail to acknowledge their strategic narrative function. Great attention is 
paid in the novel to the aesthetics of boredom, which establish the pervading ennui of the 
1980s. The unmodulated narrative voice describes pocket squares and dismemberments 
with the same detached languor, suggesting a parity of meaninglessness which would be 
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shocking were it not delivered so drily. In Bateman’s milieu, there is no depth or hidden 
meaning and this very transparency is simultaneously the source of his boredom and the 
spur for his violence. As Lars Svendsen notes in his book A Philosophy of Boredom 
(2005), ‘[b]oredom has to do with finitude and nothingness. It is a death within life, a non-
life’ (40-41); in American Psycho this constant association with boredom/death propels 
Bateman towards expressions of vitality via acts of extreme violence. Using Martin 
Doehleman’s typology, Svendsen delineates four kinds of boredom:  
situative boredom, as when one is waiting for someone, is listening to a 
lecture or taking the train; the boredom of satiety, when one gets too much 
of the same thing and everything becomes banal; existential boredom where 
the soul is without content and the world is in neutral; and creative 
boredom, which is not so much characterized by its content as its result: 
that one is forced to do something new. (41-42) 
Each of these types is at play in American Psycho in some way or another, with the 
situative boredom spilling beyond the narrative to also affect the reader. The monotonous 
listing of consumer products, clothes and services has a flattening effect which deadens the 
reader’s response to the text and surreptitiously aligns her or him with the novel’s jaded 
and affectless psychopath. Like Bateman, who according to Svendsen is impelled to 
‘transgress every conceivable and inconceivable limit, in order to create differences and 
thereby transgress the levelling’ (74), the reader is also driven to violate conventions of 
decency and decorum via an avid consumption of increasingly distasteful material. The 
violence and pornography in the novel becomes progressively Sadean as the narrative 
unfolds, its atrocities and perversities accelerating, check-list fashion, until no taboo 
remains unchallenged. 
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 The soporific effect of the novel’s tedium ensures that the first explosion of 
savagery (which occurs a full 126 pages into the narrative) is doubly impactful and the 
forceful collision between the two modes establishes the relationship between boredom 
and viciousness which will punctuate the rest of the novel. Having raced through the 
seemingly endless and plotless sections detailing products, purchases, reservations and 
attire, the reader is arrested by the intensity of the violence. As I shall show shortly, 
instances of brutality in the novel are narrated in close and shocking detail, which Ellis’s 
poetics force the reader to read slowly and carefully. Whereas the scenes of consumerism 
are alienating, the pornography and violence, although distasteful and often difficult to 
read, concern people rather than things and are therefore easier to identify with. They are 
also the most recognisable in terms of novelistic conventions (things are happening) and 
offer the greatest promise of plot development (actions typically have consequences) to 
the, at times, bewildered reader. Expressions of violence and pornography are followed by 
interminable lists of hi-fi equipment or banal conversations about restaurant reservations 
which allow the reader to ‘reset’ and recover; the most extreme scenes are ensued by 
lengthy sections of pseudo-pop journalism. In addition to ensuring that the reader does not 
become too alienated and unempathetic, these sections also help to pace the novel and 
create the ‘speed differentials’ discussed by Marco Abel (144-145) and Serpell (61). 
Arguing against Abel’s claim that ‘[s]lowness is the novel’s dominant mode of speed’ 
(145), Serpell explains how the reader must ‘negotiate between the decelerated pace of the 
violent episodes, a voyeuristically slow reading into which the reader is lured via 
pornographic segues, and the faster pace warranted by the redundant scenes of 
consumerism’ (161). Serpell goes on to state that the emphasis in the novel is on ‘suspense 
and dread, rather than on shock and disgust’ (63); however, it seems to me that a 
secondary effect of the novel’s strategic use of boredom and the Sadean linking of humour 
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and atrocity is that the most disturbing scenes of the novel actually become the most 
enjoyable. Rather than fearing what may happen next, the reader races towards the 
challenging sections, desperate to uncover the latest outrage. 
I will return to the linking of violence and humour later, but here I wish to address 
how the seemingly artless simplicity of the novel’s most tedious sections belies the 
extraordinary complexity of Ellis’s poetics. An early chapter entitled ‘Morning’ comprises 
six pages of wearisome description of Bateman’s apartment and morning routine. He goes 
into minute detail, even including an ingredient-list of his preferred pre-date hair care 
products: ‘These are formulas that contain D-panthenol, a vitamin B-complex factor; 
polysorbate 80, a cleansing agent for the scalp; and natural herbs’ (25). The situatively 
boring and seemingly endless listing of products and processes invites speed-reading, the 
surface-skimming technique aligning the reader with Ellis’s aesthetic. Yet close attention 
to the poetics pays off. As the chapter progresses, the reader becomes increasingly 
disengaged and the boredom that s/he feels mirrors Bateman’s disconnectedness. The 
subtlety is such that the changes are almost imperceptible, but as the register shifts from 
catalogue ad copy to infomercial, the pronouns shift from the first person (‘I put…I 
press…I always slather…’ (26)) to the second person (‘You can…You should…One 
should…’ (ibid.)) causing Bateman’s narration to become more distanced and impersonal. 
This not only reveals Bateman’s shaky sense of self, but also hints at the way that Ellis 
will manipulate our reading position as the narrative progresses – sometimes aligning us 
empathetically with Bateman and at other times allowing us the relief of a more detached 
perspective. Simpson, citing Leigh Brock, argues that the novel’s exhaustive and 
exhausting cataloguing of brands and products ‘not only illustrates its title character’s 
obsessive nature but also sets up a self-aware distance between the reader and the 
narrative’ (148) and I concur. However, for every instance of distancing there are also 
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deliberate attempts to draw us closer. Sometimes these are simplistic and occur at 
unimportant points in the text, such as when Bateman relates what happens at a dinner 
party in a reportage style, then sneakily addresses the reader: ‘Evelyn laughs good-
naturedly and says, “Oh Stash, you are a riot,” and then asks worriedly, “Tempura?” 
Evelyn is an executive at a financial services company, FYI’ (13). Although it is barely 
discernible, the Y in ‘FYI’ is actually quite powerful, addressing the reader directly and 
drawing her or him closer to the narrative. At other points, the strategy is more overt:  
On my way into the Chinese cleaners I brush past a crying bum, an old 
man, forty or fifty, fat and grizzled, and just as I’m opening the door I 
notice, to top it off, that he’s also blind and I step on his foot, which is 
actually a stump, causing him to drop his cup, scattering change all over the 
sidewalk. Did I do this on purpose? What do you think? Or did I do this 
accidentally? (79) 
On the surface, this appears to be a fairly standard narratorial method for engaging the 
reader and helping him or her to identify with the character (Bateman, not the bum). By 
having Bateman address the reader directly, Ellis draws the reader into the text and 
reminds her or him that s/he is part of this: ‘Did I do this…?’ appears to be Bateman’s 
response to a question from the reader; that he then questions the reader in response 
underlines the fact that reading narrative is a two-way process, or at least a simulacrum of 
one. This plays an important role in the novel’s insidious play on reader empathy and it 
also raises important questions about narrative process and the nature of fictionality. By 
drawing the reader’s attention to the novelistic apparatus, Bateman alerts him or her to the 
constructedness of the text. This colours the reader’s imaginative involvement with the 
novel with an ‘epistemological awareness’ (Ryan 98) of the separation between his or her 
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immersion in the diegesis and his or her attentiveness to the narrative poetics which 
mediate that engagement.  
 Indeed, the fictionality of this fiction is constantly underlined, with Ellis employing 
a number of interesting, multi-functional techniques. His use of movie jargon, such as 
‘smash cut’ (10), ‘panning down’ (50), and ‘Scene two’ (227) points to performativity and 
constructedness, whilst simultaneously adding character detail and a further ‘in’ for the 
media-savvy late-twentieth century reader. When we read that Bateman walks home, says 
goodnight to a doorman he doesn’t recognise ‘and then dissolve[s] into [his] living room 
high above the city’ (23) we learn far more about his insubstantiality and tenuous 
connection to reality than we could if this had been conveyed via more conventional 
poetics. As readers we delight in this narrative sleight of hand; the introduction of 
cinematic terminology draws our awareness to the serial killer movie cycle so prevalent in 
the 1980s and 1990s and makes us feel that we are part of something much bigger and 
more culturally impactful. The rich intertextuality of the novel, with its polyphony of 
people, places and texts from both real life and from fiction, causes us to engage more 
closely and more meaningfully with the work, with the effect that we empathise not just 
with the character but with the text itself. We become invested in the multi-layered poetics 
and their beguiling combination of simplicity and complexity, acceptance and revulsion. 
For this reason, I take issue with Brock’s suggestion that ‘Ellis’s style allows the reader to 
distance himself from the text, lessening its shock and impact’ (7). Agreeing with Brock, 
Simpson argues that this ‘distancing strategy may be the method by which [Ellis] thought 
he could honestly present the gruesome details of a violent killer’s crimes and still keep an 
audience’ (148), however I contend that it is in fact Ellis’s drawing-close of the reader that 
enables us to push through the unpleasure of the book’s most troubling scenes. By 
invoking our empathy for Bateman and aligning us mentally and emotionally with the 
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killer, Ellis ensures that we feel as Bateman feels, whether that emotion is pleasure, disgust 
or ennui. 
 The first third of the novel is relatively devoid of violence. There are hints at 
murders committed – a couple missing from a yacht party, presumed murdered (4); 
Evelyn’s neighbour found decapitated (117) – and expressions of violent impulse that 
Bateman does not act upon (‘the temptation to kill McDermott is replaced by this strange 
anticipation to have a good time’ (50)), but we are spared the detailed descriptions of 
torture, murder and sexual perversion which pepper the later chapters of the novel. 
However, this early section plays an important role in conditioning the reader to accept the 
brutality which will follow, as the following excerpt illustrates: 
…I take a quick hot shower and then head to the video store where I return 
two tapes I rented on Monday, She-Male Reformatory and Body Double, 
but I rerent Body Double because I want to watch it again tonight even 
though I know I won’t have time to masturbate over the scene where the 
woman is drilled to death by a power drill since I have a date with Courtney 
at seven-thirty at Café Luxembourg. (67) 
This passage comes at the end of a long, tedious and detailed description of Bateman’s 
gym routine, the precise exercises he performs including the number of sets and 
repetitions, his cool-down stretches, etc., which we have read quickly and carelessly in 
order to relieve its tedium. That Bateman has returned the porn film, preferring instead to 
get his sexual kicks from a death scene in a thriller he has rented 37 times, suggests 
Geoffrey Gorer’s claim that in the twentieth century death became the new pornography 
(51), a sobering thought for the reader who avidly consumes Ellis’s tale of gratuitous sex 
and death. The image of a man masturbating over a scene of torture and murder is grim 
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and disturbing, yet Bateman is so blasé, and the poetics are so controlled and controlling, 
that it is difficult for the reader to react appropriately here. There is no moral guidance in 
the text – Bateman feels nothing – so it is up to the reader to appraise the content, but our 
reception of the scene is coloured by its narrative delivery. We may read it with a shocked 
laugh and a grimace at its randomness and awfulness, but we do not judge and we are not 
moved to a position of outrage or disgust. Ellis forces us to feel and react as his characters 
do and not even our lack of affect is shocking, or even noticeable, at this point due to the 
playfulness of his poetics. His technique is delicate and insidious, but little by little he is 
chipping away at our usual reactions and preparing us for the explosions of extreme 
violence and pornography which will follow. 
 For all its flat, emotionless tone, lack of plot and characterisation, and alienating 
banality, the first section of the book does work to align us with Bateman. Compared to his 
friend Tim Price, who dominates the novel’s opening, Bateman is a model of decency. He 
corrects Price’s ignorant, anti-Semitic comments (35) and objects to his racist joke (37); 
during a discussion at Evelyn’s dinner party Bateman speaks of the need to ‘end 
apartheid…slow down the nuclear arms race, stop terrorism and world hunger…find a cure 
for the AIDS epidemic, [and] clean up environmental damage from toxic waste and 
pollution’ (14) – laudable aims, all. Although, as Young points out (97), the points he 
makes are so at odds with each other (‘We have, he says, to slow down the nuclear arms 
race and ensure a strong national defense, prevent the spread of communism and prevent 
US military involvement overseas’ (ibid., original emphasis)) that the speech as a whole is 
rendered absurd, to my mind this does not affect our acceptance of the character. In fact, 
our acknowledgement of his fallibility actually serves to heighten our enjoyment of the 
text. The conflicting issues that Bateman raises are difficult to reconcile; the reader doesn’t 
have the answers, neither did contemporary governments. Bateman expresses our own 
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quandaries and the quandaries of his time, and in doing so he becomes everyman. Coming 
from a label-obsessed yuppie serial killer, Bateman’s final flourish is highly ironic and 
amusing: ‘Most importantly we have to promote general social concern and less 
materialism in young people’ (15). Our initial approval of his humanitarian agenda (who 
could argue with a desire to end famine?) creates feelings of empathy which are not eroded 
when we recognise his comments as unthought-out, media-gleaned sound bites, as the 
feelings of benign superiority the realisation generates negate any negativity. Perhaps most 
importantly, Bateman is entertaining: the text’s dark humour is incentive enough for us to 
keep reading. 
 In later sections of the novel, humour will play an important role in our acceptance 
of the most grisly and disturbing scenes. However, our first encounter with the novel’s 
violence is far from funny and represents a severe test to our empathy. When Bateman first 
approaches Al, a middle-aged homeless man, he speaks gently to him, seemingly showing 
concern for his plight. His tone initially makes one wonder whether Evelyn is right and 
‘the boy next door’ does indeed have some kindness in him. However, when he launches 
his attack any empathy we may feel towards Bateman is suspended in appalled disbelief 
as, even though the tension has been rising for more than two pages and the clues were all 
there, the attack still comes as a shock. The initial blow is described in the same careful, 
gentle, almost loving tones as Bateman’s solicitous words to Al and this adds to the horror 
we feel at the violence of the attack: 
I reach out and touch his face gently once more with compassion and 
whisper, “Do you know what a fucking loser you are?” He starts nodding 
helplessly and I pull out a long, thin knife with a serrated edge and, being 
very careful not to kill him, push maybe half an inch of the blade into his 
right eye, flicking the handle up, instantly popping the retina. (126) 
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The violence that Bateman inflicts on the defenceless Al is extremely graphic and difficult 
to read; but after the torpor of the previous 125 pages the reader pushes through his or her 
resistance to the content, relieved to finally have reached something approaching action. 
What is particularly interesting about this scene is the way that Ellis’s poetics twist our 
emotional response to the violence: the disgust we experience as we read is targeted not 
just at Bateman, but also at the victim and at ourselves. Cassuto argues that ‘identification 
is naturally predicated on sympathy. The opposite of sympathy is disgust: a refusal of 
identification that involves making someone or something as taboo, polluted, not to be 
touched’ (257). I differ from Cassuto slightly here, as I believe that identification is based 
on empathy (feeling with characters) rather than sympathy (feeling for characters); 
however his wider point is sound. We neither sympathise nor empathise with Bateman’s 
hatred of homeless people, or with his need to commit horrific acts of brutality. We are 
disgusted by the expression of his murderous urges, particularly given close descriptions of 
Al’s split eyeball pouring out ‘like red, veiny egg yolk’ (126) and ‘oozing over his 
screaming lips in thick, webby strands’ (127). However, any sympathy we may initially 
feel for Al is soon overridden by feelings of disgust, brought about by descriptions of his 
‘flabby black thighs, rashed because of his constantly urinating into the pantsuit’ (126) and 
‘the ‘stench of shit [which] rises quickly’ (ibid.) when Bateman pulls down Al’s pants 
revealing a ‘dense matted patch of pubic hair’ (ibid.). Al’s incontinence recruits our 
senses, the sight and (described) smell of the urine and faeces repulsing us and identifying 
him as the ‘polluted, not to be touched’ person that Cassuto mentions. Classifying him as 
such temporarily aligns us with Bateman’s abhorrent view of the wretched homeless 
(literal manifestations of Les Misérables, which is granted so much narrative space in the 
novel) who line Manhattan’s streets and the realisation of this is disgusting to us too. 
Bateman humiliates and degrades Al, first by speaking to him in a disrespectful way (Al is 
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old enough to be Bateman’s father) and then by debagging him in the street. By means of a 
complex psychical process, skilfully manipulated by Ellis, readerly disgust then becomes 
focused on Al and his victimhood. William Ian Miller explains: 
Cruelty generates a double disgust in the impartial spectator, that is, once 
we recover from the shock it can give. First, the perpetrator is looked on 
with fear and loathing, with the most intense kind of disgust and horror. 
Then a second disgust focuses on the degraded victim, whether bloody and 
disfigured or morally annihilated in the disgrace of having been so abused. 
(195-196) 
Witnessing Al’s shame disgusts us; the emotion is generated both by his failure of agency 
– for his allowing this to happen to him – and by our own part in the proceedings. As 
Cassuto says, a surfeit of disgust prevents the reader from identifying with the victim and 
results in a kind of ‘moral paralysis’ (258). Our failure to identify with Al or to supply an 
appropriate moral response to his disfigurement is also the source of feelings of disgust 
which, according to Miller, ‘involves an admission that we did not escape contamination’ 
(204). We are unable to identify with Al due to the influence of Ellis’s poetics and the lack 
of access that we get to Al’s psyche, and in this we mirror Bateman. After the attack 
Bateman feels ‘heady, ravenous, pumped up, as if I’d just worked out and endorphins are 
flooding my nervous system, or just embraced that first line of cocaine, inhaled the first 
puff of a fine cigar, sipped that first glass of Cristal’ (127); his adrenaline referencing our 
own ‘fight or flight’ response to the passage. Looking for somewhere to have a 
‘celebratory drink’ (ibid.), Bateman eschews his usual upper class haunts and decides 
instead to visit ‘somewhere Al would go, the McDonald’s in Union Square’ (ibid.). He 
orders a shake and takes it ‘to a table up front, where Al would probably sit’ (ibid.) but his 
‘high slowly dissolves, its intensity diminishing’ (ibid.). The ebbing of adrenaline and the 
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‘horribly anticlimactic’ (ibid.) evening mirror our experience. We read the grotesque 
details of Al’s maiming with horrified fascination, hardly able to believe what we were 
being exposed to, but afterwards we feel soiled, like we’ve let ourselves down.  
The tension between repulsion and attraction is something which the novel raises on 
numerous occasions, forcing the reader to meditate on what it means to empathise with 
serial killers and engage with such salacious, challenging material. Significantly, the 
vehicle most commonly used for this in the narrative is The Patty Winters Show, a chat 
show as heavily invested in trauma as Bateman is. Topics for the shows include 
‘Concentration Camp Survivors’ (212) and ‘Teenage Girls Who Trade Sex for Crack’ 
(173); the mixture of banal daytime TV and trauma served up as entertainment mirrors our 
own consumption of murder and disfigurement via the novel. Our mixed response to 
Bateman’s deeds is particularly well illustrated by the following episode: 
The Patty Winters Show this morning was about Nazis and, inexplicably, I got a 
real charge out of watching it. Though I wasn’t exactly charmed by their deeds, 
I didn’t find them unsympathetic either, nor I might add did most of the 
members of the audience. One of the Nazis, in a rare display of humor, even 
juggled grapefruits and, delighted, I sat up in bed and clapped. (150) 
The juggling display transforms the Nazi into a clown, performing for our amusement – 
just like fictional killers in popular literature and film. By specifying Nazis rather than neo-
Nazis, Ellis conjures a mental picture of men in SS uniforms, which, combined with the 
juggling, creates an anachronistic and amusing image. There is a carnival atmosphere here, 
which sets the tone for much of the violence that will follow and seems to be a deliberate 
attempt by Ellis to ensure that the disgust the reader felt at the attack on Al doesn’t affect 
her or his reception of future scenes of murder. By destabilising subject positions in this 
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way Ellis is able to better control our response to the text and ensure that we push through 
the unpleasure of reading the more horrific details. 
A great many of Bateman’s attacks are predicated on homophobia; Al was maimed and 
called a ‘faggot’ (126) shortly after Bateman was whistled at by a gay man, and a few 
pages later he ‘began to receive fey cat-calls from aging overmuscled beachboys with 
walruslike mustaches’ (134) after watching a Gay Pride Parade ‘with a certain traumatized 
fascination’ (ibid.). In both instances, Bateman feels it necessary to reassert his masculinity 
by carrying out acts of extreme violence. The ‘traumatized fascination’ felt by Bateman at 
Pride provides a good parallel for the reader’s reception of the novel’s escalating violence, 
as in the following passage, which details a random attack on a gay man and his trophy 
dog: 
I push the serrated blade into its stomach and quickly slice open its hairless 
belly in a squirt of brown blood, its legs kicking and clawing at me, then blue 
and red intestines bulge out and I drop the dog onto the sidewalk, the queer just 
standing there, still gripping the leash, and this has all happened so fast he’s in 
shock and he just stares in horror saying “oh my god oh my god” as the sharpei 
drags itself around in a circle, its tail wagging, squealing, and it starts licking 
and sniffing the pile of its own intestines, spilled out in a mound on the 
sidewalk, some still attached to its stomach, and as it goes into its death throes 
still attached to its leash I whirl around on its owner and I push him back, hard, 
with a bloodied glove and start randomly stabbing him in the face and head, 
finally slashing his throat open in two brief chopping motions; an arc of red-
brown blood splatters the white BMW 320i parked at the curb, setting off its 
car alarm, four fountainlike bursts coming from below his chin. The spraylike 
sound of the blood. (159) 
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The shifts in register here are rapid and powerful, yet so subtly rendered as to be barely 
discernible. The unexpected attack on the dog is shocking to the extreme, its ‘hairless 
belly’ underlining its innocence and harmlessness. Unlike the attack on Al, the knifing of 
the dog does not render it abject or disgusting; it cannot be degraded by its victimhood as it 
shares what Miller describes as ‘the peculiar status we accord to infants and children for 
whom the demands of dignity are largely suspended’ (196). The pathetic image of the 
bewildered animal dragging itself round in a circle, still wagging its tail, elicits a great deal 
of sympathy before the scene descends into gross-out humour as it sniffs and licks its 
spilled intestines. This helps to offset some of the horror of the scene and also references 
the rhythms of the splatter movie cycle of the 1980s. In his book, Laughing Screaming 
(1994), William Paul explains that ‘[t]he alliance between the grossest horror and farcical 
comedy is far from new. The Grand Guignol, for example, generally alternated its buckets-
of-blood horror playlets with broad farces’ (67). Switching between the two modes often 
meant that audiences were uncertain how to react; however, as Eric Bentley points out, the 
significance of this ‘lies not in the materials themselves but only in interpretation’ (341). 
Here, the technique provides light relief from the repulsiveness of the scene, before 
plunging the reader back into outright horror when Bateman attacks the man. It also 
signals the unstable boundaries of literary and filmic categories and, by extension, of 
sanity, culture and reality itself. ‘The spraylike sound of the blood’ sounds and looks like a 
note or stage direction in a film script; indeed, the whole of this scene is very filmic. Its 
unreality seems to function as evidence of Bateman’s mental collapse and an indication 
that the killings are not real, but imagined. This collapsing of real and unreal invokes 
Freud’s view that ‘an uncanny effect often arises when the boundary between fantasy and 
reality is blurred’ (Uncanny 150), further undermining the reader’s equilibrium and 
thereby aligning her or him more closely with Bateman’s mental state, albeit unwillingly. 
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The abjection of the scene is alleviated by an absurd shift to D’Agostino’s, which he 
appears in front of ‘like in a movie’ (ibid.). There he uses an expired coupon to purchase a 
box of oat-bran cereal and walks jubilantly out of the store stuffing handfuls of cereal into 
his mouth and whistling ‘Hip to be Square’ (ibid.), the scene’s surreal coda simultaneously 
confusing and delighting the reader who is trying to make sense of the assault on his or her 
senses that has just occurred.  
Violence and humour are increasingly linked as the narrative progresses, with the 
carnival atmosphere causing us to race through the tedious scenes of consumerism and 
banal conversation with an avidity approaching blood-lust. The opportunistic killing of a 
passing Oriental delivery boy, enacted as revenge for the rumoured purchase of Nell’s and 
The Empire State Building by the Japanese, is emotionless, shocking and distasteful, 
suspending any empathy the reader may have for Bateman. However, the dumping of the 
food which leads to the discovery that he has killed ‘the wrong kind of Asian’ (173) is 
surprising and absurdly funny. By counteracting our distaste at the killing, Ellis is able to 
keep the reader engaged and on-side, and ensures that we continue to invest in his killer. 
Immediately after the murder and Bateman’s hilariously inadequate and unexpected 
mumbled apology (‘Uh, sorry’ (ibid.)), comes a line describing that morning’s Patty 
Winters topic, the casual linkage of the two suggesting that the murder and the show are 
equally banal.  
Interspersed with the violence are scenes depicting Bateman’s accelerating mania and 
whilst these are generally fast-paced and engaging, they also have a role in aligning the 
reader empathetically with the killer. Whilst doing his Christmas shopping in 
Bloomingdales, ‘[s]ome kind of existential chasm (172)’ opens before Bateman and it is so 
profound an experience that not even three Halcion and the purchase of six tubes of 
Clinique shaving cream can restore his equilibrium. When he muses that his feelings of 
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emptiness could be related to his poor treatment of Evelyn or ‘have something to do with 
the tracking device on [his] VCR’ (ibid.), we speculate that these are the ravings of a 
paranoid madman who believes his home to be bugged and thinks that electronic 
equipment is interfering with his brainwaves. However, Ellis then confounds the reader by 
having Bateman add ‘I…remind myself to look through my VCR handbook and deal with 
the tracking device problem’ (ibid.); the realisation that the issue is one of syntax rather 
than insanity makes us feel that we are the paranoid ones. By extending the uncertainty of 
the text to the reader, Ellis’s poetics make us merge a little further with his killer. Our 
realisation that Ellis is playing with us causes us to question everything about the text and, 
as we share the confusion and suspicion that Bateman feels, we are drawn ever closer to 
the psychopath. 
 This subtle merging of Bateman and reader continues as the narrative progresses 
and, like Bateman, we feel the vicissitudes of mood and perception. The murder of Paul 
Owen is relayed without emotion, with a detached inevitability. Bateman, who has taken 
two five milligram Valium tablets, ‘washing them down with a tumblerful of Plax’ (208), 
is feeling mellow and commits the murder with a kind of apathetic serenity. The murder is 
brutal and the violence has ratcheted once more, yet we can read it unflinchingly, 
distanced by Ellis’s poetics. We are not ‘with’ Bateman, but we’re not on Paul’s side either 
– just passionless observers. It’s like we’ve taken Valium too.  
Blood starts to slowly pour out of the sides of his mouth shortly after the 
first chop, and when I pull the ax out – almost yanking Owen out of his 
chair by his head – and strike him again in the face, splitting it open, his 
arms flailing at nothing, blood sprays out in twin brownish geysers, staining 
my raincoat. This is accompanied by a horrible momentary hissing noise 
actually coming from the wounds in Paul’s skull, places where bone and 
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flesh no longer connect, and this is followed by a rude farting noise caused 
by a section of his brain, which due to pressure forces itself out, pink and 
glistening, through the wounds in his face. He falls to the floor in agony, his 
face just gray and bloody, except for one of his eyes, which is blinking 
uncontrollably; his mouth is a twisted red-pink jumble of teeth and meat 
and jawbone, his tongue hangs out of an open gash on the side of his cheek, 
connected only by what looks like a thick purple string. (ibid.) 
The graphic detail is made more horrible by a sense of verisimilitude; this is not the bright 
red blood of horror movies, it is brown, real-looking. The sounds and sights of the killing 
appear to be told from experience, not fantasy; this all feels horribly real. All the more 
disturbing, then, that we are not more moved, outraged or disgusted by what we are 
‘seeing’. The disgust and amusement of earlier sections are missing, casualties of the drip-
drip-drip of sensory overload and desensitisation. Like Bateman we are becoming blank 
and affectless and if we even notice, we don’t really care.  
Yet Ellis cannot let us rest. It is not enough that he has morphed us into pseudo 
Batemans; he must attack us again, our constantly shifting reception of the narrative, so 
expertly produced by Ellis’s poetics, ensuring that meaning is fluid and the reader is in a 
constant state of questioning flux. By the time of Bethany’s murder, the murder/violence 
has lost much of its carnival atmosphere. There are funny moments, but we don’t – can’t – 
laugh. It’s all too disgusting and distressing and we feel that things have gone too far. 
Forced to question our enjoyment of the novel, we must acknowledge that it has been 
sparked not just by Ellis’s virtuosic narrative technique, but also the grisly content. Having 
pushed us to the brink of acceptance or rejection, Ellis teases us again: ‘with a pair of 
scissors I start to cut off her dress and when I get to her chest I occasionally stab at her 
breast, accidentally (not really) slicing off one of her nipples through the bra’ (236). The 
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addition of ‘accidentally (not really)’ makes us consider who Bateman is addressing that 
he needs to phrase it this way. It’s playful, boyish, and demonstrates that Bateman is 
delivering his narrative to someone he trusts and who he needs to keep on-side. He’s keen 
not to alienate the reader which is ironic given that even as this happens Ellis is pushing us 
towards a rebuffal of our complicity in the narrative. Throughout the lengthy passage 
detailing Bethany’s suffering, Bateman refers to her simply as ‘she’ and ‘her’; his choice 
of language revealing the objectification and depersonalisation at play. During the torture 
she is reduced to mere body parts in Bateman’s consciousness, temporarily ceasing to be a 
person. It is not until the end of the paragraph that he uses her name mid-sentence; the fact 
that this occurs at a moment of humiliation is, of course, significant: ‘She starts screaming 
again once I’ve ripped her dress off, leaving Bethany in only her bra, its right cup 
darkened with blood, and her panties, which are soaked with urine, saving them for later’ 
(ibid.). The image of the urine-soaked underwear is abject and this abjection is grounded in 
her personhood – recognition of her humanity makes us remember our own. Bethany is 
humiliated, shamed, and that shames us too. We cannot enjoy this scene on any level. 
There is a moment of levity, but the scene is so grotesque it fails to lift the mood:  
I take advantage of her helpless state and, removing my gloves, force her mouth 
open and with the scissors cut out her tongue, which I pull easily from her mouth 
and hold in the palm of my hand, warm and still bleeding, seeming so much 
smaller than in her mouth, and throw it against the wall, where it sticks for a 
moment, leaving a stain, before falling to the floor with a tiny wet slap. (236)  
There is so much detail here about the tongue – its size, temperature, and resonance – that 
we feel complicit; we can almost feel it in our own hand, hear the sound it makes as it hits 
the floor. The reader is left thoroughly alienated and disgusted by this scene, much of 
which is too horrific to reproduce here. It is significant that Bethany is the most ‘fleshed 
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out’ of the all characters within the novel (and not just of Bateman’s victims): we have a 
greater sense of who she is and have received some biographical details. That she shares a 
history with Bateman makes her seem more real, as it aligns her with the controlling 
consciousness of the novel. Perhaps most crucially, she is nice. Bethany is not shallow and 
vacuous; she does not debase herself like the prostitutes, and the fact that she barely even 
drinks shows her to be decorous. This puts us in the uncomfortable position of having to 
muse whether she is therefore more ‘worthy’ than the other victims and thus undeserving 
of her fate. This notion is pushed to an extreme in the chapter ‘Killing a Child at the Zoo’, 
where the murder scene is unbearable and very difficult to read. Child-killing is one of the 
final taboos, an inexcusable act negating any possibility of identification or empathy with 
the killer. As usual, it is dispassionately narrated by Bateman, but this time the distance he 
puts between himself and the emotional and moral impact of his crime is not enough to 
buffer the reader too. It may enable us to read on but it is not enough for us to be unmoved 
by the crime. Our only reaction to this crime can be disgust and we note this with relief, as 
it creates a comfortable distance between ourselves and Bateman, who is revealed as an 
utter monster. Here, Ellis appears to be testing his readers, forcing us to distinguish 
between crimes against familiar victims such as prostitutes and bums, who in films and the 
media are often portrayed as deserving of their fate, and the innocent, against whom 
violence is never acceptable. This scene challenges the reader to search his or her 
conscience to determine where his or her moral compass sits, a process which inevitably 
highlights the anomalies of acceptance thrown up by our enjoyment of the earlier instances 
of violence in the novel. 
 These shakily defined boundaries are tested in the chapter ‘Girl’, where an 
unnamed woman is tortured with a rat. It is still a grisly, disgusting, abject read but some 
of the fun, the carnival, is back. It tempers the horror and saves the reader from being 
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completely alienated – we find that we can still enjoy Bateman’s dark humour, at least 
until the rat (dis)appears. Ellis assists this reversal in empathetic attachment by subtly 
referencing Hannibal Lecter, the psychopathic serial killer who until this point has enjoyed 
the most support and acceptance in popular culture. Like Lecter, Bateman appears as a 
gourmand and aesthete as he adds dobs of Dijon mustard to a woman’s brain as he 
cannibalises her in front of another terrified victim:  
I’m wearing a Joseph Abboud suit, a tie by Paul Stuart, shoes by J. Crew, a 
vest by someone Italian and I’m kneeling on the floor beside a corpse, 
eating the girl’s brain, gobbling it down, spreading Grey Poupon over 
hunks of the pink, fleshy meat. (315) 
It is interesting that the thing which appals the girl – Bateman’s lack of humanity – is the 
thing that most fascinates us, yet we don’t feel horror. When, later, he muses: ‘I can tell 
that it’s going to be a characteristically useless, senseless death, but then I’m used to the 
horror. It seems distilled, even now it fails to upset or bother me’ (316), we realise that this 
is our experience too yet even this doesn’t disturb us; as the scene descends into a splatter 
movie, it feels fake, filmic, unthreatening and, crucially, culturally acceptable. 
The investment in filmic language and imagery continues in what is perhaps the 
most revealing and enjoyable chapter of the book. ‘Chase, Manhattan’ starts fairly 
‘normally’ with a dinner with friends and a confession of misery that no one acknowledges 
– ‘Listen, guys, my life is a living hell’ (333) – before morphing into a Hollywood 
blockbuster. Bateman randomly shoots a busking saxophonist so that ‘a huge crimson ring 
appears behind his head’ (334) but is seen by police cruising nearby. He highjacks a taxi, 
shooting the driver, and is pursued by the squad car (335); the obligatory high-octane car 
chase follows, including a gunfight and, later, an exploding police car. Ellis’s inclusion of 
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every action movie cliché and convention underscores the fact that the narrative is serving 
up entertainment rather than purporting to represent experience. The willing suspension of 
disbelief is itself suspended as the metanarrative reminds us about the nature of our 
engagement with this material. This is Ellis’s poetics at their most powerful and overt, the 
simplicity of construction belying the complexity of their effect. The entire chapter 
consists of a single sentence, split into paragraphs which stream seamlessly one into the 
other. The parataxis and lack of full stops creates pace and urgency, causing us to read it 
breathlessly and raising our heart rate, an effect of narrative which aligns us with Bateman 
physically as well as mentally. 
At the end of the car chase, the narrative switch from first person to third suggests 
that Bateman’s mania is such that he is totally dissociated. This has the added effect of 
putting the reader in an outside position – we are no longer in Bateman’s head, looking 
through his eyes. We are spectators now and this makes the narrative experience feel 
constructed and unreal, like we are watching a film:  
…racing blindly down Greenwich I lose control entirely, the cab swerves 
into a Korean deli, next to a karaoke restaurant called Lotus Blossom I’ve 
been to with Japanese clients, the cab rolling over fruit stands, smashing 
through a wall of glass, the body of a cashier thudding across the hood, 
Patrick tries to put the cab into reverse but nothing happens, he staggers out 
of the cab, leaning against it, a nerve-wracking silence follows, “nice going, 
Bateman,” he mutters, limping out of the store, the body on the hood 
groaning in agony, Patrick with no idea where the cop running toward him 
across the street has come from, he’s yelling something into his walkie-
talkie, thinking Patrick is stunned, but Patrick surprises him by lunging out 
229 
 
before the cop can get to his gun and he knocks him over onto the 
sidewalk… (335-336) 
The reiteration of Patrick’s name (thirteen times in two paragraphs) has a dual function; 
we get a sense of Bateman trying to reinforce his sense of self, and also become aware of 
the separation between the character and the narrator, and of ourselves and the character. It 
seems that this is a daydream or fantasy – at one point we read that ‘Patrick keeps thinking 
there should be music’ (336), then  
guns flashing like in a movie and this makes Patrick realize he’s involved in 
an actual gunfight of sorts, that he’s trying to dodge bullets, that the dream 
threatens to break, is gone, that he’s not aiming carefully, just obliviously 
returning gunfire…’ (ibid.) 
As Bateman runs away, looking for a car to steal, he hopes to find ‘a black Range Rover 
with permanent four-wheel drive, an aircraft-grade aluminum body on a boxed steel 
chassis and a fuel-injected V8 engine’ (337), a specification which speaks not just to 
Bateman’s knowledge of stuff, but also to action movie conventions. The chapter ends with 
a rambling telephone confession, inevitably rejected as implausible, and some time-lapse 
cinematography ‘…the sun, a planet on fire, gradually rises over Manhattan, another 
sunrise, and soon the night turns into day so fast it’s like some kind of optical illusion…’ 
(339). As well as adding a much-needed dose of excitement to the text, this filmic 
unreality also assists the reader’s empathetic engagement with the psychopath. Our 
acceptance of the book’s most troubling sections suddenly becomes acceptable, as we can 
conclude that none of it happened anyway. However, whether it did or did not actually 
occur is irrelevant, as Young notes: 
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[w]e have still had to read all the detailed descriptions of the killings and 
the effect on us is exactly the same. Whether Patrick’s murders are fantasies 
or not, within fiction, they are all fictional. Thus we are forced by the author 
to confront the definition and function of fictionality itself. (116) 
Having negotiated some of the most disturbing material in contemporary literature and 
confronted the limits of readerly endurance, one must also address the allure of such 
fiction. The fact that it is fiction, and therefore restrained within the protective frame of the 
novel, is key to our relationship with it. The high stakes of the narrative can be safely 
enjoyed without danger or risk; the paradigm of fictional and factional crime narrative – 
i.e. the progression through the crime, apprehension, trial and punishment of the criminal – 
is disturbed in American Psycho and although it can be disconcerting to see this pattern 
broken, it is also thrilling. Furthermore, the novel speaks to the way in which we live our 
lives; the dissociation from other human beings, especially in urban environments, can be 
liberating but it can also leave us vulnerable and unsupported. The reader can identify with 
Bateman’s isolation, the facelessness of city life, the lack of interaction with neighbours 
and the absence of community. Our worst fears of senseless, random brutality, fed by a 
popular culture obsessed with serial killers, can be explored during the reading experience, 
the novel’s fictionality cushioning the reader from any ill effects. Yet even this is unsettled 
by American Psycho: its effects seem to linger long after the narrative has ended. Its very 
open-endedness, its resistance to closure, denies the reader a neat exit from the text. 
Ellis offers no explanation for his novel within the text itself, there is no symbolic 
function to the violence, it simply ‘is’. The pornography of death can have no real 
development, as Gorer notes (52). There remains only a process of degradation and 
constant one-upmanship; the desensitisation inherent to the medium leading to escalating 
sensationalism and depersonalisation. Having opened with the Dantean injunction 
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‘Abandon all hope ye who enter here’ (3), which establishes the diegesis as an inescapable 
hell, it is appropriate that the final words of the novel, ‘THIS IS NOT AN EXIT’ (384) 
should invoke Sartre. According to Sartrean existentialism, so infused with alienation and 
despair, man is entirely autonomous. Although exposed to the objectifying gaze of the 
other and the essentialisms the other will inevitably impose upon him, he remains isolated 
and alone. Separated from others, he is subject solely to his own will, independent from 
culture and law. ‘Existence precedes essence’ (13) therefore a person is free to identify his 
or her own understanding of existence and define his or her own identity. Yet Bateman, by 
his own admission, is ‘simply…not there…[His]self is fabricated, an aberration. [He is] a 
noncontingent human being’ (362, original emphasis). His self, like his narrative, defies 
classification. There are no absolute meanings, nor are there insights to be gleaned or 
lessons to be learned. When Bateman asks ‘Is evil something you are? Or is it something 
you do?’ (362), his question resonates both intra- and extradiegetically. We are sullied by 
our engagement with the book’s excesses, and by the pleasure we have taken in them, and 
confused by Ellis’s virtuosic handling of our empathetic engagement with the text. As 
readers, we are used to answers but not only are they are not forthcoming, Bateman 
teaches us that they are fleeting, contingent and meaningless. The only thing one can be 
certain of with American Psycho is its cultural impact. It is a niche text which became a 
cult classic; its relentless collapsing of categories between real and unreal, madness and 
sanity, good and evil, leading ultimately to the creation of the most normalised 
psychopathic character yet encountered: Dexter, the hero killer.  
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4.2 Jeff Lindsay’s Dexter: the Psycho as Hero 
After the twentieth century’s concentrated focus on fascinating, personable psychopaths, 
the new millennium heralded a further development: the heroic serial killer. Jeff Lindsay’s 
Dexter series, which comprises seven novels published between 2004 and 2013 and has 
sold around 1.7 million copies to date, has introduced one of popular culture’s most 
impactful psychopaths – a serial killing vigilante who cleans up Miami’s dark streets and 
enjoys the reader’s full support. Lindsay’s crime fiction creation was quickly picked up by 
US premium cable channel Showtime, with the first season of the series Dexter airing in 
2006 and a further seven seasons following until the series finale in 2013. Viewing figures 
were smashed with each successive season and the show has won a raft of awards, 
including Golden Globes and Emmys. Acceptance of the titular hero has reached such 
heights that the name ‘Dexter’ has soared in the baby name charts, enjoying a fourteenfold 
increase in popularity in England and Wales (www.names.darkgreener.com) between 2004 
and 2012, whilst in the United States it rocketed from the 874
th
 most popular boy’s name 
in 2005 to the 384
th
 in 2012 (www.babynamewizard.com). That parents are willing to 
name their offspring after a serial killer speaks volumes to how this figure has been taken 
to audiences’ hearts, but how can we account for this phenomenon? 
Lindsay’s character, Dexter Morgan, is the embodiment of Kristeva’s notion of the 
‘criminal with good conscience [...] the killer who claims he’s a saviour’ (4) yet he is 
neither an abject figure nor a monstrous other. Rather, he is portrayed as an improved 
version of us; clever, cool and effective, he is the ‘us’ we wish we could be. As Schmid 
observes, ‘Dexter represents a turning point in the willingness of Americans to embrace 
the serial killer as one of their own, as the personification of essentially American values’ 
(‘Devil You Know’ 132-133), a startling development when one contrasts this with the 
psychopath narratives examined at the beginning of this thesis. The Dexter novels are 
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written in the first person, a narrative strategy placing the reader close to the killer which 
one can trace back through Bret Easton Ellis, Jim Thompson and Horace McCoy. As 
Dexter’s actions are relayed from his own perspective, they meet no disapprobation in the 
text and Lindsay’s poetics ensure that there is little resistance from the accepting reader. 
Dexter’s commitment to dispatching those paedophiles and killers who prey on the 
vulnerable and whom the law cannot contain is positioned as a rational response to a cruel 
and perplexing modernity. Ironically, this vigilante is also a functionary of legitimate law 
enforcement, via his work as a blood spatter technician for Miami-Dade Police 
Department. The tension between his opposing roles – heroic avenger on the one hand, 
psychopathic predator on the other – creates a moral ambivalence which should be difficult 
for the reader to negotiate, yet Lindsay’s poetics ensure that the reader’s responses are 
manipulated in such a way that identification with Dexter is rarely threatened. Indeed, 
Lindsay’s scheme is laid bare in Dexter’s very name: deriving from the Latin for right, the 
name means ‘right-handed’, ‘favourable’ or ‘auspicious’ (Pickering 84). Pertinently, given 
Dexter’s own repeated references to himself as ‘Dashing Dexter’, ‘Dauntless Dexter’, and 
so on, the name is also associated with heraldry. The heraldic escutcheon, or family shield, 
is typically split into two halves; dexter, to the bearer’s right, is the position of honour, and 
its opposite side, sinister, is to the bearer’s left. In Western culture right and left carry 
associations with good and evil, a division highlighted here by our understanding of the 
word ‘sinister’ as being ‘suggestive of evil; looking malignant or villainous’, ‘wicked or 
criminal’ or ‘of evil omen’ (OED). It is interesting to note that the bearer’s right and the 
viewer’s right are transposed; from the viewer’s perspective, dexter appears on the left – 
the side of the devil – so again the reader is faced with a multivalent perspective of right 
and wrong, good and evil. Dexter’s references to himself as ‘Dashing Dexter’ and 
‘Dauntless Dexter’ evoke images of valiant knights slaying monstrous dragons and create 
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a slew of dialogic meanings which imbue him with subconscious positive associations. 
Allusion to the family shield also hints at the police badges carried by the Morgan family: 
Dexter, as I have noted, works in the forensics department of Miami PD, and his foster 
sister, Deborah, is a cop. They have both followed in the footsteps of the late Harry 
Morgan, Deborah’s father and Dexter’s foster father, who was a highly respected 
detective. In the first novel, Darkly Dreaming Dexter (2004), Dexter notes how he and 
Deb are ‘so very different, and yet still both Harry’s kids, the two strange fists of his 
unique legacy’ (225). This legacy is the basis of the reader’s acceptance of Dexter’s extra-
legal ‘justice’ work; the (mostly) night-time killings which make the character unique and 
compelling. 
Harry took Dexter into his family aged three, after Dexter’s mother, who worked 
for Harry as a police informant, was brutally slain by a drugs gang. Having witnessed his 
mother’s murder, Dexter was left sitting in a pool of her blood in a dark shipping container 
for two and a half days until he was discovered and rescued by Harry (Darkly Dreaming 
263). Although Dexter repressed the memory, and has no knowledge of it until it surfaces 
again in adulthood, the trauma of the event has a profound psychological impact on him. 
As he grows up, he finds himself unable to feel or express emotion, or interact socially. 
More significantly, Dexter is increasingly influenced by the internal ‘other’ that he refers 
to as his Dark Passenger, a primal force with an insatiable appetite for murder that drives 
Dexter to ‘experiment’ on the neighbourhood pets.  
Unable to get his son ‘straightened out’ (Darkly Dreaming 40) and terrified of what 
will happen when he inevitably graduates to killing humans, Harry develops a code for 
Dexter to live by, which will help him to channel his impulses into only killing those 
deserving of their fate, and to avoid arrest by being careful and forensically aware. The 
Code supplies the novels’ moral framework and positions Dexter as a force for good, 
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rather than a figure of evil. Importantly, it also absolves the reader of any guilt s/he may 
(or should) feel at enjoying representations of violence and engaging with a serial killer, 
thereby reducing cognitive dissonance. The Code of Harry, which posits Dexter’s killings 
as being for the good of society, is consonant with the ideas being explored; dissonance is 
reduced when we accept that leaving Code-less killers and predatory paedophiles free to 
prey on the vulnerable is far worse than condoning their dispatch by Dexter. Reducing 
dissonance in this way makes Dexter more sympathetic and underscores the righteousness 
of his rhetoric, thereby validating the reader’s decision to accept it. Lindsay’s poetics also 
help to reduce the dissonance created by guiding the reader to the appropriate position of 
identification and creating a complicity that draws the reader closer to the killer. In Dearly 
Devoted Dexter (2005), the second novel in the series, Dexter muses that 
…I could have been much worse. I could have been a vicious raving 
monster who killed and killed and left towers of rotting flesh in my wake. 
Instead, here I was on the side of truth, justice, and the American way. Still 
a monster, of course, but I cleaned up nicely afterward, and I was OUR 
monster, dressed in red, white, and blue 100 percent synthetic virtue. (4) 
In just 67 words, Lindsay manages to draw a contrast between his neat and principled 
killer and the insatiable ‘vicious raving monster[s]’ that he preys upon, whilst positioning 
Dexter as a Superman-inspired avatar of integrity, whose actions uphold the cherished 
dominant fictions and supporting structures of American society. The reference to the Stars 
and Stripes infers that accepting Dexter is both patriotic and desirable, whilst describing 
Dexter as ‘OUR monster’ simultaneously makes our support of him both personal and 
communal. Despite this, the ambivalence which colours the reader’s engagement with 
Dexter remains. His boast that he is a monster who cleans up ‘nicely afterward’ does little 
to recommend him, and the careful reader is warned to be mindful that the ‘virtue’ s/he 
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bases her or his identification on is ‘100 percent synthetic’. Lindsay’s ironic humour 
ensures that the reader is constantly reminded of the psychic struggle to reconcile the 
tension between the accepted morality of mainstream society and the morality of Lindsay’s 
novels. 
The juxtaposition of Dexter and his victims is Lindsay’s chief means of reducing 
dissonance and ensuring the reader’s identification with his vigilante killer. Five of the 
seven novels contain paedophiles and child killers whose crimes are so heinous and 
indefensible that it is impossible to be sympathetic towards them. Their child victims are, 
of course, utterly blameless; unlike with Dexter’s victims, there is no grey area or 
mitigating circumstance where it could be argued that the children brought their fates upon 
themselves.
35
 Lindsay underlines this point by regularly emphasising Dexter’s own 
relationship with children as one of honour and compassion. Although Dexter ‘genuinely 
wouldn’t care if every other human in the universe were suddenly to expire’ (Darkly 
Dreaming 54), he likes and respects children and abhors those who present a threat to 
them: ‘for some reason I care about kids. And when I find someone who preys on children 
it is very much as if they have slipped the dark Maître d’ twenty dollars to move to the 
front of the line’ (Dearly Devoted 10). This characteristic helps to draw a stark distinction 
between serial killing Dexter and those killers that he kills, a distinction which ensures that 
the reader’s empathetic acceptance of Dexter is not threatened by his crimes.  
In Darkly Dreaming Dexter, Lindsay goes to great lengths to establish the 
deservedness of Dexter’s victims; the novel opens with a 12-page section detailing 
Dexter’s capture and kill of Father Donovan, a paedophile priest responsible for the 
murder of at least seven orphans. The first page of the novel, however, focuses on Dexter 
                                                          
35
 There are echoes here of the chapter entitled ‘Killing a Child at the Zoo’ in Ellis’s American Psycho, 
where the reader is forced to confront his or her prejudices against the relative deservedness of various 
victim groups. I address the issues raised on page 226 of this thesis. 
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and the ‘Need’ (1) which drives him to kill. It is described in playful, beguiling language 
intended to draw the reader in; his or her eagerness to read on mirroring Dexter’s 
eagerness to sate his homicidal hunger:  
Oh, the symphonic shriek of the thousand hiding voices, the cry of the Need 
inside, the entity, the silent watcher, the cold quiet thing, the one that 
laughs, the Moondancer. The me that was not me, the thing that mocked 
and laughed and came calling with its hunger. With the Need. And the Need 
was very strong now, very careful cold coiled creeping crackly cocked and 
ready, very strong, very much ready now – and still it waited and watched, 
and it made me wait and watch. (ibid.) 
The passage draws on popular cultural tropes drawn from horror films and suspense 
novels
36
 to create an interesting combination of familiarity and the alien. The reader feels 
that s/he knows what is being described, yet what this actually is remains unspecified and 
mysterious. This creates a textual presence for something which both is and is not; for the 
shadow self of every person that we both acknowledge and deny. This sets up, on the very 
first page of the novel, the unsettling and seductive ambivalence upon which the novels are 
founded. It is significant that at this early stage Dexter does not mention the Code; the 
hook for the reader at this point is not the resolution of dissonance but the dissonance 
itself. Whilst stories of transgression have thrilled audiences for as long as there have been 
narratives, this first page also ensures that the reader knows that this monster is not just an 
out-of-control maniac, but a careful, diligent creature of reason and restraint. Dexter 
                                                          
36
 These influences are many and varied and carry with them heteroglot inferences and shades of meaning 
which impact upon the reader’s understanding of the events being relayed. In the passage cited above, one 
can feel the influence of Edgar Allan Poe’s short story, ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ (1843). This early psychopath 
narrative details a well-planned and vicious attack on a defenceless old man. Contemporary readers were 
expected to be horrified by the grisly tale; modern readers of Dexter, who recognise the intertextual 
reference, are confronted with the dissonance between that reaction and their own. Poe’s killer was 
ultimately undone by his own guilt, something Dexter is not troubled by. The contrast between the 
motivations and guilt reactions of the two killers is noteworthy and reveals a great deal about the acceptance 
and development of psychopathic characters in the last century and a half. 
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describes how he has ‘been waiting and watching the priest for five weeks now…For three 
weeks I had known he was it, he was next, we belonged to the Dark Passenger, he and I 
together’ (ibid.). The reader is reassured that the killing is justified and well-planned and, 
as the narrative continues and the issue of the Code is raised for the first time (2), we learn 
that it is not the fulfilment of a sadistic fantasy or sexual perversion but an act of cop-
sanctioned retribution. 
The first hint of actual violence, when Dexter captures Father Donovan in his 
noose, is shocking to the uninitiated reader; it is very fast after the long build-up, yet it is 
also restrained and relatively painless for both the victim and the reader: 
NOW. 
I sat up in his backseat and slipped the noose around his neck. One 
quick, slippery, pretty twist and the coil of fifty-pound-test fishing line 
settled tight. He made a small ratchet of panic and that was it. (4) 
Due to its homodiegetic narration, delivered from Dexter’s perspective, the novel does not 
focus on the thoughts, feelings or reactions of Dexter’s victims. We get fleeting, external 
observations, consonant with the psychopath’s view of events, which serve equally to 
shield us from the abjection of the assault and to empathetically align us with the 
perpetrator. However, Lindsay’s poetics ensure that the reader remains aware of the 
tension between their own moral standpoint and the skewed morality of the book. Dexter’s 
reference, in this novel, to his prey as ‘victims’ rather than the ‘playmates’ he refers to in 
later novels makes the narrative darker and more visceral, ratcheting the cognitive 
dissonance to titillating levels. Yet just as we feel ourselves growing uncomfortable with 
the scene, Lindsay tweaks us back to a position of complicity and identification with 
Dexter by ensuring that we realise the magnitude of Donovan’s crimes. As a man of the 
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cloth he should be an irreproachable paragon of love and morality, yet we learn that he has 
killed at least seven orphans. When we read that ‘[t]here were seven of them, seven small 
bodies, seven extra-dirty orphan children laid out on rubber shower sheets, which are 
neater and don’t leak’ (9), we feel empathy for the defenceless young children, living 
without the protection of loving parents, and horror at the abject ‘sight’ of their tiny 
corpses. Significantly, the reference to ‘leaks’ speaks of Dexter’s experience – we know 
that he has done this before and somehow that is reassuring. The reader’s acceptance of 
this small detail makes her or him complicit in Father Donovan’s murder as by condoning 
– or perhaps even mentally willing – the act as just punishment for Donovan’s crimes, s/he 
figuratively commits it too. The dissonance this creates is dissipated by the addition of an 
element consonant with our acceptance of Dexter’s actions – we learn that not only would 
Dexter never harm a child, he is also compelled to find and eliminate those who do: ‘I 
could never do this to children…Not like you, Father. Never kids. I have to find people 
like you’ (10). The novel’s repeated emphasis on the need to rid the world of those who 
prey on children satisfies the reader’s internal censor and also speaks to Dexter’s 
victimhood; acceptance is bought by shifting the focus from the aggression being meted 
out to the very human reasons behind it.  
Even as the narrative details Dexter’s aberrance, the reader is reminded of his 
mercy. The muscle relaxant he injects into Father Donovan makes the priest easier to 
dominate but it also fills him with ‘quick, clean calm’ (11). Furthermore, we appreciate the 
fact that Dexter’s actions are considered and reasoned. He takes his time, respecting the 
‘meat’ – ‘I had about eight hours before I had to be gone. I would need them all to do it 
right’ (12) – and this sense of ritual adds a weird civility to proceedings. Lindsay is careful 
to protect his readers from the abjection of the kill and his poetics shield us from the gore 
that horror films have taught us to expect; a simple ‘I went to work’ (12) signals what is 
240 
 
happening whilst preventing the narrative from descending into gratuitous, salacious 
violence. Most significantly, Dexter’s victims usually invite their fate verbally as well as 
by the heinousness of their crimes. Father Donovan thanks Dexter as he ‘works’ on him, 
sanctioning the kill, and the knowledge of his impending fate seems to bring him peace: 
‘What?’ I said. I moved my head a little closer. ‘I can’t hear you.’ 
I heard him breathe, a slow and peaceful breath, and then he said it 
again before his eyes closed. 
   ‘You’re welcome,’ I said, and I went to work. (12) 
Although, of course, one must be wary of trusting a first person narrator who also happens 
to be a serial murderer, the ‘peace’ that Father Donovan appears to feel suggests that 
Dexter is releasing him from the irresistible and diabolical forces which have driven his 
murders. This positions Dexter as a merciful provider of absolution and tranquillity, and 
there is a gentleness
37
 to the scene which undercuts its viscerality. Most significantly for 
the reader, when Father Donovan effectively sanctions his own murder he also sanctions 
our support for it, thereby ensuring that dissonance is reduced and our empathetic link with 
Dexter is maintained. Dissonance does remain, of course, and Dexter confronts it in a 
direct address to the reader:  
Killing makes me feel good. It works the knots out of darling Dexter’s dark 
schemata. It’s a sweet release, a necessary letting go of all the little 
hydraulic valves inside. I enjoy my work; sorry if that bothers you. Oh, very 
sorry, really. But there it is. And it’s not just any killing, of course. It has to 
be done the right way, at the right time, with the right partner – very 
complicated, but very necessary. (13) 
                                                          
37
 Of course, it is doubtful that Father Donovan perceives this gentleness. The reader’s impression of Dexter 
as merciful, righteous and tender is partly to do with the fact that s/he accesses the narrative via Dexter’s 
thought perceptions and partly due to the text’s poetics which aim to ensure the reader’s complicity and 
induce an empathetic response to the titular antihero. 
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This may seem an audacious, even dangerous move in terms of identification, but by 
addressing the reader directly Lindsay draws him or her into complicity.
38
 We are not 
reading a found document such as one might find in the Gothic, we are being told, 
personally, by a killer, about his nefarious exploits. Why it’s necessary remains ambiguous 
and the reader is left wondering whether it is necessary to relieve the ‘Need’ or to rid 
society of evil. This ambiguity runs throughout the novel and it is important; it mirrors our 
moral quandary as readers and creates the tension that makes the books interesting. 
The murder of Jamie Jaworski, a paedophile and thief, highlights this tension. In 
contrast to the almost-tender Father Donovan murder, the Jaworski kill is graphic and 
ghastly, with many alienating details. The murder is committed on impulse, with no 
planning, and Dexter is slow to get Jaworski to admit his guilt. However, when Dexter 
does finally prompt his victim to speak about his crimes – the sexually sadistic murders of 
runaway girls – the reader can accept the murder because of his remorselessness. 
Jaworski’s comment – ‘Five little beauties. I’m not sorry’ (141) – makes it clear that not 
only does he deserve his fate, but he will continue to kill unless Dexter stops him. Unlike 
the other novels in the series, Darkly Dreaming Dexter does expose the reader to some 
disturbing acts of Dexter-violence. It is nasty but quick and clean and, as it is relayed from 
Dexter’s point of view, the reader is not exposed to the physical pain that Jaworski must 
experience: 
‘No,’ we said, and sliced off his left ear. It was closest. The knife was sharp 
and for a moment he couldn’t believe it was happening to him, permanent 
and forever no left ear. So I dropped the ear on his chest to let him believe. 
                                                          
38
 There is also an interesting overlap of sex and murder in this quotation, which I will examine in greater 
detail on page 262-263. 
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His eyes got huge and he filled his lungs to scream, but I stuffed a wad of 
plastic wrap in his mouth just before he did. (138) 
There’s a chilling insouciance to the detail about the left ear being closest which should be 
alienating, yet the scene lacks some of the impact we might expect. The reason for this 
resides in the dialogic conflation of this scene and the most (in)famous ear-cutting scene in 
popular culture, when Michael Madsen, as Mr. Blonde in Reservoir Dogs (1992), deprives 
Marvin Nash, a police officer (played by Kirk Baltz) who he is holding hostage, of his 
right ear. Once this connection is made Dexter’s fictional act becomes more cognitively 
fictional; the willing suspension of disbelief is temporarily swept away as we link the act 
we are reading about to a scene from a film. Significantly, much of the power of the ear-
cutting scene in Reservoir Dogs resides in the dissonance between the visual image and the 
jaunty, enjoyable soundtrack, a fact which reminds Lindsay’s reader of the dissonance 
created between the abject act described in the text and our consumption of it as 
entertainment. Despite this, Lindsay takes a real risk in sharing so much graphic detail 
with the reader and there is an abandon here quite at odds with the measured, controlled 
kills the narrative has led us to expect. At this point in the novel, Dexter is much closer to 
his serial killer counterparts than he is to the reader and this has considerable implications 
for our empathetic response to him. Disturbed by a security guard, Dexter stops and 
contemplates his victim. The paragraph that follows is pure abjection: 
I stared down at the grubby little insect and felt myself fill with loathing. 
The thing was drooling snot and blood all together, the ugly wet slop 
burbling across his face. A trickle of awful red came from his mouth. In a 
quick fit of pique, I slashed across Jaworski’s throat. I immediately 
regretted my rashness. A fountain of horrible blood came out and the sight 
made it all seem even more regrettable, a messy mistake. Feeling unclean 
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and unsatisfied, I sprinted for the stairwell. A cold and petulant grumbling 
from my Dark Passenger followed me. (143) 
We are distanced from Dexter here – his actions and his disdain for his victim are too 
much for the reader to bear. There is no attempt to relieve the dissonance; no poetic sleight 
of hand to twist us back towards a position of identification. Although Dexter mentions 
regret, the reader is aware that this refers to Dexter’s impetuousness rather than remorse 
for his victim; it is the mess which Dexter deems to be a problem, not the morality of the 
act. The reader is forced to confront the ‘reality’ of serial killing and the reality is 
unpleasant and uncomfortable to read. So why include it? Is it to challenge the reader’s 
allegiance, to shake him or her out of complacent acceptance of a ‘hero’ killer? Is it to 
make the reader aware of what he or she is ‘involved in’? Or is it simply to show Dexter as 
human, fallible and therefore more like us? It is, in fact, all of these things, yet 
paradoxically this brush with abjection ultimately functions to strengthen our feelings for 
Dexter. His uncharacteristic loss of control indicates a psychological blip, a return to the 
trauma of his childhood. The acting out of extreme violence, this time with him in control 
as the aggressor, reminds the reader that Dexter is, in fact, a victim. This sanctions our 
acceptance of Dexter, reminding us that he was not born a monster but forged as one, by 
an unimaginable juvenile trauma.  
Acceptance also relies on our continued acknowledgement of the importance of 
Harry’s Code as the only means of dealing with characters such as Jaworski. The Code 
operates in the grey areas of the law, ensuring that those killers who evade conventional 
justice can be dealt with. Lindsay goes to great lengths to highlight the problems with the 
normative justice system, from the Lombrosan beat cops with low foreheads and even 
lower intelligence, to the career detectives who prioritise politics over people’s lives – ‘the 
real threat to society was LaGuerta. She had called off the hounds, closed down the hue 
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and cry, sent people back to bed in a burning building’ (Darkly Dreaming 114) – and the 
corruption which means that those with money and influence can literally get away with 
murder: 
Joe’s money would get the charges reduced to hunting out of season, with a 
sentence of twenty hours’ community service. A bitter pill to swallow, 
perhaps, but that’s life in the service of that old whore Miami Justice, and 
we had certainly expected it. (Dexter is Delicious 348)  
The reader is left in no doubt that Dexter’s brand of justice is vitally necessary and without 
it society, particularly children, would not be safe. Despite these assurances, a level of 
dissonance remains constant throughout the novel series.  
 Although it is uncomfortable to experience cognitive dissonance, Jacovina et al. tell 
us that it ‘is accompanied by a strong state of arousal...[which] within the context of a 
narrative...may actually be pleasurable’ (240). Furthermore, ‘[w]hen people read for 
entertainment, higher levels of arousal are related to higher levels of enjoyment’ (241). 
The ‘arousal’ stimulated by dissonance, and its conflation of pleasure and pain, leads to 
sensations of jouissance. In general usage jouissance refers to pleasure, but for Lacan it is 
a way of referring to anything which is too much for the subject to bear. Suffering is a key 
component of jouissance, emanating from the subject’s compulsive drive to go beyond the 
pleasure principle in search of ever greater levels of enjoyment and, as Dylan Evans 
observes, ‘jouissance thus nicely expresses the paradoxical satisfaction that the subject 
derives from his symptom, or, to put it another way, the suffering that he derives from his 
own satisfaction’ (92). The jouissance experienced by the reader of psychopath fiction 
stems from the decision to transgress the societal taboo surrounding murder and enjoy 
depictions of killers and killings. Cognitive dissonance arises when the reader’s acceptance 
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of Dexter clashes with his or her real-world conviction that murder is wrong but this is 
mitigated by the introduction of consonant elements such as the Code of Harry or the 
deservedness of Dexter’s victims, which ensure that the reader may continue to enjoy the 
heightened state of arousal this ambivalence creates whilst protecting against psychic 
injury. 
In his Seminar 17, Lacan also refers to jouissance as ‘the path toward death [...] a 
discourse about masochism’ (18) – fitting when considered alongside our ambivalent 
relationship with modernity’s favourite fictional serial killer. The dissonance created by 
the reader’s acceptance of Dexter results in what Freud termed ‘moral masochism’, as the 
reasoning, law-abiding ego comes under attack from the aggressive and sadistic superego. 
Significantly, this ‘turning back of sadism against the self regularly occurs where a 
cultural suppression of the instincts holds back a large part of the subject’s destructive 
instinctual components from being exercised in life’ (‘The Economic Problem of 
Masochism’ 170). In denying our own sadistic urges and vicariously enjoying Dexter’s 
instead, we are subconsciously turning these urges against ourselves. Such masochistic 
behaviour ratchets instinctual tension up to titillating levels so we may embrace the 
pleasure/pain of the resultant jouissance. For the reader or viewer of transgressive texts 
such as Dexter, the masochism lies in the dissonance created by identification with 
Dexter’s Dark Passenger. Although hopefully none of Lindsay’s readers wish to slaughter 
other human beings, the struggle between the light and dark sides of the self is common to 
all. Vicarious enjoyment of the dark doings of Dexter’s unleashed id represents a 
seemingly risk-free way of exercising one’s own Dark Passenger, with the mediating 
frames of the novel and TV screen allowing the reader to distance his-or herself from the 
conscious and subconscious drives being explored. Yet the process is not without its 
hazards. Moral masochism destroys moral consciousness, eroding our sense of right and 
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wrong and making it easier for us to accept characters like Dexter. The jouissance we feel 
as the process plays out arises from the experience of enduring punishment and pain 
simultaneously with pleasure. This moral masochism alleviates the guilt we feel at 
enjoying representations of violence, helping us to disavow our own dark selves and deny 
our complicity in Dexter’s actions. Taking pleasure from transgression in this way also 
offers reassurance to the beleaguered modern reader or viewer. Like Dexter, we too can 
feel adrift and alienated in a bewildering, fast-paced and aggressive modernity that at times 
seems to be spinning out of control. Our consumption of texts such as Dexter suggests 
transgression as a means of reinscribing the dominant social order. The masochistic 
pleasure we take from engaging with Dexter fetishises our submissive role in society, 
thereby reinforcing the moral interdictions that suppress our destructive instincts. 
However, Jung warns that 
[w]e must beware of thinking of good and evil as absolute opposites. The 
criterion of ethical action can no longer exist in the simple view that good 
has the force of a categorical imperative, while so-called evil can resolutely 
be shunned. Recognition of the reality of evil necessarily relativizes the 
good, and the evil likewise, converting both into halves of a paradoxical 
whole. (‘The Problem of Evil Today’ 171) 
By drawing attention to the relativity of the binary positions of good and evil, Jung warns 
of their shifting and contingent nature. This is not to say, of course, that these categories 
cease to have any resonance or meaning, rather that ethical judgement is based on the 
specifics of a given situation. This appears to recognise the validity of solutions such as 
Harry’s, yet Jung also warns of the psychic consequences of engaging in such activity: 
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Moral judgment is always present and carries with it characteristic 
psychological consequences…moral evaluation is always founded upon the 
apparent certitudes of a moral code which pretends to know precisely what 
is good and what evil. But once we know how uncertain the foundation is, 
ethical decision becomes a subjective, creative act. (ibid.) 
The uncertainty of this foundation is explored several times in Lindsay’s novels. In the 
fourth book of the series, Dexter by Design (2009), Dexter makes a mistake and kills the 
wrong man. The reader’s empathy for Dexter, which is based upon an understanding of the 
righteousness of the kills, is severely threatened. The realisation that the killing was 
gratuitous and unjustified forces the reader to question his or her glib acceptance of 
Dexter’s status as Dark Avenger. When Dexter muses ‘I never pretended to have any real 
humanity, and I certainly didn’t tell myself that what I did was all right just because my 
playmates were cut from the same cloth’ (122), the reader is forced to question their own 
understanding of Dexter’s actions. Dissonance has been reduced by attributing the killings 
to alternative justice and the Code of Harry, but the wrongful killing of Doncevic forces 
the reader to consider whether he or she does actually think that vigilante slayings are ‘all 
right’, really. Ironically, this is the first murder that Dexter has committed for something 
other than his selfish need to dice and chop: ‘…I had done this one for her [Deb], as much 
as anything else – the first time I had ever acted out of noble impulses, and it had turned 
out very badly. My sister made a really poor Dark Passenger’ (123). The inference is that 
Dexter does not consider the other kills to have been ‘noble’, as we have done. Notably, 
the key problem here is not with the ‘Code killings’ but with Dexter’s interpretation of 
nobility. The reader is able to draw a distinction between revenge (Doncevic) and 
retribution (Father Donovan, Jaworski) which absolves him or her of any moral 
accountability and reasserts the righteousness of the moral decisions taken. 
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 The uncertainty and mutability of moral evaluation is laid bare in book six of the 
series, Double Dexter (2011) when a member of the public witnesses Dexter 
dismembering ‘Puffalump’, a paedophile clown. Puffalump preys on young illegal 
immigrants and has graduated from sexual offences to murder. He was twice arrested and 
released for lack of evidence, and his subsequent crimes often went unreported due to the 
unofficial status of his victims’ families. Dexter is therefore addressing a social justice 
issue as well as a moral and criminal one, and he enjoys the reader’s full support for his 
actions. However, Bernie Elan, who saw Dexter at work, is not party to the information 
that the reader has access to and he reads the scene in a totally different way. He sees 
Dexter as a dangerous predator who must be stopped, thereby transposing Dexter and 
Puffalump via the apparent moral certitudes of the situation. Elan’s reading of the scene 
forces the reader – and Dexter – to question the righteousness of Dexter’s actions, 
especially when in his blog Elan outlines his plan to kill his ex-wife and frame Dexter for 
her murder. Elan claims that his murders are for the good of society:  
I was put here to deal with the rule breakers, the ones who have gone too 
far and can’t come back. You. My very-ex-wife. And who knows who else? 
There’s lots of ‘em. I see ‘em every day. 
 So in a way I am becoming like you, right? The big difference is, I 
do it to stop people like you. I do it for Good. (158, original emphasis) 
Here we see Dexter’s, and our, justification for murder being turned on its head by an 
opposing viewpoint and we are compelled to acknowledge both the fallibility of a Code 
like Harry’s and the inability of any one person to decide what is right and wrong. In 
forcing us to recognise the issues with a vigilante justice system, Lindsay reinscribes the 
hegemonic order. Yet, in order to preserve her or his engagement with a series of novels 
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that s/he has invested so much time and energy in, the reader is compelled to continue to 
support Dexter. This is made possible by Lindsay’s depiction of Elan, whose name, Dexter 
notes, references ‘zest, zeal, [and] panache’ (133), qualities quite at odds with his 
depressive, narcissistic and aggressive nature. Elan is also characterised as immoral, weak 
and undisciplined. He does not live by a moral code; his kills are messy, untargeted and 
unjustified and, perhaps most importantly, he does not recognise his own darkness. 
 Dexter, by contrast, is fully at ease with his Dark Passenger and his acceptance of 
its influence gives him a more nuanced view of right and wrong. In Jungian analysis, 
acknowledgement of one’s dark half is vital to psychic health and to ‘own one’s shadow is 
to become responsible for it, so that one’s morality is less blind and less compulsive, and 
ethical choices become possible’ (Stevens 67). Acknowledgement of the shadow, by both 
Dexter and the reader, therefore becomes an essential identificatory tool. As Anthony 
Stevens notes, Jung postulated that each individual consciousness is made up of a Self and 
a number of ‘archetypal components which play specific roles in the psychic development 
and social adjustment of everyone’ (61). These components enter the psyche as complexes 
during the course of development and although they manifest differently in every 
individual, they perform a universal function. Each person is composed of the same basic 
psychic elements, or archetypes, which include the ego, persona, shadow, anima and 
animus. The archetypes represent the various stages of the life drama played out in the 
Hero myth of identity formation and, according to Donald Kalsched and Alan Jones, they  
lead from an initial stage of unconsciousness before the ego has awakened, 
through various stages of heroic struggle, to a final state of “wholeness” or 
integration when life has reached its full potential…Jung called this process 
“individuation,” the process of becoming the true individual that one really 
is. (1) 
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This is significant when considered in relation to Dexter and his Dark Passenger. The 
Passenger is a manifestation of Dexter’s shadow which, as we have seen, is composed of 
the undesirable character traits which must be suppressed in society. Jung described the 
shadow as ‘the “negative” side of the personality, the sum of all those unpleasant qualities 
we like to hide, together with the insufficiently developed functions and the contents of the 
personal unconscious’ (‘On the Psychology of the Unconscious’ 66). Dexter’s shadow is 
separated entirely from his persona, which is the acceptable mask or façade that he shows 
to the world. Carefully honed with the help of Harry, Dexter’s persona is the jovial, clean-
living, crime-fighting self that he portrays in his interactions with the public, his colleagues 
at Miami PD and his girlfriend Rita; the construction of this persona betrays him as what 
Cleckley described as ‘a subtly constructed reflex machine that can mimic human 
personality perfectly’ (228). The use of Jungian archetypes functions as another 
identificatory device in Lindsay’s poetics as, according to Jung, the archetypes are ‘a 
psychic organ present in all of us’ (‘Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious’, qtd. in 
Segal 11). 
 The archetypal hero myth focuses on the trials and tribulations that beset the 
subject on the path to individuation. Its themes can be found in the stories of figures as 
disparate as Jesus and Luke Skywalker and this, too, makes it recognisable and accessible 
to the reader. This intertextuality brings with it dialogic shades of meaning that colour our 
expectations and reception of Lindsay’s narratives, thereby reducing the dissonance we 
experience when engaging with a character like Dexter. Kalsched and Jones describe the 
conventions of the myth thus: 
The birth of the hero usually occurs in humble surroundings such as a 
manger or cave, but it is always extraordinary in some way…Frequently, 
the hero has two fathers – his personal father and a “higher” father…The 
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hero…inherits a dual nature. He is a human being like everyone else, yet at 
the same time he feels himself to be an outsider, a stranger to the 
community. He does not fit in, and discovers within himself something that 
sets him apart, such as his prophetic powers, healing abilities, or creative 
powers. These lead him to extraordinary deeds. (3) 
Kalsched and Jones, writing in 1986, obviously did not have Dexter in mind when they 
composed this description; the fact that it fits his story perfectly demonstrates how closely 
Lindsay’s narrative aligns with the myth. The Dexter the reader knows was born when he 
witnessed his mother’s murder, in the humble surroundings of a dockside shipping 
container. This ‘birth in blood’ saw him develop a ‘dual nature’ which his foster father, 
frequently referred to as ‘Saint Harry’ throughout the novel series, tried hard to contain. 
The novels abound with Dexter’s descriptions of himself as monstrous and inhuman, and 
his ‘hobby’ can certainly be described as ‘extraordinary’. 
 Structurally, the novels generally see Dexter dispatching one or more carefully 
selected victim of his own choosing (very often a paedophile or child killer, as noted 
previously), before being pitted against an arch-villain who comes to his attention via his 
crime scene forensic work. Each story arc therefore offers a representation of the 
‘universal hero myth’, which according to Jung depicts ‘a powerful man or god-man who 
vanquishes evil in the form of dragons, serpents, monsters, demons, and enemies of all 
kinds, and who liberates his people from destruction and death’ (‘The Archetype in Dream 
Symbolism’ 95). Dexter’s relation to the universal hero myth strengthens the reader’s 
empathetic connection with the killer. The universality of the myth makes it applicable to 
everybody; Dexter can therefore be understood to be working on behalf of every reader. 
Furthermore, by likening his killer to the ‘god-man’ of myth, Lindsay elevates him to 
suprahuman status. No longer subject to the societal restrictions and prohibitions 
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governing average citizens, Dexter is raised above ordinary morality. His extra-legal 
justice work consequently becomes acceptable, even desirable, and the reader’s support of 
it is similarly sanctioned. The arch-villains who oppose Dexter and dominate each of the 
novels in the series signify ‘the regressive forces of the unconscious which threaten to 
swallow the individuating ego’ (Kalsched and Jones 3). Through these battles ‘early 
infantile attachments must die and a more mature and productive life be born in their 
place’ (ibid.). For Dexter, this relates to his juvenile desire to save his mother and avenge 
her death by vanquishing those ‘bad men’ who prey on the vulnerable. His particular 
hatred of paedophiles and child killers addresses this need, as Dexter and his long-lost 
brother, Brian, were also victims of his mother’s killers. Here, Lindsay taps into the 
revenge narratives so common to American popular culture and further secures the 
reader’s acceptance and empathy. 
In Darkly Dreaming Dexter, Dexter speaks of the ongoing battle between his 
shadow and persona which can only be quelled, temporarily, by a kill. Following his 
murder of Jamie Jaworski, Dexter notes how 
…some of the tension of the last week was gone, the cold voice of the Dark 
Passenger was quiet, and I could be me again. Quirky, funny, happy-go-
lucky, dead-inside Dexter. No longer Dexter with the knife, Dexter the 
Avenger. Not until next time. (130) 
The ‘me’ that Dexter refers to here is his individuating ego, which is under threat of being 
engulfed by his growing shadow. Interestingly, in the later books of the series Dexter 
suggests that his true self is actually his dark half whilst ‘daytime Dexter’ is simply the 
socially acceptable façade, but here he claims that the reverse is true. Regardless of his 
claims, as the series progresses we find that Dexter does retreat from the Passenger-led 
darkness of the first novel and moves slowly closer to his persona. He remains a serial 
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killer, of course, but the body count drops and the books become increasingly less violent 
and visceral. This process relates to the element of the dragon battle which aims at what 
Kalsched and Jones term the ‘redemption of the feminine’ (3). In myth, this usually entails 
the heroic rescue of a beautiful maiden held captive by a terrifying monster, with these 
figures respectively representative of ‘the inner core of the personality and its surrounding 
defenses’ (ibid.). Once the captive is liberated the hero is free to marry her and live happily 
ever after, in peace and harmony. By vanquishing the complexes imprisoning his inner 
core, Dexter is able to develop psychically, throwing off the worst excesses of his shadow 
and moving closer to his hero side. Kalsched and Jones explain that this process ‘can guide 
us through th[o]se major transitional passages in our personal development where a rebirth 
or reorientation of consciousness is indicated’ (ibid.) and this reorientation proves to be 
vital to the reader’s ongoing empathetic engagement with Dexter.  
In Darkly Dreaming Dexter, the dragon figure takes the form of Dexter’s brother 
Brian, a serial killer known as the ‘Tamiami Slasher’,39 who preys on Miami’s prostitutes. 
Like Dexter he was ‘born in blood’ in the shipping container their mother died in, but 
unlike his brother he was raised in the care of the state without the love of Harry or the 
guidance of Harry’s Code. The novel’s denouement sees Dexter forced to choose between 
saving his sister, Deborah, or joining his brother in her murder. Deborah, who was 
working as an undercover vice cop and is consequently dressed in ‘gold lame hot pants and 
a skimpy silk blouse tied above her navel’ (Darkly Dreaming 255), has been captured by 
Brian and imprisoned in a shipping container at the same spot where Dexter and Brian’s 
mother was murdered. Lindsay places a heavy emphasis on what Deborah looks like as she 
is held captive and the highly visual nature of this scene taps into popular cultural 
treatments of the ‘damsel in distress’ trope; it also references Deborah’s symbolic role as 
                                                          
39
 The Dexter TV series renames Brian the ‘Ice Truck Killer’. 
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the ‘beautiful maiden’ of the dragon myth. This offers a degree of subconscious 
reassurance to the reader as in the archetypal myth the imperilled maiden rarely comes to 
harm, due to her rescue by the dashing hero. However, this scenario is complicated by the 
fact that Deborah is dressed as a prostitute. Her ‘sex suit’ objectifies her and aligns her 
with Brian’s usual choice of victim; these factors combine with Dexter and Brian’s 
murderous proclivities to make Deborah’s position so vulnerable that her murder becomes 
a real possibility. For the reader, consonance and dissonance become engaged in a 
cognitive tug-of-war which mimics the torment that Dexter will endure as he struggles 
with his dark urges.  
Having been led to the shipping container by clues brought to him in dreams – 
clues drawn from vestigial memories as the repressed slowly returns, and from Dexter’s 
connection to the collective unconscious – Dexter realises that something momentous 
awaits him inside: ‘there I would find Deb, too, and find either myself or my not-self’ 
(236). Dexter instinctively knows that within the shipping container individuation will be 
completed and that the process will be painful and messy. He enters the container unable 
to remember his mother’s murder and unaware of Brian’s true identity, but once inside the 
repressed returns and he is flooded with painful memories and bewildering feelings of 
terror and abandonment. As Brian fills in the gaps in Dexter’s memories and explains how 
the events shaped them both into killers, Dexter feels a kinship for the first time. When 
Brian offers him a knife and asks him to join him in killing Deborah he occupies the 
mythological role of the shadowy being who tries to tempt the hero into performing an evil 
action. As Kalsched and Jones observe, ‘[s]uch acts result in expulsion from paradisal 
condition. The protection of childhood, as well as the contentment with the past or with 
what has been achieved, are types of paradise that are lost when life calls for a new 
adaptation’ (2). Dexter’s happy existence as a Harry-schooled killer acting out murderous 
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impulses couched in terms of his childhood complexes is threatened, and as the light of 
consciousness dawns he is psychically wrenched away from Harry and Deb and the only 
stability he has ever known. The two function for Dexter as representatives of the parental 
imago and are his substitutes for the moral complex, or superego, which his psychopathy 
precludes. As Dexter wrestles with the temptation to join with Brian in killing Deborah he 
sees her morph into his actual mother; her wide, terror-filled eyes becoming the glassy 
stare of the dead and her rigid, taped body the unmoving, abject corpse. The horror of the 
image eliminates the fraternal feelings that had reminded him of Harry’s Code and 
prevented the killing, and reawakens the sentiments of anger and abandonment that the 3-
year-old Dexter felt when his mother was murdered. This represents the point in myth 
when 
the world falls into opposites, and “good” and “evil” are assigned their 
place in the world. The Great Good Mother shows her dark aspect, the 
hateful or Terrible Mother, while the Creative Father now sits opposite the 
Destructive Father, and brothers kill each other in the name of love, and the 
world is alternately either an enchanted or persecutory place. (ibid.) 
The loving and virtuous figure of ‘Mommy’/Deborah becomes ‘Wicked Mommy, who 
wanted to leave us here alone in the awful cold blood’ (Darkly Dreaming 270) and as 
Dexter raises his knife to kill her we see the two faces of Harry: the Creative Father who 
gave new life to an abandoned and emotionally void boy, and the Destructive Father who 
created a killer. Dexter’s psychic struggle is played out in a tense, dramatic scene as he 
wrestles with the temptation to join Brian in a reproduction of their mother’s murder 
scene; the knife remains poised above Deborah’s chest as Mommy/Deborah and the 
ghostly voice of Harry do battle with the Dark Passenger. When Dexter voices his 
helplessness whilst ‘growing into the handle of the quivering blade’ (ibid. 271), Harry 
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implores him to only kill those who deserve to die, reminding his son ‘You’re a good kid, 
Dex’ (ibid., original italics) and the reader is pushed into a position of empathy with the 
poor, tormented child at Dexter’s core. Unable to either plunge the knife into his sister or 
throw it away, Dexter remains frozen but it is clear that he has fought the Passenger and 
has striven to adhere to the Code of Harry. His choice to save Deb rather than join Brian 
represents his reorientation of consciousness to the side of light and law and a (semi) 
renunciation of killing and darkness. This is a significant turning point in the 
characterisation of Dexter, as in the subsequent novels in the series he becomes 
progressively less monstrous and more human.  
 This reorientation can be seen as a result of Dexter’s symbolic violation of the 
incest taboo. As noted above, the hero who liberates the imperilled maiden does so as he 
wishes to marry her and live happily ever after, but Deborah is not only Dexter’s foster 
sister but also representative of his anima/idealised mother. Jung warns that 
[s]ince incest must be avoided at all costs, the result is either the death of 
the son-lover or his self-castration as punishment for the incest he has 
committed, or else the sacrifice of instinctuality, and especially of sexuality, 
as a means of preventing or expiating the incestuous longing. (‘Origin of 
the Hero’ 147-148) 
Dexter’s partial rejection of his cherished shadow side corresponds to the ‘sacrifice of 
instinctuality’ which in the later books of the series sees him moving increasingly away 
from darkness and towards detection. Although this is never openly acknowledged in the 
novels, the careful reader will notice a decrease in the frequency and intensity of Dexter’s 
kills as the series progresses. In the first novel, Dexter has three victims (one murder is 
told in flashback), in the second he has two, and in each of the four other books he kills 
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only one person (although book five, 2010’s Dexter is Delicious, does end with the 
promise of one further victim). The first three novels establish Dexter’s serial killing 
credentials within the first 36 pages, in book four the reader must go for more than 100 
pages before ‘witnessing’ Dexter at work, and by book five there are almost 180 pages 
between the opening of the novel and a Dexter murder. Book five is also notable in that it 
sees Dexter renounce his shadow self, following the birth of his daughter, Lily Anne. In 
book six there is a return to earlier form, with the first eleven pages dedicated to Dexter’s 
dispatch of a murderous paedophile. By book seven, however, Dexter appears to have 
largely forgotten about the ‘Need’ which powered the earliest novels; his killing of a 
homicidal stalker takes place between pages 180 and 189 and is notable for both its lack of 
gusto and its limited narrative space. The viscerality of the first novel also wanes in the 
subsequent books; apart from a graphic section involving a pair of tin snips and a 
paedophile’s fingers in book two (Dearly Devoted 23) the reader is largely spared the gore 
and misery which would logically attend a serial killer’s ministrations, with Lindsay 
preferring to protect the reader’s hard-won identification with his character and obscure 
Dexter’s precise actions via euphemisms and literary sleight-of-hand. 
 Dexter is repositioned from slayer to sleuth as the novels gradually depart from the 
conventions of psychopath fiction and turn increasingly towards the police procedural 
format. This move heralds Dexter’s psychological development following the 
individuation process at the close of the first novel and it also significantly reduces the 
dissonance experienced by the reader during immersion in the text. By shifting the focus 
away from Dexter’s own killings and onto his pursuit of the opposing characters, Lindsay 
encourages greater acceptance of and identification with his hero. However, the reduction 
of dissonance also leads to a reduction in the arousal the dissonance creates in the reader, 
an action which threatens to disrupt the enjoyment the reader gains from the text. The 
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unsettling moral ambivalence which titillated readers of the earliest books in the series is 
increasingly supplied in the later novels by Dexter’s brother, Brian, and Rita’s children, 
Cody and Astor. Having escaped from the kill scene at the end of the first novel, Brian 
disappears from the series before mysteriously reappearing in the fifth book, Dexter is 
Delicious. As noted above, in this novel, Dexter decides to hang up his kill kit and 
renounce his dark ways following the birth of his daughter. Although this development 
makes Dexter seem more human and theoretically increases his potential as a locus for the 
reader’s empathy and identification, it also makes him more ordinary and less interesting. 
The reader who has invested in the series on account of its stimulating levels of cognitive 
dissonance is forced to seek his or her thrills elsewhere. It is significant that Brian meets 
this need, as he functions as the dark counterpoint to Dexter; a vision of what Dexter might 
have become without Harry's tutelage: 
…Brian had been forged in the selfsame fire that had turned me into Dexter 
the Dark, and it had also given him an inarguable need to slice and dice. 
Unfortunately, he had grown to maturity without the restraints of Harry’s 
guiding code, and he was very happy to practice his art on anyone, provided 
they were youngish and female. He had been working his way through a 
string of Miami prostitutes when our paths had first crossed. (61-62) 
In book one in particular, the juxtaposition of the two brothers helped to validate the 
reader’s acceptance of Dexter by emphasising the righteousness of Dexter’s kills. As 
Schmid has noted, the technique had been previously used to great effect by Thomas 
Harris in The Silence of the Lambs and ‘[j]ust as Buffalo Bill allows readers to maintain 
their attachment to Hannibal Lecter in a relatively untroubled form, so the Ice Truck 
Killer, despite his family resemblance to Dexter, enables us to continue rooting for the 
“hero” of the series’ (‘Devil You Know’ 140). In the fifth book, however, where Dexter 
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has reformed, we find that the contrast between the brothers leads us to actually like Brian 
more. He is funny, smooth and sinister and the fact that he is much more dangerous than 
Dexter has transformed from a shortcoming into a benefit. The reader is willing to 
overlook his earlier indiscretions because in this book he offers greater promise for 
salacious, titillating mayhem. Our shifting allegiance reveals our own shadows and the 
dissonance created by our acknowledgement of this fact, either on a conscious or 
subconscious basis, adds to our enjoyment of the novel. 
 Rita’s children, Cody and Astor, were beaten and psychologically abused by their 
biological father in their early years and the experience was so traumatic that it left them 
with fledgling Dark Passengers, just like Dexter’s: 
The sharp and shiny tin soul of Dexter the Avenger was forged from a 
childhood trauma so violent I had blocked it out completely. It had made 
me what I am, and I am sure I would sniffle and feel unhappy about that if I 
was able to feel at all. And these two, Cody and Astor, had been scarred the 
same way, beaten and savaged by a violent drug-addicted father until they, 
too, were turned forever away from sunlight and lollipops. As my wise 
foster father had known in raising me, there was no way to take that away, 
no way to put the serpent back in the egg. (In the Dark 23-24) 
The serpent/egg imagery couches their aberration in naturalistic terms, making it seem 
organic and acceptable. Any sympathy or sadness the reader may feel at the thought of 
these poor, maltreated children is nullified by the comparison with Dexter and his 
admission that he is unable to ‘feel at all’ and is therefore unconcerned about his own 
childhood trauma. In making the children mirror Dexter’s experience, Lindsay ensures that 
the psychic manoeuvres that have allowed the reader to accept Dexter and his Passenger 
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are also transferred to the children, so the reader’s response to Dexter’s revelation about 
their dark proclivities is one of eager anticipation. When Dexter notices Cody’s Passenger 
in book two, he vows to pass on all of Harry’s teachings so that Cody may become ‘a new 
Dark Avenger, carrying the Harry Plan forward against a new generation of monsters’ 
(Dearly Devoted 296); it is significant that he emphasises the Harry Code here, as this 
sanctions our acceptance of a child being trained to kill. Although Dexter reneges on his 
promise following Lily Anne’s birth in book five, the children are delighted when they 
recognise that the uncle they never knew they had has a similar skillset. When Brian takes 
Cody and Astor out one evening for ‘Chinese food’ – which Dexter knows they don’t like 
– Dexter is left with ‘a very uncomfortable sense that something very wrong [is] going on’ 
(Dexter is Delicious 99). For the reader, however, there is no sense of foreboding; s/he 
anticipates something delectably dark and this provides the frisson of excitement which 
has been missing since Dexter reformed. Although Dexter is too preoccupied to piece 
together the clues littering the text, it is clear to the discerning reader that Brian has taken 
over the children’s training. There is a small sense of triumph for the reader who has 
uncovered a secret to which Dexter remains oblivious and this both strengthens our 
acceptance of Brian and ensures that we remain engaged with the text. 
 It is interesting to note that that the reader’s level of engagement and empathetic 
response is conditioned by the degree of salaciousness in the text. The more voluptuous the 
violence (or the threat/promise of violence) in the novel, the more avidly the narrative is 
consumed. Furthermore, in a technique borrowed from Ellis, the passages which most 
inflame the reader’s emotions – descriptions of crime scene victims or passages detailing 
Dexter’s stalk, capture and kill of his adversaries – are those which are relayed in the most 
dispassionate manner. When describing the victims found at crime scenes, Dexter gives 
graphic details of their injuries:  
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It looked like she’d had a very hard time of it. Like the previous victim, this 
one had been hacked, stabbed, bitten, and clawed with an undisciplined but 
frenzied abandon, a wild impatience that had left very few patches of 
visible skin unmarked by trauma. (Dexter’s Final Cut 176) 
As I noted in my discussion of the Father Donovan and Jaworski murders, Lindsay uses 
such sections to manipulate the reader’s response to the text; by contrasting Dexter 
favourably with the arch-villain of each novel’s story arc, Lindsay pushes the reader 
towards identification with his eponymous hero. The abject corpses left by the arch-
villains, often attended by clouds of flies, are described in graphic detail with carefully 
chosen descriptors such as ‘undisciplined’, ‘frenzied’ and ‘wild’ marking a stark contrast 
between the animalistic perpetrators and ratiocinative Dexter. However, Dexter’s tone 
when he is relaying this information is typically impassive or sardonic. He may show an 
interest in the aesthetics of the scene – ‘The technique was clumsy, inefficient, even brutal, 
but it spoke of a wild experimental joy in the work that was a pleasure to see’ (ibid. 28) – 
or he may speak flippantly of something which angers him 
In one of the pictures, the boy looked like he was in a silver-gray cocoon, 
with only certain areas exposed. What MacGregor left exposed told me a 
great deal about him. As I had suspected, he was not the kind of man most 
parents would wish for a scout master. (Dearly Devoted 14-15) 
but he never dwells on feelings. Dexter repeatedly tells us that he is incapable of empathy 
and is unable to feel or express love. His relationship with Rita is simply a means of 
blending in and appearing normal; she is his ‘beard’, his disguise, and the fact that she 
brings with her a ready-made family is an added bonus for a man with an avowed distaste 
for sex. In fact, sex has very little place in the novel series as a whole. On the rare 
occasions where it does occur, such as in the first novel when Dexter and Rita 
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unexpectedly consummate their relationship (Darkly Dreaming 149), or Dexter’s ecstasy-
fuelled sex with fellow kidnappee Samantha Aldovar in Dexter is Delicious (242), it is 
alluded to rather than addressed directly. This is significant in a novel series which places 
such a heavy emphasis on murder, and seems to relate to Leslie Fiedler’s assertion that 
American literature is pathologically obsessed with death but unable to portray sexual 
passion. Fiedler’s ground-breaking overview of American literature, Love and Death in the 
American Novel (1960), situated the best of American fiction in the Gothic form which has 
at its heart the ‘substitution of terror for love as a central theme…The titillation of sex 
denied, it offers its readers a vicarious participation in a flirtation with death’ (134). 
Fiedler argues that the gothic themes of alienation and terror allow the American author to 
explore pathological national concerns without offending discerning readers in a literature 
dominated by sentimentalism. 
 These themes can be traced throughout the Dexter novel series; the baroque kill 
scenes staged by the Tamiami Slasher in the first novel and Brandon Weiss in the fourth 
stand as examples of gothic excess, whilst the supernatural elements introduced to the third 
novel, Dexter in the Dark, address the need to situate the worst extremes of behaviour 
beyond the human. For all the originality of his ‘serial killer who only kills other killers’, 
Lindsay’s fictions fit neatly within an American canon which Fiedler defines as 
overwhelmingly ‘gothic, non-realistic and negative, sadist and melodramatic – a literature 
of darkness and the grotesque in a land of light and affirmation’ (29). The overlaying of 
sex with death can be seen in the curious passage I quoted earlier, in my discussion of the 
Father Donovan kill: ‘Killing makes me feel good…It’s a sweet release, a necessary letting 
go of all the little hydraulic valves inside…it’s not just any killing, of course. It has to be 
done the right way, at the right time, with the right partner (Darkly Dreaming 13). All one 
needs to do to make this passage relatable is substitute the word ‘killing’ for ‘sex’; indeed, 
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there is a sense that the reader instinctively understands all of Dexter’s descriptions of his 
‘Need’ in sexual terms, a phenomenon which arises from our sado-masochistic 
relationship with the dissonance emanating from our empathetic acceptance of Dexter and 
his Passenger. It seems that Geoffrey Gorer’s ‘pornography of death’ has come full circle; 
that, in a popular culture defined by excess, the two are indistinguishable. Despite this, 
there remains a coyness in the literature (and, perhaps, society as a whole) whereby the 
prohibitions surrounding sex remain in place, despite its increasingly explicit and 
widespread depiction in popular culture. For all its ubiquity in music videos, television 
shows, advertising, etc., sex remains an essentially intimate, quotidian act usually engaged 
in by two people in a private setting. Conversely, via the film and television industries, 
violent death has become an exotic spectacle for mass public consumption and a legitimate 
source of entertainment. In the Dexter books, it seems that killing is also an activity in 
which the whole family can engage: Dexter and Brian have numerous victims across 
multiple books, Harry and Deb have killed in the line of duty, and even Rita (accidentally, 
By Design 283), Cody (In the Dark 370) and Astor (Double 327, Final Cut 346) have 
blood on their hands. Yet when sex and death appear together on the same bill it is risky 
business; as Carol Clover has shown (Chainsaws 33-34), for all the advances in sexual 
equality and gender relations, sex, particularly in horror films, remains punishable by 
death. 
 Lindsay’s Miami, as relayed to us by Dexter, is an emotionally void wasteland. 
Love gets scant mention in the novels and those who do open their hearts (or, worse, their 
legs) are dealt with harshly. Prostitutes are, of course, easy victims, but romantic love 
often seems riskier than transactional sex – particularly for women. A college student who 
sleeps with her professor is ritualistically slain (In the Dark 103); Camilla Figg falls deeply 
in love with Dexter and is pounded to death by a cop killer (Double Dexter 173); eighteen-
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year-old Samantha Aldovar is killed by cannibalistic vampires following her deflowering 
by Dexter (Delicious 339). Even Dexter’s wife, Rita, is ultimately slain by a paedophiliac 
TV star (Final Cut 351) who is pursuing a sexual relationship with her underage daughter, 
and Jackie Forrest, the celebrity that Dexter is about to leave Rita for, is killed by the same 
man (ibid. 310).  
Dexter’s relationship with Jackie marks a startling change in the cold, emotionless 
psychopath of the earlier novels. Assigned as a technical adviser to the stars of a TV pilot, 
Dexter falls in love with the character based on his sister Deborah (who, in her role as 
Dexter’s substitutive ‘Mommy’, which I discussed during my analysis of the denouement 
of Darkly Dreaming Dexter, was previously the locus of Dexter’s subconscious, pre-
oedipal, incestuous longings). As noted above, in Dexter’s Final Cut Dexter kills only one 
person and this brief and perfunctory event does not occur until page 189. Dexter’s 
apathetic approach to killing in this novel appears to be the result of his character’s slow 
reorientation towards detection and away from death, which began following the 
individuation process at the close of Darkly Dreaming Dexter. Dexter’s ‘Will Graham 
moments’, where he temporarily inhabits the psyche of the killers he hunts in sudden and 
vivid visions – ‘And I see her, see the way she thrashes, moans, twists wildly against the 
ropes’ (63, original italics) – also become more frequent and pronounced and the Dark 
Passenger itself is at one point tellingly recast as the ‘Dark Detective’ (317). In contrast to 
Dexter’s diminished dark desires, there is mention of innumerable instances of sex 
between Dexter and Jackie (246, 248, 255, 256, 278 and 292), including a very detailed 
and uncharacteristic paragraph on Dexter’s fascination with Jackie’s breast and nipple 
(248). The subconscious process of renunciation which began in book one, when Dexter 
chose to save Deb rather than join Brian in her killing, reaches its culmination in this 
seventh (and possibly final) novel. The ‘sacrifice of instinctuality’ (Jung, Origin of the 
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Hero 148), which saw Dexter reject his shadow and embrace his hero self, has culminated 
in his return to (almost) normal emotional functioning. Dexter has fallen in love with 
Jackie and for the first time appears to have access to virtually the full range of human 
sentiments. It is ironic that, earlier in the novel, Dexter tells us that ‘Deb knows what I am 
[a serial killer], and in her limited way she almost approves’ (242), yet when Deb 
discovers her brother’s infidelity she is unable to forgive him: ‘I don’t think I ever want to 
talk to you again’ (276). The true crime is one of sex, not murder, and in this we see 
America’s Fiedleran pathology laid bare.  
 Increasingly, these national concerns also include a fascination with celebrities who 
have become an acceptable locus of estranged, unattainable sexuality. Gossip magazines, 
reality TV shows and tabloid newspapers abound with images of scantily clad stars and 
editorial detailing their outrageous and decadent lifestyles. The remoteness of these 
figures, the gulf between the stars and those who avidly consume media dedicated to them, 
defuses the tension between their overt sexuality and the censorious moral culture that 
Fiedler identifies. In many ways, it is the status of celebrity which is beguiling to the 
consumer, with the hypersexualised image simply a PR strategy dedicated to securing 
column inches. In Dexter’s Final Cut, Jackie Forrest is a highly successful and publicly 
adored star of film and TV and Dexter is as seduced by her fame as he is by her 
appearance and personality. This would have been unthinkable in the earlier novels, as 
Dexter’s rigid training by Harry emphasised the importance of keeping a low profile to 
avoid detection, yet less than a third of the way into Dexter’s Final Cut, Dexter basks in 
Jackie’s reflected glory: 
Someone in the throng yelled, “Whoo!” and I felt myself smiling with 
pleasure. I knew it was for Jackie – but I was with her, part of her 
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entourage, and in a moment of truly bizarre insight, I realized I liked it. I 
enjoyed having idiot smiles following in my wake. (113) 
This adulation-by-proxy feeds Dexter’s psychopathic grandiosity and narcissism, but more 
complicated territory is also being negotiated. The conflation of celebrity and serial killing 
mirrors the phenomenon that Schmid identifies in his book, Natural Born Celebrities: 
Serial Killers in American Culture (2005), which addresses the iconic status accorded to 
serial killers in contemporary society. Schmid argues that the current fascination with 
stardom is rooted in the celebrity’s equivocal status as somebody who is at once 
recognisable and utterly alien; a status which equally applies to the enigmatic serial killer. 
The attraction of repulsion which has always attended the grotesque and the monstrous is 
intensified in the serial killer, whose carnivalesque contraventions of law and morality 
allow the ghoulish consumer to vicariously transgress society’s boundaries from within the 
comforting bounds of hegemony. The glamorous celebrity offers a similar means of 
escape; for every photograph of a red carpet event or sumptuous yacht party there is 
editorial detailing breakdowns, addictions and other human failings. This allows the reader 
to vicariously experience A-list life whilst revelling in its attendant miseries; miseries 
which can make us feel grateful for our own lives. Furthermore, our ambiguous response 
to the celebrity helps us to mediate our response to those serial killers who have 
transcended mere notoriety to become famous in their own right: 
Our complicated relationship with celebrities, affective as well as 
intellectual, composed of admiration and resentment, envy and contempt, 
provides us with a lexicon through which we can manage our appalled and 
appalling fascination with the serial killer. (Schmid, Natural Born 25) 
So, when Dexter fantasises about leaving behind his ordinary life to enjoy the reflected 
glory and material trappings of Jackie’s fame it seems plausible to the reader who is 
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already familiar with the celebrity status of such killers as Ted Bundy and Richard 
Ramirez. There is an irony, of course, in the fact that a man so dedicated to what Seltzer 
terms ‘psychasthenic vanishing’ (136) should crave the limelight, but there is symmetry to 
it too. Serial killers such as Henry Lee Lucas in America or the UK’s self-styled 
‘Crossbow Cannibal’, Stephen Griffiths, craved notoriety and revelled in the attention their 
trials afforded them, and Seltzer attributes the need for self-making and aspirations for 
celebrity to ‘the conditions of an anonymous mass society’ (135). Of course, the celebrity 
attached to such killers came after their arrest; in fiction, too, the ‘stardom’ of killers such 
as Hannibal Lecter was attached to them during their time in prison. Although Dexter is 
increasingly seduced by the attention paid to Jackie and the other stars of the television 
pilot, he hopes to remain free to slice and dice: 
…Dexter must maintain a low profile or cease to be Dexter. Still, I found 
that I felt larger, more handsome, certain that great wit fell from my lips 
every time I parted them to speak. It was invigorating, intoxicating, and I 
enjoyed it... (Final Cut 113) 
Yet Dexter in this novel has already ‘cease[d] to be Dexter’. His ‘Need’ has all but 
vanished and he experiences real human emotions; he is no longer a facsimile of one of us, 
but one of us in actuality. It is fitting, then, that this newly ‘ordinary’ man should finally be 
forced to pay for his crimes. Part of the reader’s acceptance of Dexter’s killings was 
bought on the understanding that Dexter was different to us; possessed of a special 
aptitude that allowed him to do the things that nobody else could. In Dexter’s Final Cut, 
everybody’s favourite psychopath has turned into a man capable of love, a development 
which hints that he has potential for further emotional growth. He remains callous and self-
centred, as one would expect from a psychopath; the overwhelming, life-changing love 
that he felt for Lily Anne in book five is reduced to ‘a very small twinge’ (290) and he is 
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happy to leave her and the rest of his family to pursue a life with Jackie. Dexter still 
professes an urge to purge humanity of its more undesirable members, although the 
contrast between the driving Need of book one and the background murmur of the 
slumbering Passenger in book seven is starkly rendered.  
 The denouement of Dexter’s Final Cut sees our hero racing to save Astor from the 
clutches of predatory paedophile, Robert Chase, who has also murdered Jackie Forrest and, 
earlier, her PA, Kathy. Rita, who reached the house before him, has been attacked by 
Chase and left bound and gagged, teetering on the brink of death (342). When Dexter 
arrives to rescue them, he is quickly overpowered by the actor who attempts to kill him 
before being stabbed to death by Astor. Rather than feeling relief at his lucky escape, 
Dexter quickly realises that the damning scene could be enough to implicate him in the 
murders of Jackie and Chase. Rita’s testimony is his only chance of proving his innocence, 
but she dies while he is untying her and cannot be resuscitated. There is an aptness to this, 
as Dexter himself notes:  
…even I had to admit that I deserved it. My entire career had never been 
more than a prelude to prison. I’d kept ahead of Just Desserts for a very 
long time by using my wits – but recent events proved those were gone, 
dried up and blown away like last autumn’s leaves. It was all over: 
inarguably, inescapably over, and as I admitted that to myself, I even felt a 
little bit of relief. (352) 
It is fitting that the novel – and possibly the series – should end on a note of uncertainty. 
By leaving the situation unresolved, Lindsay leaves the reader in a state of limbo and the 
novel’s ambiguous ending mirrors the moral ambivalence which has characterised the 
entire series. Dexter may be innocent in this instance but there are 57 slides in his 
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rosewood box (298), memento mori of the lives he has taken. Dexter’s crimes have offered 
the reader a means to both transgress and reinscribe the moral interdictions that underpin 
the dominant fictions of society and we need him, in the end, to pay for his crimes. Having 
flirted with death, order must be restored; just as Dickens crushed Rigaud, so Lindsay must 
contain his psychopath. When Dexter decides to ‘face the music’ (352) the reader is a 
spectator rather than a collaborator, the ‘we’ of the novels’ darkest sections resolutely 
replaced with the first person singular: ‘I took out my phone and I called it in. Then I sat 
with Astor and waited for the music to start’ (352). The reader may have joined Dexter in 
his ‘Dark Dance’ (Dearly Devoted 114), but in the end s/he is not committed to this 
allegiance. The fictional trajectory of the psychopath finds its culmination in a figure that 
has become so naturalised that it has lost many of the characteristics that made it so 
compelling and engaging. Psychopathic Dexter’s psychological and emotional growth may 
be clinically suspect; it is also literarily unsatisfying. The enigmatic psychopath who looks 
normal but remains ‘other’ has been revealed as just another fallible human being and, like 
us, he must pay for his mistakes.  
 
 
  
270 
 
Conclusion 
 
As this thesis has shown, narrative poetics determine the reading position from which a 
text is accessed and guide the reader to a spectrum of responses, ranging from alienation 
and resistance to empathy and identification. Immersion in the text can be of varying 
depth; a reader may remain aware of the literary experience, or s/he may temporarily 
surrender her- or himself to the narrative and temporarily merge with a fictional character. 
This kind of ‘counterfactual reasoning’ (Ryan 111), what Ryan calls ‘mental simulation’ 
(ibid.), occurs at the deepest level of empathetic engagement and can lead to a reader 
thinking and feeling with characters as the action unfolds. This is a powerful effect which 
can occur in any kind of literature, but when the character that the reader identifies with is 
a morally reprehensible psychopath, its potency is revealed by disconcerting feelings of 
ambivalence. The cognitive dissonance created when a reader thinks and feels in a way 
which runs counter to personal and social mores can be difficult to reconcile. Dissonance 
may however be mitigated by a number of techniques, such as those outlined by Festinger 
(see page 10) or Leitch (see page 10-11). 
The novel offers the reader a safe way to vicariously transgress societal norms and 
explore alternative versions of consciousness and experience. Ego identification is central 
to reader enjoyment of, and emotional and psychic participation in, literary texts and 
therefore to the process of identification itself. Empathetic engagement with characters and 
situations may represent the subconscious fulfilment of repressed wishes and create a 
pleasurable release of psychic tension in the neurotic reader (according to Freud, we are all 
neurotic to some degree or other). Of course, it is important to remember that identification is 
not a narrative technique but something which occurs in the reader, in response to textual 
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triggers. The author may attempt to push the reader towards particular responses to a text, 
but reception can vary with multiple readings, even with the same reader. Resistance can 
also be scripted into a text’s range of implications or it may arise spontaneously in the 
reader; counter readings are always possible. Furthermore, cognitive responses may be 
multiple, with empathy and resistance present in the same text and in relation to the same 
character. The plurality of potential responses mimics the range of possible spontaneous 
reactions to narrative and recognises also the diversity of human subjectivity.  
In the course of this thesis I have explored a variety of fictional representations of 
the psychopath and analysed the poetics which seek to place readers in positions of 
empathy or resistance in relation to this divisive and enigmatic figure. Charles Dickens, as 
we have seen, mainly employed a conventional heterodiegetic narrator although his use of 
it was far from conformist. His polyphonic technique allowed him to create, in Little 
Dorrit, a complex panoply of voices, each with equal diegetic weight. Dickens was 
beguiled by his psychopath and, although the ending of the novel betrays ambivalence and 
guilt, he clearly enjoyed exercising this shadow figure in the narrative. Little Dorrit’s 
psychopath, Rigaud, is of vital importance to the story but, as befits such a liminal 
character, he operates on the margins of the narrative. The text’s suspicion of Rigaud 
keeps the reader at a distance; empathy and acceptance of the psychopath is limited due to 
the lack of access that the author grants to Rigaud’s psyche. Despite Dickens’s obvious 
fascination with Rigaud, ultimately order must be restored and the psychopath is reduced 
to nameless matter. The interaction between character, narrator and even, at times, author, 
creates an impressive yet subtle display which mimics the manipulative behaviour of the 
prototypical psychopath. 
 In Crime and Punishment, Fyodor Dostoevsky also uses a heterodiegetic narrator; 
however, his novel is more experimental and his poetics have a more pronounced effect on 
272 
 
the reader. His novel was the first to combine a dialogic technique with a pronounced and 
prolonged interest in psychological disorder and criminality. The level of entrancement is 
deeper in this novel, as Dostoevsky’s narrative technique allows the reader to become 
more psychologically immersed in the text. Indeed, mental simulation occurs to such an 
extent that descriptions of Raskolnikov’s mental anguish also affect the reader; many 
readers report feeling changed by their harrowing encounter with the narrative. The reader 
also experiences greater empathy for and acceptance of the focalising character, as a result 
of the increased access that the narrative grants to Raskolnikov’s consciousness. With 
greater interiority comes greater proximity to the more challenging aspects of 
Raskolnikov’s philosophy; moral ambivalence consequently becomes more prevalent as 
the reader struggles to reconcile his or her acceptance of the character with the hostility 
that Raskolnikov’s actions and beliefs inspire. 
 The interest that Dostoevsky shows in the representation of aberrant psychology in 
fiction was later capitalised on by William Faulkner. His efforts to accurately represent 
consciousness led him to become one of the first authors to experiment with an almost 
exclusively first person format. The result is a novel that is powerful and effective, but 
difficult to read. The narrative is so complex that it verges on the abstruse, the a-chronicity 
of memory monologues and the specificity of personal perception rendering it at times 
unintelligible. Despite the use of a homodiegetic first-person narrator empathy is also 
strained, proving that narrative situation does not always encourage an empathetic 
response from the reader. Although the reader encounters the diegesis from a privileged 
position within the consciousness of the focalizing character, s/he remains largely an 
outsider, looking in. Faulkner’s technique is paradoxically too immersive and the varying 
success of the four monologues reveals that a degree of narration is necessary to lead the 
reader to a position of empathy and identification, and concomitant mental simulation. 
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Nonetheless, the narrative figuring of consciousness was to remain a key concern of the 
modernist period and the innovations Faulkner made in the representation of aberrant 
psychology were to have a lasting effect. His typographical signalling of mental disorder 
and dechronologised subjectivity would later be found in the works of authors such as 
Horace McCoy and Jim Thompson, with the techniques becoming so well-established that 
Thompson was even able to satirise them in his novel The Killer Inside Me. Perhaps most 
significantly for this study of the poetics of identification in psychopath fiction, Faulkner’s 
positioning of psychopathic subjectivity as normal was of vital importance. Faulkner’s 
psychopath, Jason, is recognisable and accessible; his domestic context and personal and 
professional frustrations transform his selfish psychopathy into a point of identification. 
For the first time in the fictional trajectory of the psychopath, the reader is able to relate to 
the psychopathic character – a development in the representation of the psychopath made 
possible by Jason’s ordinariness. 
 This ordinariness was to become a key element in depictions of psychopathy in the 
twentieth century, a century that saw an exponential increase in narratives focusing on 
psychopathic characters. Cultural drivers for the heightened interest in the psychopath 
included the horrors of two World Wars and depictions became increasingly sophisticated 
during this period. Early twentieth century depictions saw a greater focus on the 
psychological impetus for the psychopath’s actions and this led to increased empathy and 
acceptance of the psychopathic figure. Freud’s theories became much more widely known 
in the post-war period due to the work that he did on trauma and his influence can be felt 
in much of the period’s cultural output. The horrors of war had heightened awareness of 
the dark, aggressive drives at the heart of human nature and the psychopath became a 
convenient means of expressing the issues this raised. The emphasis on psychology, 
particularly from the 1940s onwards, reflects psychoanalytical and pharmacological 
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advances in the treatment of mental illnesses and a broader awareness and acceptance of 
mental illness and mental aberrance in society. Technical terms for mental conditions also 
became more current and precise, and psychopathy itself became more firmly established 
and understood due to the work of Hervey M. Cleckley. These social, cultural and 
scientific factors fed into literary representations of psychopathy and, in a move started by 
Dostoevsky, the fictional psychopath gradually became less of a monster and more a 
recognisable member of society. A concerted move towards homodiegetic first person 
narratives ensured that the reader remained in close proximity to the psychopath although, 
heeding Faulkner, the uninterrupted unfolding of sense perceptions took second place to 
self-narration and self-quoted monologues. Propinquity to the psychopath ensured a certain 
degree of empathetic attachment to the focalising character, which was reinforced via 
subsequent narrative techniques aimed at enhancing the state of entrancement and 
encouraging mental simulation. Moral ambivalence consequently also retreats slightly 
during this period, particularly in the novels of Patricia Highsmith and Jim Thompson, 
where the psychopath’s crimes often go unpunished. This gives rise to what Horsley terms 
‘a fantasy of impunity sustained by lack of narrative closure’ (132), a development which 
marks a new direction in the fictional trajectory of the psychopath.  
 Literary interest in psychopathy around the middle of the twentieth century also led 
to an increase in the number of authors aiming for an imaginative understanding of ‘real 
life’ psychopaths; documentary and non-fiction novels, which turned factual events into 
literary entertainment, adopted a moral tone which sought to bring a semblance of 
respectability. A drive to understand those psychopaths whose horrific crimes had captured 
the public imagination placed great store by psychological profiling of the perpetrators and 
their motivations, and looked to causality theories in an attempt to explain the seemingly 
inexplicable. The result was an attempt at nullification, at rationalising the crimes and the 
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criminals behind them as a way of containing them. The interface between fictional and 
‘factional’ representations of the psychopath in literature is interesting, in that there is a 
degree of crossover between the two forms. The reader of pulp or noir fiction can feel 
sympathy or empathy for a character like Ripley in a relatively untroubled way, yet 
Truman Capote’s sympathetic treatment of Perry Smith in In Cold Blood was met with a 
storm of contemporary disapprobation which continues to concern readers today. 
However, it seems that debate should centre less on sensitive depictions of psychopaths in 
true crime and more on popular cultural responses to psychopaths in general, as it is the 
lack of clear moral response which is at issue. The narrative possibilities offered by 
characters that are unfettered by emotion and affect are enthralling and the presentation of 
the psychopath and his nefarious behaviour as entertainment has shaped cultural 
conceptions of the figure. Capote’s sympathetic portrayal of Perry Smith was 
controversial, but it also tapped a human need to demystify and rationalise the seemingly 
monstrous and incomprehensible. In Cold Blood brought respectability to the true crime 
genre and fuelled ongoing interest in the psychopath. This interest was to influence the 
serial killer subgenre which emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century and was 
shaped by both the popular, escapist literature which valorised the psychopath and the true 
crime which sought to contain him. This ambivalence, and the increase of interest in the 
psychopath which follows from it, mirrors reader response to the figure and the dominance 
of the serial killer subgenre in the popular culture of the 1980s and 1990s speaks to its 
widespread and long-lasting appeal. It is not without irony, however, that one can note 
how the ‘fantasy of impunity’, explored by pulp writers such as Thompson or noirists like 
Highsmith, feeds the fear of random, senseless crimes and the breakdown of community 
which true crime literature seeks to assuage.  
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The serial killer subgenre, and its multiple representations of charismatic, likeable 
psychopaths roaming the cities, killing indiscriminately and often getting away scot-free, 
stoked the culture of fear in urban and rural America. The ubiquity of the subgenre meant 
it was also influential in bringing the psychopath into the mainstream. Thomas Harris was 
instrumental in this, due to the extraordinary reach and appeal of his character, Hannibal 
Lecter, and also by his focus on, and links with, the FBI. That the FBI’s Behavioral 
Science Unit had a media profile of its own only added to the perceived legitimacy of the 
fears surrounding serial killers, which were highly exaggerated by popular culture. In 
American Psycho, Bret Easton Ellis draws on a range of precedents to create a ground-
breaking psychopath who exploits the opposing dynamics of attraction and repulsion at the 
heart of reader engagement with the fictional psychopath. The reader becomes startlingly 
aware of his or her own role in this dialectic and is also cognisant of the extraordinary 
power of poetics as immersion shifts between imaginative involvement, where the reader 
remains aware and potentially appreciative of the author’s handling of his material, and 
entrancement. Early reviews of American Psycho, such as Roger Rosenblatt’s famous 
denouncement of Ellis’s ‘loathsome’ prose (New York Times, 16th December 1990) and 
Naomi Wolf’s dismissal of the novel as ‘the single most boring book I have ever had to 
endure’ (34), reveal that many commentators were unsure about Ellis’s talent. This 
uncertainty made the novel even more powerful, by placing an untrammelled focus on its 
violence and alleged misogyny. During the state of entrancement, and the mental 
simulation that it calls forth, the reader is brought all too close to the fictional psyche of 
the titular psychopath and in a text which is so overtly subversive, this closeness can be 
difficult for the reader to accept. Yet rather than offer solutions to the dissonance created, 
Ellis’s text seeks to confront readers with their complicity and with the moral ambivalence 
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created by the consumption of violence and suffering as entertainment. The novel is a 
cultural landmark, in terms of both its representation of psychopathy and its poetics.  
The lack of resolution in American Psycho relates to the ‘fantasy of impunity’ 
explored by the pulps and to the serial killer subgenre’s flirtation with terrifying, 
uncontainable monstrosity. It is also indicative of its time; the excess of the late 1980s 
coded into Bateman’s boundless appetite for murder. It is interesting, then, that the 
character of Dexter in Jeff Lindsay’s series of novels, should be a figure of retribution. 
Lindsay draws heavily and self-consciously on his literary forebears to bring cultural 
fascination with the psychopath to its logical conclusion in the heroic serial killer. As a 
witty and personable vigilante working for the greater social good, he represents a 
psychopath the reader may easily like and support. His supporting role within hegemony, 
as a member of the Miami Dade Police Department, further facilitates reader empathy and 
identification with the character. Dexter’s ‘mask of sanity’ is such that he blends 
seamlessly in with the crowd; his explanations of his aberrance draw the reader into 
complicity with him, rather than pushing him or her away. However, this psychopath is 
normalised to such an extent that he begins to move away from those elements which were 
originally so alluring as he becomes progressively more ordinary and more human. It 
seems ironic, yet strangely fitting, that the fullest expression of the psychopath trope 
should lead to its nullification. The fictional trajectory of the psychopath comes full circle, 
ending where it began, with the symbolic containment and neutralisation of the threat 
posed by this figure. Popular culture has been so filled with representations of psychopathy 
– a condition which affects just 1% of the population – that it has come to be seen as just 
one more version of normal human experience. Character traits that in fiction would 
formerly have been reserved for the hero have been appropriated by Lindsay’s psychopath, 
suggesting, perhaps, that ‘normal’ human beings are unable to offer satisfying solutions to 
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the problems of the modern world. If Bateman is symptomatic of 1980s excess, then 
Dexter is representative of the twenty first century need to curb those excesses; the 
‘licenced release’ of carnival ultimately serving the ‘interests of that very official culture 
which it apparently opposes’ (Stallybrass and White 13). 
That the most recent book in Lindsay’s series was published a little over six 
months ago speaks to the ongoing popularity of the character, yet in broader popular 
culture representations of the psychopath are sometimes now regarded with a degree of 
cynicism. Martin McDonagh’s 2012 film, Seven Psychopaths, questions the validity of 
psychopath narratives, positing them as hackneyed, boring and overexposed. It is 
impossible to predict what the next development of the psychopath narrative will be and 
there may be a fallow period whilst we wait to see what happens next. What remains clear, 
though, is the fact that psychopaths have been the main drivers of some of the most 
successful and enduring TV series of the last decade. Series such as HBO’s The Sopranos 
(1999-2007), Levinson/Fontana’s Oz (1997-2003), Showtime’s Dexter (2006-2013) and 
HBO’s Boardwalk Empire (2010-present) capitalised on the dramatic potential of the 
psychopath and this trend shows no signs of abating. AMC’s award-winning series 
Breaking Bad (2008-2013) has achieved cult status and although its protagonist, Walter 
White, is not in fact a psychopath, global audiences have been captivated by his descent 
into megalomania. As he builds his meth empire, Walt becomes progressively more 
ruthless and callous – psychopathic traits which are increasingly valorised as the series 
progresses. The lure of the psychopath seems as strong as ever, but writers are faced with 
finding fresh ways of handling their material. Free from the confines of word count and 
limited narrative space, long television series can be far more successful than novels at 
developing characters and story arcs; it is therefore likely that the psychopath will continue 
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to be explored on screen, with novels functioning as a testing ground and fertile source of 
developments in this area.  
Joyce Carol Oates’s Zombie demonstrates that further experimentation is possible 
in psychopath fiction and that responses to the literary psychopath are as multiple and 
varied as subjectivity itself. This multiplicity is mirrored by the reading process also; the 
potential for seemingly endless variation ensuring that reader fascination with the 
enigmatic psychopath does not abate. The tantalising glimpse into the consciousness of the 
definitive other promises a thought-provoking literary experience; the ambivalence 
generated during empathetic engagement with such a figure ensuring that the experience 
lingers long after the reader has finished the book. The plurality of response is also 
enticing; the vagaries of subjectivity, emotional response and reader reception shifting 
from reading to reading. Going forward, perhaps the only constant will be human interest 
in criminality and aberrant psychology; for as long as there are literary devils, there will be 
people who wish to empathise with them. 
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